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## MULTIPLE MEANINGS AND THEIR BEARING ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF DANTE'S METAPHORS

IN SPITE of all the centuries of Dante exegesis, not a few of his metaphors are still unclear. The reasons for this state of things are various; but it may be that there is one which has not been given the place it deserves, namely, the possibility that more than one meaning or bearing of some critical word or phrase, in any given case, was in the writer's mind, and that only by a recognition of that fact, and analysis on that basis, can the real intent and content of the figure be arrived at. Despite the traditional conservatism of commentators and critics in their passive resistance to such criteria, it would seem reasonable to suppose that where any word or phrase had in Dante's time two, or more, meanings of which both, or all, make sense in their context, we must not only realize that he was conscious of the alternative meanings but in many cases be ready to grant that the double or multiple meanings were deliberately intended; and this paper hopes to show, specifically, that this principle—and its extension also to the various possible connotations of a word in its context—will not infrequently lead to a satisfactory solution of debatable metaphors.<sup>1</sup> This it may accomplish in various ways: it may make

<sup>1</sup> Among the leading exponents of multiple significations in Dante's works is Professor Fletcher of Columbia University; and while his main interest is in allegory and symbolism, he does not hesitate to recognize multiple meanings in individual words: e.g., in his essay, "The Comedy of Dante," in his book, *Symbolism of the Divine Comedy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921). If the present writer may be permitted, he will make some quotations from his review of this work in the *Personalist* of October, 1922: ". . . The author subtilizes, via the famous *Epistle to Can Grande*, on the dual significances findable in the Latin title. . . . I applaud the major premise that Dante was fully and pur-

them clear, or more clear; it may show that the chief function of a metaphor which is introduced with apparent abruptness is that it may act as a transition to a subsequent theme; it may explain how and why Dante at times produced composite metaphors which at first sight strike the modern reader as most decidedly "mixed" or at least very eccentrically grouped. And, finally, it may even lead, at times, to the discovery of metaphors probably intended, the very existence of which had hitherto remained unsuspected. Assuming that this method of inquiry is well founded, the scope, interest, and value of its application are evident.

The fact of semantic pluralism in Dante's works, as in those of his contemporaries and predecessors, is universally acknowledged, and needs only to be carried further toward its logical conclusion. Precedents of most august weight abounded. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* III. 11) discusses double meanings intentionally used by speakers and writers; the Bible contains many cases of intentional plays on words, which in some cases are taken most seriously—what could be more serious than the solemn "Tu es Petrus, et super hanc Petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam"? Etymologies, especially for proper names, tended largely to

posefully conscious of all the apposite meanings and connotations involved in his own diction; many futile squabbles of critics would be silenced and many new and broader vistas opened if we could agree to allow Dante that much intelligence." In his "The Crux of Dante's Comedy," *Romanic Review*, XVI (1925), 1-42, the same author lays frequent and strong stress on multiple meanings of words as well as of allegories; and he rightly says (p. 1): "Interpreters . . . have too commonly seemed to forget Dante's own insistence that his allegory is multiple." On the specific subject of multiple word-senses he says, *inter alia* (p. 34): "Puns are serious things for Dante and his age," with their reverence for words (*Nomina sunt consequentia rerum*). Of the DXV cipher Professor Fletcher goes so far as to assert: "Dante . . . packed into it all possible significations, however strained or fanciful they may seem to a modern mind. Not to do so would have been to run counter to his own amazing ingenuity, countenanced as that was by the universal practice of the best minds of over ten centuries." Some of the word-quibbles suggested in his article seem a bit far fetched; e.g. (p. 18): "Vellute . . . as a quibbling equivalent of *volute*, or as the past participle of a supposed verb from *velle*." If one may go this far, let me nominate also *Pilato*, of *Purg.* XX, 91, as an echo of the Old Ital. *pirato*, 'pirate'—which fits the context beautifully (cf. *corsar* of vs. 81; and note further that in Old Ital. both *corsare* and *corsale* were used as equivalent to the modern *corsaro*—cf. *valchi* [reduced form of *valichi*] for *varchi* [*Purg.* XXIV, 97]; and the alternations of *alboro* and *arboro*, *pellegrino* and *peregrino*, used by Dante as well as by his contemporaries! Further: with this much latitude, the influence of *nove(m)*, 'nine,' on his choice of a title for his *Vita n(u)ova* would be easily admissible (cf. *Purg.* XXX, 115; and see *Rom. Rev.*, I [1910], 89 ff.), and the "Deum per homines, tanquam per celos *novos*, aliquid operatum fuisse," of *Epist.*, V, 24 (with which cf. perhaps *nuovi* amor of *Par.*, XXIX, 18—in spite of the diphthong), would suggest itself as analogous (cf. II *Pet.* 3:13; *Isa.* 65:17; 66:22); and both *Re giovane* and *Re Giovanni* might be harbored (*Inf.*, XXVIII, 135)—cf. Toynbee, *Dante Studies and Researches*, pp. 253-55 and 284; and *Troni....ternaro* (*Par.*, XXVIII, 104 f.) would also bear further inspection, etc.

be *polysemous* (Dante uses this word himself in *Epist.*, XIII, 20; and it is often employed by Servius in his commentaries on Vergil). As one universally known storehouse of such, in the Middle Ages, take Isidore of Seville's *Etymologies*. Names might mean two or even more different people or things at the same time;<sup>2</sup> and while such fusions are doubtless often the result of *confusions*, the perpetration of multivocal words and concepts was held in too high esteem to recommend accuracy and single-tongued speaking. The rage for allegory was merely another phase of this vogue of the complex. As is well known, Dante himself insists on literal and allegorical meaning, the latter itself multiple.<sup>3</sup> "Equivocal rhymes," in which are rhymed together homonyms, or even the same word used in different constructions, or in meanings which vary sometimes only slightly, are standard in Italian poetry, and always have been;<sup>4</sup> and in verse forms such as the *sestina* pluralism of sense was carried to extremes in Dante's own day.<sup>5</sup> Several puns are thrust upon us by Dante, and others are rather easily recognized in his works.<sup>6</sup> The whole clause of *Inf.*, XXXIII, 117, is deliberately equivocal.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Moore, *Studies in Dante*, Vol. IV: "Sta. Lucia in the *Divine Comedy*," for a probable fusing of two different saints; and cf. the more-than-suspicion that the two Mount Idas, and the two Babylons, were often confused (apparently) by those who had plenty of reason to know better; and so on, almost *ad infinitum*; the examples, and types of examples, which it is possible to cite are beyond keeping track of.

<sup>3</sup> *Conv.*, II, 1, 2-6; *Epist.*, XIII, 20-22. But Dante warns us (*Mon.*, III, iv, 6) that non-primary significations are not always present, or when present may be erroneously interpreted.

<sup>4</sup> A *rimario* will show, in round numbers, some twoscore "equivocal rhymes" in Dante's lyrics, and perhaps twice as many in the *Divine Comedy*. An exact census could be made only after an agreement on a very strict series of definitional limitations, because of the complications introduced by (1) specializing types like the *sestina*; (2) purely auditory homonyms like *langue*, *l'angue*; (3) partial homonyms like *turpa*, *deturpa*; *addusse*, *sedusse*; (4) combinations of the last like *confesso*, *fesso*; (5) extensions of the last to purely compositional partial-homonyms like *fiammeggio*, *pareggio*—and ultimately to merely inflectional or morphological ones like *dissetito*, *inretito*; (6) "identical rhymes" like *ammenda*, *ammenda*, etc.

<sup>5</sup> The use of *senhals* is closely allied; note especially Dante's use of *petra* in the "Rime per la Donna Pietra" (*Rime*, C-CHII).

<sup>6</sup> At least one of the meanings in each case is usually metaphorical. The following seem certainly intended (or at least very probably so; in which case they are put in brackets): *VN*, XI, 3, *salute* (cf. *Par.*, XXX, 53, and *Mon.*, I, iv, 4); *VN*, XXIV, 4, *Primavera*; *VN*, XXIX, 3, *fattore*; [*Rim.*, LXXIII, 8, *cortonese*]; [*Inf.*, XVIII, 51, *salse* (cf. Toynbee, *D. S. and R.*, p. 226)]; [*Inf.*, XIX, 72, *borsa*; *Inf.*, XXIV, 125, *mul*; *Inf.*, XXXII, 106, *Bocca* (cf. *mascelle*, vs. 107, and *Ciacco*, VI, 52); *Purg.*, VI, 142, *sottili* (cf. *Par.*, XXXII, 51); *Purg.*, XII, 72, *mal sentero*; *Purg.*, XV, 117, *errori*; [*Purg.*, XIX, 116, *converso* (cf. vs. 72, and *conversione* in vs. 106)]; [*Purg.*, XXIV, 62, *stilo* (cf. *pennne*, vs. 58)]; *Purg.*, XXVII, 91, *ruminando* (cf. 86); *Purg.*, XXXI, 136, *grazia...grazia*; [*Par.*, IV, 58, *tornare* (cf. *riede*,

Besides the more likely and the certain cases of intended puns or double senses, there are many, very many, other instances which an open-minded investigation of the whole subject would have to consider.<sup>7</sup>

vs. 52]; *Par.*, XI, 53, *Ascesi*; *Par.*, XXI, 134, *bestie*; [*Par.*, XXVI, 23, *schiarar* (and *cerne*, vs. 35)].

The following are also perhaps purposeful puns: *Inf.*, I, 106, *umile* (cf. Moore, *Studies in Dante*, I, 179 f.); *Inf.*, VIII, 60, *gravi cittadini*; *Inf.*, XX, 28, *pietà*; *Inf.*, XXI, 63, *baratta*; *Purg.*, X, 30, *dritto* (cf. *manco*, *ibid.*); *Purg.*, XXVIII, 51, *primavera*; *Par.*, X, 46, *basse* (cf. 47-48); *Par.*, X, 108, *tesoro*; and if *Par.*, I, 16, *giogo*, has not the extra, punning, sense of 'yoke, burden,' the metaphor is fearfully mixed.

Plays more upon the sounds than upon the meanings seem to be involved in such cases as *Cons.*, IV, vi, 11, *voluptade*, *voluntade* (cf. Hildemar, ninth-century grammarian and orthographer, in his commentary on the *Regula S. Benedicti*: "Sunt multi qui distinguunt voluntatem per *n* attinere ad Deum, et voluntatem per *m* ad hominem, voluptatem vero per *p* ad diabolum"); *Mon.*, III, xi, 2, *advocati...advocari*; *Epist.*, V, 22, *verbo Verbi*. *Cons.*, IV, x, 12 repeats *torre* in a way which is either intentionally jingling or else unhappily callous to euphonic infelicity. *Par.*, I, 26, puts *allor* in the middle of a verse immediately after one which reminds us with *its tuo diletto legno* that the word *alloro* has just been used, in vs. 15; and in the rhyme, at that: the effect is certainly strange; and one wonders about various things—among them, the question of Dante's use of internal rhymes and echoes.

<sup>7</sup> E.g., in the *Divine Comedy* only (including cases of all types where plural meanings, connotations, or suggestions are possible): *Inferno*: I, 49, *lupa* (see *MLN*, XL, 340); I, 63, *foco* (cf. III, 27, 75); I, 75, *superbo* (cf. *Purg.*, XII, 36, 70; *Inf.*, XXI, 34; *Purg.*, IV, 41); I, 85, *autore* (cf. *Cons.*, IV, vi, 4-5); I, 87, *stilo* (cf. *VN*, XXVI, 4; *Rim.*, LXXXII, 10; *Cons.*, IV, II, 11; *Purg.*, XXIV, 62); I, 103, *terra*; I, 105, *nazione*; *Feltro e Feltro*; I, 117, *la seconda morte*; II, 41, *consumai*; II, 48, *ombra*; III, 25, *diverse* (cf. VI, 86); III, 29, *senza tempo*; III, 54, *indegna*; III, 83, *antico*; III, 91, *porti*; IV, 13, *cieco mondo* (cf. III, 47; VI, 93; XXVII, 25; *Purg.*, XVI, 66); IV, 135, *più presso li stanno*; V, 108, *porte*; VI, 21, *profani*; VI, 65, *selvaggia*; VI, 69, *piaggia*; VI, 96, *podestà* (both political and abstract meanings); VII, 1, *Papè* (cf. *papi*, vs. 47; and remember that it is the God of Wealth who utters this exclamation. Ugucione da Pisa: "Pape interjectio admirantis: unde papa, id est admirabilis"!); VII, 33, *ontoso*; VII, 61, *buffa*; IX, 1, *pinne*; IX, 80, *passo*; IX, 91, *dispetta*; IX, 131, *monimenti...caldi* (see Pietrobono's commentary); X, 39, *conte*; X, 63, *ebbe*; XI, 65, *Dile*; XI, 113, *guisanz*; XII, 89, *novo* (cf. XVI, 116; *et saepe*); XII, 120, *si cola*; XIII, 41, *geme*; XIII, 108, *ombra*; XIII, 117, *rosta*; XIII, 151, *giubbetto*; XV, 72, *becco*; XVI, 124, *faccia* (cf. XVII, 10); XVII, 39, *mena*; XIX, 4, *avolterate*; XIX, 36, *torti* (might also be adj. with *consorti*, vs. 32); XIX, 52-53, *ritto...ritto*; XIX, 97, *ti sta*; XX, 70, *arnese*; XXI, 46, *convolto* (see *Giorn. dant.*, XXX, 222 f.); XXI, 54, *nascosamente accaffi*; XXI, 132, *duoli* (cf. XXVIII, 110; *Par.*, XIX, 118); XXII, 24, *balena* (a whimsical wordplay? Cf. *dalfini*, vs. 19; and see *Torraca's* commentary); XXII, 123, *proposto*; XXII, 150, *crosta*; XXIII, 26, *imagine*; XXIII, 85, *bieco*; XXIII, 109, *frati* (see D'Ovidio, *Studii sulla Div. comm.* [Milan, etc., 1901], p. 86); XXIV, 48, *coltre* (meant also 'pall' in early Italian); XXIV, 148, *combattuto* (see *Torraca's* commentary, and his quotation from *Ristoro*); XXV, 18, *acerbo* (cf. *Par.*, XIX, 48); XXV, 65, *papiro* ('paper' and 'wick'); XXIX, 1, *diverse*; XXIX, 36, *pio*; XXX, 95, *greppo*; XXX, 108, *mastiere*; XXX, 131, *Or pur miral* (see *Steiner's* commentary); XXXIII, 135, *verna* (see *Torraca*).

*Purgatorio*: I, 24, *prima gente* (in time, and in first zone; cf. XXX, 1); III, 126, *faccia* (cf. *Par.*, XIII, 129 *volti*); IV, 53-54 (entire); IV, 64, *rubecchio*; VIII, 131 (entire clause); IX, 125, *ingegno* (cf. XIV, 54); IX, 136, *acra* (cf. XXXI, 3); XI, 66, *fante*; XI, 102, *nome*; XIII, 7, *ombra*; XIII, 67, *approda*; XIV, 31, *pregno*; XIV, 84, *liore*; XIV, 100, *fabbro*; XV, 49, *s'appuntano* (cf. *Par.*, XXVI, 7); XXII, 4 and 71, *giustizia*; XXII, 40, *sacra* (cf. XXIV, 154); XXIII, 73, *alberi* (with reference also to *Cross*; cf. vs. 74 f.); XXV, 1, *storpio*; XXV, 109, *tortura*; XXV, 111, *cura* (cf. vs. 138); XXVIII, 104, *volta* (cf. *Par.*, XXVIII, 50); XXIX, 61, *ardi*; XXIX, 62, *vive*; XXIX, 75, *pennelli*; XXIX, 82, *diviso*;



The reluctance of expositors to accept multiple significances of words as being deliberate, and especially where aesthetic principles are primarily involved, as they are in figures of speech, is without doubt due to the fact that this feature is in most cases really *unaesthetic*; and to that extent the reluctance of Dante's admirers does them honor. The practical result, however, in the case of possible multiple meanings of all types, whether involved in figures of speech or not, is that a large part of Dante commentaries is taken up with dogmatic assertions of single meanings, with the commentators resolutely and often defiantly lined up in two or more camps, for each debatable word or phrase.

It would seem indicated that we should bow to the evidence, and accept semantic pluralism with what grace we can. After all, the gain will be considerable if this attitude will help us better to see and to understand Dante's work as he himself conceived and intended it; and, where the multiple meanings are not vital for the comprehension of his main thought, it will usually be found, I believe, that the non-primary alternatives are not obtrusive enough seriously to mar the poetic effect.

XXIX, 119, *devota* (cf. XIII, 82; XXIII, 21; *Mon.*, II, v, 15); XXX, 1, *primo cielo* (cf. I, 24); XXX, 92, *notan* (cf. XXXI, 38); XXX, 101, *pie* (cf. 95; V, 87 and 133); XXX, 115, *vita nova*; XXX, 125, *seconda etade*; XXXI, 117, *trasse*; XXXI, 144, *armonizzando*; *ciel l'adombra*; XXXII, 24, *primo legno* (cf. 51); XXXII, 48, *seme, giusto*; XXXII, 99, *Aquilone*; XXXII, 118, *cuna*; XXXII, 135, *vago vago* (cf. XIX, 22; *Par.*, XII, 14; and perhaps *ibid.*, XXXI, 33).

*Paradiso*: I, 19, *spira* (cf. II, 8); II, 9, *nove* [Muse] (cf. VII, 72; XIII, 50); III, 12, *perai*; IV, 63, *nominar*; VI, 2, *contr'al corso del ciel*; VI, 47, *nomato* (cf. *Purg.*, XVIII, 82); VI, 56, *sereno* (cf. XIX, 64; also *Inf.*, VI, 51; XV, 49); VI, 63, *penna* (cf. *volo*, vs. 62); VI, 91, *replico*; VI, 135, *Romeo*; *peregrina*; VIII, 116, *terra* (cf. XXV, 92); IX, 47, *cangerà l'acqua*; IX, 108, *torna*; IX, 129, *pianta* (cf. *fiore*, vs. 130); X, 22, *banco*; X, 37, *è Beatrice*; X, 71, *gioie, care*; X, 138, *invidiosi* (cf. XII, 142); XI, 48, *giogo*; XI, 138, *corregger*; XII, 40, *imperador* (in both political and military meanings); XII, 45, *raccorse*; XII, 72, *orto* (cf. XI, 55); XII, 120, *arca* (cf. XXIII, 131); XII, 142, *paladino*; XIII, 16, *raggi*; XIII, 59, *nove*; XV, 9, *concorde*; XV, 23, *radial*; XVI, 63, *alla cerca*; XVI, 154, *vermiglio* (cf. XVII, 66); XVII, 17, *punto* (cf. XXXIII, 94); XVII, 26, *fortuna* (cf. *Purg.*, XXXII, 116); XVII, 58, *sale*; XVII, 98, *vita*; XVIII, 62, *cresciuto l'arco*; XVIII, 70, *gioital*; XVIII, 87, *versi brevi*; XVIII, 129, *pio Padre*; XIX, 15, *vincere a disio*; XIX, 101, *segno* (cf. VII, 61, etc.; esp. cf. VI, 32 with XIV, 101); XX, 15, *spinto*; XX, 20, *chiaro*; XX, 40, *canto* (cf. vs. 38 f., and *Purg.*, X, 60); XX, 137, *affina* (cf. *Fiore*, CLXXXVII, 7); XXIII, 132, *bobolce*; XXIV, 91, *targa*; XXIV, 138, *almi* (cf. *Inf.*, II, 20); XXVI, 28, *come*; XXVI, 35, *cerne* (cf. vs. 22 f.); XXVI, 84, *prima*; XXVI, 107-8, *pareglio...pareglio*; XXVI, 134, *I*; XXVII, 145, *fortuna* (cf. XII, 52); XXIX, 6, *si dilibra*; XXIX, 60, *intender*; XXX, 122, *messo*; XXXI, 36, *andò di sopra*; XXXIII 86, *volume*; XXXIII, 90, *un semplice lume*; XXXIII, 94, *punto* (cf. XVII, 17), *letargo*; XXXIII, 107, *fante*; XXXIII, 127, *concella*.

It is not contended that the foregoing list is complete; much less that more than a single meaning was certainly intended in each case; it is a collection of possibilities of intended multiple meanings; and several of the items included will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Let me cite a few cases where it seems to me that light may be thrown by this method of approach. The following examples will be presented in the general order outlined above,<sup>8</sup> viz.: (1) added clearness, (2) transitional function, (3) complex metaphors, (4) unsuspected metaphors; but usually two or more of these features coexist in each.

1. At the end of Canto XXX of the *Inferno*, after Vergil has reproved Dante for unbecoming curiosity, he comforts him by telling him that his resultant shame is ample penance; and the following canto (XXXI) begins:

Una medesima lingua pria mi morse,  
 sì che mi tinse l'una e l'altra guancia,  
 e poi la medicina mi riporse:  
 così od'io che solea la lancia  
 d'Achille e del suo padre esser cagione  
 prima di trista e poi di buona mancia.<sup>9</sup>

Those commentators who pause at verse 1 have some difficulty with the concept of a tongue's biting, though Benvenuto da Imola cleverly explains it: "Mordaciter me reprehendit." Venturi, who mentions this metaphor in connection with the simile of verses 4-6, remarks: "...lingua e morde non hanno fra loro piena corrispondenza."<sup>10</sup> Such phrases as *lingua mordace*, *parole mordaci*, etc., are, however, commonplaces.

But Dante, while having Vergil's tongue primarily in mind, may at the same time have been also thinking more or less consciously of a serpent's tongue, which popularly was, and is, thought to bite: the idea is ubiquitous in both folk lore and literature.<sup>11</sup> Dante was doubtless aware that a serpent does not use its two-pronged tongue<sup>12</sup> to bite with; but the familiarity of the idea would easily explain how he came to combine the fact of its twin points with the concept of the blood

<sup>8</sup> At the end of the first paragraph.

<sup>9</sup> "One and the same tongue first bit me, so that it stained my one cheek and the other, and then in turn it extended to me the medicine: thus, I hear, the lance of Achilles and his father used to occasion first sad and then good dealing."

<sup>10</sup> *Le similitudini dantesche* (3d ed.; Florence, 1911), p. 355; simile 574.

<sup>11</sup> E.g., in the Bible we find: Ps. 139:4: "Acuerunt linguas suas sicut serpentis"; cf. Ps. 13:3 (repeated in Rom. 3:13); Job 20:16; Jac. 3:8 (cf. vs. 7); and the same concept explains Jerome's metaphor, in his *Praefatio* . . . *ad desiderium* ("in Josue"): "Unde cesset arcuato vulnere contra nos insurgere scorpius, et sanctum opus venenata carpere lingua"—certainly a serpent's tongue, paired with the scorpion's tail.

<sup>12</sup> *Inf.*, XXV, 133 f.: *lingua....forcuta*.

brought to his two cheeks by the sharp reproof from Vergil's tongue—as if with one thrust it had pierced them both. And when we note that in *Inf.*, XXV, 50 ff., Dante had vividly described a serpent which sunk its teeth into the two cheeks of a sinner, with *guancia* in that passage, as here, rhymed with *lancia*, and, more than that, the same entire phrase, *l'una e l'altra guancia*, employed, it seems almost certain that this is what Dante had in mind. Further, the metaphor of a two-edged sword for the tongue of sharp reproof is also a well-known standard; for example, take the dread avenger of the *Apocalypse*, XIX, 15;<sup>13</sup> and this gives a direct analogy with the spear of Peleus and Achilles in our passage. This spear was renowned as a weapon which healed its own wound; so that perhaps we are led back to our suspected serpent-metaphor by way of the superstition which at times applies to the serpent bite the "hair-of-the-dog" principle known from time immemorial, and crystallized in the adage: "Similia similibus curantur."<sup>14</sup> It may be, thus, that we have not only clarified a metaphor, but actually discovered one—which might have been reserved for Class 4.

2. In *Paradiso*, Canto XXXIII, looking upward with ever strengthening spiritual insight into the Divine Ray, what Dante saw there he describes in a passage which begins thus:

Nel suo profondo vidi che s'*interna*,  
legato con amore in *un* volume,  
ciò che per l'universo si *squaderna*.<sup>15</sup>

Modern commentators say that *s'interna* means here 'is within'; but, in spite of such statements as Casini's dictum<sup>16</sup> that "there can

<sup>13</sup> "Et de ore ejus procedit gladius ex utraque parte acutus, ut in ipso percutiat Gentes." Nearly the same wording is used in describing the "One like unto the Son of Man" who appeared to John in the first chapter with his messages, partly of reproof, for the seven churches (*Apoc.*, I, 16): "... de ore ejus gladius utraque parte acutus exibat." Cf. *Purg.*, XXXI, 2 f.

<sup>14</sup> This is apparently the concept underlying the passage in Jacopone da Todì's *Lauda*, LVI, 3-4: "Colla lingua forcuta—m'hai fatta sta feruta,/ che colla lingua ligui—e la piaga me stigni" (text of Giov. Ferri's ed., rev. S. Caramella; Bari: Laterza, 1930). Steiner quotes this in his comment on this passage of Dante's; yet the idea of the serpent's tongue as perhaps specifically applicable to clearing up the "biting tongue" difficulty here apparently never occurred to Steiner. The double tongue of the serpent also gave rise to a figure of a different type: that one so familiar to us in the expressions "double tongued" and "double speaking," though the English seems to have no particular thought of the serpent in mind; in Latin it was specifically a serpent figure, e.g., Plautus *Persa* II. 4. 28: "Tamquam proserpens bestia, est bilinguis et scelestus."

<sup>15</sup> Vss. 85-87.

<sup>16</sup> Repeated in S. A. Barbi's re-working of the *Commentary*.

be no idea of the operations of the Trinity, as *the*<sup>17</sup> ancient commentators believe, because Dante does not contemplate this mystery until vs. 115," I cannot help feeling that "the" ancient commentators were right when I note that these three verses contain in succession the words (*s'*)*interna*, *un* (*volume*), and (*si*) *squaderna*. For Dante has already used, in *Par.*, XXVIII, 120, *s'interna*—inventing the word for the purpose—to mean 'is threefold';<sup>18</sup> and *squaderna* has "four" as its well-known root. Comparing *quaderno* in *Par.*, XVII, 37—

La contingenza, che fuor del *quaderno*  
della vostra *matera* non si stende,  
tutta è dipinta nel cospetto eterno<sup>19</sup>

—and considering the similarity of the contexts, it does not seem rash to guess that *s'interna* of XXXIII, 85, points to the Trinity of the spiritual world—acting also as a transitional foreshadowing of the formal exposition in verses 115 ff.;<sup>20</sup> and that *si squaderna* of verse 87 here, as well as *quaderno* of XVII, 37, refers to the material world with its four elements,<sup>21</sup> now seen bound together *con amore* in *one volume*—the essential unity of all things in God.

3. As a sample of what might seem at first a badly "mixed" metaphor, which may hinge on plural meanings or connotations, consider *Par.*, XXVI, 49–51, 55–63:

"Ma di ancor se tu senti altre *corde*  
*tirarti* verso lui, sì che tu suone  
con quanti *denti* questo amor ti *morde*."

Però ricominciai: "Tutti quei *morsi*  
che posson far lo cor *volgere* a Dio,  
alla mia caritate son concorsi;

<sup>17</sup> *Gli*: apparently at least many of them.

<sup>18</sup> Without dissent from the commentators.

<sup>19</sup> "Contingency, which beyond the *quaderno* [really a quarto volume] of your matter [i.e., matter, as opposed to spirit] does not reach, is all depicted in the face of the Eternal."

<sup>20</sup> "Nella profonda e chiara sussistenza  
dell'alto lume parvermi tre giri  
di tre colori e d'una contenenza;  
e l'un dall'altro come iri da iri  
parea riflesso, e l' terzo pareo foco  
che quinci e quindi igualmente si spiri."

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Scartazzini's brief summary of this common concept, Leipzig ed. of his *Commentary*, n. to *Purg.*, XXIX, 88, referring to *Apoc.*, IV, 6–8 (*quatuor animalia*): "Il numero quattro...è il numero del mondo, come tre è il numero di Dio." F. Olivero (*Giorn. dant.*, XXVII, 252) translates the *si squaderna* of *Par.*, XXXIII, 87, "is divided into quires."

chè l'essere del mondo e l'esser mio,  
 la morte ch'el sostenne perch'io viva,  
 e quel che spera ogni fedel com'io,  
 con la predetta conoscenza viva,  
 tratto m'hanno del mar dell'amor torto,  
 e del diritto m'han posto alla riva."<sup>22</sup>

St. John is examining Dante on love; and has found him to set his highest affection on God because of reasons both philosophical and scriptural; and at this point the quotation of verses 49-51 starts.

The *corde* and *tirar* here, taken with the *morsi*, and especially the *far....volgere*, of Dante's reply, make one think at once of a favorite metaphor of his: that of guiding or driving a horse by bit and rein, as, for example, in *Purg.*, XIV, 143 f.:

Quel fu il duro *camo*  
 che dovria l'uom tener dentro a sua meta.<sup>23</sup>

But—unless Dante was thinking of those cruel curbs called *lupati* (or *lupata*) in Latin, which had wolflike teeth<sup>24</sup>—*Par.*, XXVI, 51, either is a metaphor to the second degree or else shows that something else was in Dante's mind; and when we see him wind up, in verses 62-63, with what is apparently a figure of being fished out of sin's sea,<sup>25</sup> we wonder if he had a fishline and fishhook in mind from the very first. Maybe so, but not necessarily. *Morsi*<sup>26</sup> of verse 55 may have been primarily part of a horsemanship metaphor, and then the *amor* of verse

<sup>22</sup> "But say, further, if thou feelest other cords draw thee towards Him, so that thou mayest declare with how many teeth this love doth bite thee."—Therefore, I began again: 'All those bitings which can make the heart turn to God have been concurrent unto my love; for the existence of the world and my own existence, the death which He endured that I may live, and that which all the faithful hope even as I do, together with the aforesaid living consciousness, have drawn me from the sea of perverted love, and have set me on the shore of the right' " (Norton's trans.).

<sup>23</sup> "That was the hard curb which ought to hold one within his bound."

<sup>24</sup> Vergil uses the word in *Georg.* III, 208, on which Servius comments: "DVRIS PARERE LUPATIS frenis asperimis, dicta autem lupata a lupinis dentibus, qui inaequales sunt, unde etiam eorum morsus vehementer obest." De Salvio, *The Rhyme Words in the "Divine Comedy"* (Paris: Champion, 1929), p. 78, calls *camo* a Latinism; and Moore, *Studies in Dante*, I, 59, thinks it "doubtless borrowed by Dante from Ps. xxxi. 9" (from which indeed Dante seems to quote the words in *camo et freno* of *Mon.*, III, xvi, 9). But *camo* was often used in Old Italian.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the "fishers of men" figure in Matt. 4:19; Mark 1:17; Luke 5:10; Jer. 16:16; and Peter as "The Fisherman" (*Purg.*, XXII, 63; *Par.*, XVIII, 136). Some take Dante here to have intended, rather, the figure of rescue from shipwreck.

<sup>26</sup> If *corde* / *tirarti* (vs. 49-50) had not immediately preceded, one would have been inclined to surmise that the "teeth-biting" metaphor here was similar to that in *Rim.*, CIII, 31 f.: "...ogni senso / co li denti d'Amor già mi manduca."

51—aided more or less consciously by suggestions from its concrete connotations (among which perhaps that of *morso* as the regular word for the 'flake' of an anchor)—may have suggested *amo*, 'hook' (the fishhook with its biting barb).<sup>27</sup>

Yet the fishing metaphor may have been in mind from the first, by literary reminiscence, and the *corde* of verse 49 thus be directly explained; for we find the same pair of figures used rather often elsewhere in close combination, as, for example, in *Ezech.*, XXIX, 4: "Et ponam *frenum* in maxillis tuis: et agglutinabo pisces fluminum tuorum squamis tuis: et *extraham* te de medio fluminum tuorum. . . ."<sup>28</sup> In fact, the fusion of these two metaphors had in Dante's time become something of a literary habit, especially in verse, where the convenient rhyme *camo: amo* doubtless had a great deal to do with its popularity; Cecco d'Ascoli has it in one stanza of his *Acerba*,<sup>29</sup> and Dante himself had previously linked the same two metaphors in his own *Comedy*: the sentence quoted above from *Purg.*, XIV, 143 f., "Quel fu il duro *camo* / Che dovria l'uom tener dentro a sua meta," is followed immediately by "Ma voi prendete l'esca, sì che l'amo / Dell'antico avver-

<sup>27</sup> See, e.g., M. S. Garver, "Sources of the Beast Similes in the Italian Lyric of the Thirteenth Century," *Romanische Forschungen*, XXXI (1908), 284: "The punning on the word *amo*, fishhook, and different forms of the verb *amare* is frequently found." Cf. Chiaro Davanzati, in *Le antiche rime volgari, secondo la lezione del Codice Vaticano 3793*, ed. D'Ancona and Comparetti (Bologna, 1875-88), DCCXCII, 13: "D'amar....consiglio che 'mbocchiate l'amo"; and Uguiccone da Pisa, *Magnae derivationes* (according to Bodleian MS, Laud 626—Rotograph 30 of the series of the Mod. Lang. Assoc. of Amer.): "Item ab amo, hic amicus. ci., quasi amoris custos; vel dicitur ab hamo, idest cathena caritatis"; Jacopone, *Lauda*, LXXXV, 1: "O amor che m'ami—prendime a li toi ami"; Petrarch, *Son.*, "Beato in sogno," vs. 14: "....presi l'esca e l'amo!"; *Son.*, "Di di in di," vs. 2: "Nè però smorso i dolce inescati ami!"; *Son.*, "In quel bel viso," vs. 5: "Il cor preso ivi come pesce a l'amo"; *Canz.*, "Amor, se vuo'," vs. 55 f.: "....gli ami ov'lo fui preso, e l'esca / Chi' i bramo sempre"; *Son.*, "Mai non fui," vs. 14: "Pregli ch' i sprezzai 'l mondo e i suoi dolci ami."

<sup>28</sup> Not so in the English Bible, which has " . . . I will put *hooks* in thy jaws," etc. The "belli occhi / onde a pigliarmi fece Amor la corda" of *Par.*, XXVIII, 11 f., may be another case of the fishing metaphor—if it be not that of a noose or snare for catching game; cf. the *corda* of *Inf.*, XVI, 106, with which Dante once thought to "prender la lonza alla pelle dipinta." A kindly critic suggests that vs. 49-51 might be taken as not involving any specifically visualized metaphor; looked at in this light, of course, there is hardly any problem of importance offered by our passage.

<sup>29</sup> Vss. 2593-2600: "Così fa l'inimico della gente, / Che mostra di diletto la dolce esca, / Fino alla morte pasce nostra mente. / In questo mare grande e spazioso / Con diversi ami dolcemente pesca. / Beato è quegli che volta lo muso / E mette alla sua gola il freno e il *camo* / A ciò che preso non sia da quest'amo." Cf. also the following stanza from a thirteenth-century "Lauda di una compagnia cortonese," published in Monaci, *Crestomazia italiana dei primi secoli* (Città di Castello, 1912), p. 461, vs. 19-22: "Fosti l'esca et Cristo l'amo / per cui fo difeso Adamo; / perck'Eva prese el *camo* / del freno ke fo talliente."



saro a sè vi tira."<sup>30</sup> The great influence on Dante of Ezekiel's symbolism and imagery is well known.<sup>31</sup> Yet the wide use of the *camo:amo* rhyme may easily have been, after all, the deciding factor.

4. Finally, perhaps another new metaphor or two may be discovered—or rediscovered. For example, in *Inf.*, III, 34–39—

Questo misero modo  
tengon l'anime triste di coloro  
che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.  
Mischiate sono a quel cattivo coro  
delli angeli che non furon ribelli  
nè fur fedeli a Dio, ma per sè foro.<sup>32</sup>

—does not *coro*, 'choir,' of verse 37 suggest that *modo* of verse 34 means not only 'mode' or 'manner' in the general sense, but 'tune' or the like, as did the Latin *modus* when used in reference to music and poetry?<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Vss. 145–46. It is rather evident that Cecco was imitating Dante directly, in the passage given in the preceding note; but in view of Cecco's expressed disdain for Dante, he probably would not have allowed himself so close a parallel in the wording if the commonness of the fusing of these two metaphors had not made it fairly inconspicuous.

<sup>31</sup> Moore's classic work, *Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante* (Vol. I of his *Studies in Dante*), gives an inadequate idea of the extent to which Dante reflects Ezekiel. With regard to the quotation from that prophet given above, it should be said that it comes very soon after the sentence "Tu signaculum similitudinis . . . , etc.," quoted word for word by Dante from *Ezek.* 28:12 f., in his *Epist.*, XIII, 76.

Another factor which should not be entirely overlooked is the possibility of a confusion, in the late Latin, between the words for 'bit' or 'curb' and for 'hook': the former is regularly and correctly spelled *camus* in most cases, but the writing of initial *ch-* for *c-* is a well-known foible of medieval scribes; while, through the converse of the same tendency, initial *h-* often becomes *ch-*, so that the word for 'hook' which should be *hamus* is not infrequently found spelled *chamus*—in standard texts of the Vulgate itself, for example.

<sup>32</sup> "The wretched souls of those who lived without infamy and without praise maintain this miserable *mode*. They are mingled with that caitiff *choir* of the angels, who were not rebels, nor were faithful to God, but were for themselves" (Norton's trans.).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. the related ideas in *note* (*Inf.*, V, 25 and XIX, 118); *ontoso metro* (VII, 33); *antico verso* (XVI, 20); *metro* (XIX, 89). It seems impossible that Dante did not have this technical meaning of *modus* in mind in certain parts of the *De vulg. eloq.*, especially in the part which treats of prosody, and above all in Book II, chap. III, in which "distinguit quibus *modis* vulgariter versificatores poetantur." Music continued to be a real accompaniment of lyric poetry until after Dante's apogee. *Purg.*, XVI, 20, is another verse which gains greatly if this special sense is given to *modo*; and some of the commentators have recognized this fact (e.g., Del Lungo and Vandelli):

"Io sentia voci, e ciascuna pareva  
pregar per pace e per misericordia  
l'agnel di Dio che le peccata leva.  
Pur 'Agnus Dei' eran le loro essordia;  
una parola in tutte era ed un *modo*,  
sì che pareva tra esse ogni concordia."

Here Norton may have had this conception of the specific meaning of *modo*, though he does not comment; he translates: "I heard voices, and each appeared to be praying for peace and for mercy to the Lamb of God that taketh sins away. Only 'Agnus Dei' were their exordiums: one word there was in all, and one *measure*; so that there seemed entire

And, to mention one more case, it would be a pretty figure if *lume* of *Par.*, IX, 7, was intended by Dante to mean not only 'light' but 'lamp'—one of the standard meanings of the word<sup>34</sup>—a lamp which was to be kept full of oil<sup>35</sup> by the generous Sun of the World—

E già la vita di quel *lume* santo  
rivolta s'era al Sol che la riempie

—reminding us of our Milton's

. . . . The stars  
That Nature hung in heaven, and filled their lamps  
With everlasting oil.<sup>36</sup>

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concord among them." Grandgent's commentary, too, though very briefly, seems to suggest this understanding. The special prosodic sense of *modo* here is further recommended by the word *concordia* in the next verse: this word (and its cognates) was often used in musical and prosodic senses, outside of strictly "classical" Latin, as a synonym for *harmonia*. The English use of its opposite, "discord," shows this flavor strongly. In Dante's own Italian we find him using, for example, *concordanza* in reference to the rhyming of words (*Conv.*, IV, II, 12), and *discordante* in referring to languages which sound dissimilar (*ibid.*, I, v, 9); while the sense of "rhythm" is specifically indicated in the use of *si concorda* (*Par.*, XX, 147) referring to the synchronous winking of the eyes. Note, also, how perfectly *modo* in the musical sense would fit *Purg.*, XXV, 136: "(Indi al cantar tornavano....) .... / E questo modo credo che lor basti...."

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Purg.*, XXII, 68 (and perhaps *Inf.*, I, 82); also *Purg.*, XXXII, 98; see *MLN*, XLIV (1929), 238 f.

<sup>35</sup> Or wax; cf. *Purg.*, VIII, 113.

<sup>36</sup> *Comus*, II, 197 ff.

## LOPE DE VEGA AN IMITATOR OF QUEVEDO?

SPANISH literature, like others, offers ample proof of the lenience with which an earlier age looked upon literary borrowings and imitation. Yet the evidence adduced so far is doubtless still very incomplete. For example, two of the outstanding names of Spain's Golden Age have never been linked in this way, though, as I shall presently show, there is reason for so doing.

In Quevedo's *Premática del tiempo* there occurs a long paragraph which bears striking similarities in phrasing to passages in two of Lope de Vega's plays. In the *Premática del tiempo* we read the following advice to those who would guard their purses from designing women (I italicize the words and phrases that are identical or closely related in both authors):

Item, porque hemos visto que en esto del dar y pedir hay varias trazas—para dar alivio a todas las bolsas, y fáciles respuestas para toda mujer buscona y pedigüeña, declaramos que de aquí adelante *nadie dé sino buenos días y buenas noches, besamanos, favor ... al que lo merece (con buenas palabras no más), lugar ... en las visitas y conversaciones, y al superior, y gusto ... "a todos en cuanto pudiere."* Asimismo declaramos que no dé a ninguna mujer joya ninguna, so pena de quedarse con el jó como bestia, sino sólo darle *palabras fingidas*, y dar a perros a todas las taimadas que piden perrillos de faldas, y más si han de ser con collares y cascabeles de plata. Y así a la que te pidiere un manteo de *raso, enséñale el del cielo azul y raso; si terciopelo, aféitate tres veces*; si manto de *soplillo*, envíale los soplos de tus suspiros; *si banda, dale la de los tudescos*, o que en entregarse a ti la tendrás de tu banda; *si liga, la de Lepanto*; *si pasamanos* de oro y plata, que se vaya a casa de un platero a pasar las manos por todo esto, a título de quererlo comprar, si tuviere dinero, o tomarlo, si se lo dieren; si perlas, que ya ella misma es una perla, y que con derramar lágrimas verterá cuantas perlas quisiere; *si una toca, tócale un laúd o guitarra*; *si rosario de cocos, remítela a unas viejas ensartadas en coche*, que como *parecen micos*, esas le harán cocos al vivo; si cadenas, envíala a la de Marsella, que tiene gruesos eslabones, o a una cárcel, o galeras; si brincos, los de un ademán; si lienzos, los de un muro; si *zapatillas*, y más si son de ámbar, excúsate con que es presente en profecía, y que no sabes cuántos puntos calza, y cuando mucho (para quitarte de ruido) envíale las de las espadas negras; si bocados, que se vaya a un alano; y si comida, envíale por ante los de un coleteo; capones, de un facistol; gallinas, de hombres cobardes; y por postre, buñuelos de viento y nueces de ballesta. Y caso que te vieres forzado a haber

de dar algo, sea como la bebida, poco y muchas veces, porque solicita cada vez y puede obligar de nuevo. Y declaramos que los que esto no cumplieren, se queden para siempre rotos, enamorados, y sin mujer y sin dineros.<sup>1</sup>

In Lope's *De cosario a cosario*, Don Juan, recently arrived at Madrid, with the *indiano's* conventional fear of depredations upon his purse reads to the heroine the following document, which parallels in part the thought and wording of the opening lines of Quevedo's paragraph:

DON JUAN (Lee): Memoria de lo que tengo  
de dar en Madrid. ...

CELIA: Prosiga.

DON JUAN (Lee): *Besamanos* cuando hablare,  
lisonjas y cortesías;  
he' de dar también oídos  
a verdades, no a mentiras.  
Dar reverencia a los grandes,  
que gustan de recibirla;  
dar buenas pascuas a todos,  
*buenas noches, buenos días;*  
*dar gusto en cuanto puidiere,*  
*dar lugar en las visitas,*  
dar la mano a cualquier dama  
que cayere o que desliza,  
como no pase la tal  
de cuarenta años arriba;  
dar talle, si hay ocasión,  
y al ir por la calle os miran;  
dar celos, si dieren celos,  
y dar repique, si pican;  
dar honra a todo mayor;  
dar gracias, y no decirlas,  
y dar en no dar a nadie  
sino *palabras fingidas*.<sup>2</sup>

In Lope's *El sembrar en buena tierra*, Florencio dismisses the requests of the self-seeking *buscona*, Prudencia, with many of the very puns found in the second third of Quevedo's paragraph:

No te diera en todo vn año  
el ayre de vn auanillo.  
Que yntentes, me marauillo,  
engañar al mismo engaño.

<sup>1</sup> *Obras satíricas y festivas* ("Clásicos castellanos"), LVI (1924), 57-59.

<sup>2</sup> *Biblioteca de autores españoles*, XLI, 488a.

Si quieres medias acaso,  
 por medio las tuyas corta;  
 y *si raso azul te importa,*  
*el cielo es azul y raso.*  
*Y si quieres terçiopelo,*  
*tres vezes me afeytaré,*  
 y el terçio pelo daré,  
 que es lo más que yo me pelo.  
 Si quisieres guarnizi6n,  
 la de esta espada es de prueba;  
*si de pasamanos nueva,*  
 pasallas por vn balcón.  
 Si quieres apretador,  
 debe vna deuda y verás  
 que no ha de apretarte más  
 el corrimiento may6r.  
 Si guantes de flores mil,  
 vete al jardín que quisieres;  
 y si primaberas quieres,  
 sal de Hebrero y vete [a] Abril.  
*Si ligas,* que cuestan tanto  
 que la bolsa se desliga,  
 lee el libro de *la Liga*  
 de la guerra de *Lepanto*.  
 Si espejo, puedes mirarte  
 de vna fuente en la quietud;  
*si tocas, toca vn laúd*  
 v dexamé a mi tocarte.  
 Pero pensar con tu ardid  
 sacarme nada, Prudencia,  
 es como hazer quinta esenzia  
 de vn pedernal de Madrid. ...<sup>3</sup>

PRUDENCIA: !Quánto va que te enamoro!

FLORENCIO: !Quánto va que no podrás,  
 si por los echizos vas  
 hasta el mismo Atlante moro!

PRUDENCIA: Aora bien, cómprame aquí  
 tan solamente vna vanda.

FLORENCIO: La que *de tudescos* anda  
 con el rey, ¿es buena?

<sup>3</sup> Act II, ll. 1365-1400. I quote the text of the autograph manuscript, which I expect to publish shortly in a critical edition. The play may also be read in the recently published Vol. IX of the Academy's *nueva edición* of Lope's works, which, however, contains many textual inaccuracies.

- PRUDENCIA: Si.  
 FLORENCIO: *Pues esa misma te doy:*  
                   *mira que lindas colores.*  
 PRUDENCIA: ¿Tú gastas conmigo flores?  
 FLORENCIO: ¿Pues no, si Florençio soy?<sup>4</sup>  
 .....  
 PRUDENCIA: Dame siquiera,  
                   *mira si mi amor es limpio,*  
                   *sólo vn rosario de cocos.*  
 FLORENCIO: Aguárdame, te suplico;  
                   *ensartaré en vna cuerda,*  
                   *por servirte, quatro o çinco*  
                   *coches de damas mui feas*  
                   *que vi en el Prado el domingo;*  
                   *serán rosario de cocos.*  
 PRUDENCIA: No me disgusta el arbitrio.  
 FLORENCIO: Con ellas podrás hazerlos,  
                   *que todas parecen micos.*<sup>5</sup>

That these passages are related in some way seems certain. If they had in common only an expression or two, our suspicion would hardly be warranted. Lope has in fact used some of these same plays on words in other *comedias*, but as he uses only one or two, there is no need there for postulating a relationship.<sup>6</sup> After all, many of these

<sup>4</sup> Act II, ll. 1417-28.

<sup>5</sup> Act II, ll. 1523-34.

<sup>6</sup> In *Los amantes sin amor*, dating from 1601-1602, the *gracioso*, learning of the heroine's request for a piece of "*raso azul*," advises his master thus:

"Saca una pieza del cielo  
 un día que, tras el hielo,  
 esté bien azul y raso" (Acad., nueva ed., III, 145b).

In *La noche toledana*, written in 1605, Lope employs, though not with an ironic connotation, two of the *Premática* puns:

"Le haré de soplillo el manto  
 De soplos de mis sospiros.  
 Y en señal de mis prisiones,  
 Una cadena tan bella,  
 Que tenga la de Marsella  
 Menos gruesos eslabones" (BAE, XXIV, 208c).

Note that both these plays antedate the *Premática*. In *El desconfiado*, not dated as yet, but written apparently between 1613 and 1618, Pedro, reproved for spending so much in gifts to women, elaborates one of the expressions found in Quevedo:

"Algo he dado, Feliciano;  
 demás que dar unos días  
 es alta razón de estado,  
 y después ir dando perros  
 a cuenta de lo pasado,  
 a las humildes, de falda;  
 a las melindrosas, brazos;  
 a las soberbias, lebreles,  
 y a las taimadas, alanos" (Acad., nueva ed., IV, 494b).



puns were no doubt commonplaces of the time. When, however, one finds, as in the cases just read, so many of the same witticisms, so close a resemblance in sustained metaphor as in the one on the rosary, and so great a similarity of pattern in general, some filiation may safely be assumed. But just what the relationship is it is impossible to determine without more facts than we have. What we do know would seem at first glance to favor Quevedo's priority. *De cosario a cosario* is supposed to have been written between 1618 and 1621.<sup>7</sup> The date of *El sembrar en buena tierra* is January 6, 1616.<sup>8</sup> The *Premática del tiempo*, though not published until 1629, appears to have been written by 1613.<sup>9</sup> Circulating in manuscript copies, like many of Quevedo's works, it could easily have come into Lope's hands. It would seem, then, that it was Lope who borrowed from Quevedo. But this hypothesis rests on the assumption that the passage in the *Premática*, which we are concerned with, was included in it at so early a date. Bearing in mind, however, that there is some reason for considering the possibility of an intermediate version of this work,<sup>10</sup> which

<sup>7</sup> Buchanan, *The Chronology of Lope de Vega's Plays* (Toronto, 1922), p. 21; also *MLN*, XXIV (1909), 198.

<sup>8</sup> Autograph manuscript, in the British Museum; cf. Rennert y Castro, *Vida de Lope de Vega* (1919), p. 518.

<sup>9</sup> Ernest Mérimée, in his *Essai sur la vie et les œuvres de Francisco de Quevedo* (Paris, 1886), p. 133, was the first to point out that Salas Barbadillo quoted certain passages from Quevedo's *Premática del tiempo* in his *El sagas Estacio*, which, though not published until 1620, was ready for the press in 1613. In a recent article, "Imitación de Quevedo," in *Revista de la Biblioteca, Archivo y Museo*, V (1928), 307-9, M. Herrero García mentions the same instance of Salas' indebtedness to Quevedo, but fails to refer to Mérimée. Herrero García's only contribution is in certain additional examples of indebtedness. His notation of parallel passages is, however, still incomplete. He should have mentioned as an additional parallel to the *Premática* passage ("Clás. cast.," LVI, 59-60), Medina's speech in *El sagas Estacio* ("Clás. cast.," LVII, 100 top). Add also as a parallel of Torres' speech on page 135 of the latter work, Quevedo's *Premática*, ed. cit., p. 56, ll. 1 and 21-23. It should be noted finally that Mérimée's charge of plagiarism brought against Salas has been considered ill-founded by E. B. Place, "Salas Barbadillo, Satirist," in *Romanic Review*, XVII (1926), 239. The evidence seems, however, incontrovertible.

<sup>10</sup> In copying Quevedo's paragraph on "entremetidos" (ed. cit., p. 59), Salas in his *El sagas Estacio* (ed. cit., p. 123) speaks as though it came at or near the beginning of Quevedo's *Premática*: "digo, pues, que los primeros locos a quien él echa la mano son unos que el mundo llama entremetidos. ..." As a matter of fact Quevedo does not introduce the "entremetidos" until after he has satirized several other types. Again, Salas, after imitating almost verbatim another paragraph of the *Premática*, the one on merchants (ed. cit., LVI, 60, and LVII, 130), goes on to give a long criticism of wealthy old men who marry and of the young women who marry them (ed. cit., LVII, 132). This criticism Salas offers not as his own but as another pronouncement by the "pesquisidor parnasista," namely, Quevedo. Yet it is not found in the latter's *Premática*. Are we to conclude from these inconsistencies that Salas was following another version of the *Premática*? Before doing so, we should ask whether Salas' evidence should be taken very literally. At least at one point he seems to contradict himself. If, as he says, the "entremetidos" are the

is merely an expanded form, with important changes and additions, of Quevedo's earlier *Premáticas y aranceles generales*, we may reasonably demand proof that the *Premática del tiempo*, as written by 1613, contained the paragraph quoted at the beginning of this article. And so far as I know, that proof is lacking.

We are on no surer ground if we attempt to ascertain the priority of Lope or Quevedo on the basis of the form and content of the passages in question. While it is true that the prose quotation is in a satirical vein natural to Quevedo, it is equally true that the lines from the two plays are no less characteristic of Lope. Word plays are as typical of Lope as of Quevedo—the fondness for puns on the part of Lope's *graciosos* comes at once to mind—and the satire on self-seeking women found so frequently in Quevedo<sup>11</sup> likewise figures prominently in the writings of Lope de Vega.<sup>12</sup>

In view of the uncertainty indicated concerning the *Premática del tiempo*, we can only admit as a possibility that it was Lope rather than Quevedo who paid in this case the compliment of imitation.<sup>13</sup>

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first to be criticized by the "parnasista," how does he happen, a few pages later, to imitate another stricture of Quevedo's—one on discourteous men and women—which is given nearer the beginning of the *Premática*? Perhaps this inconsistency, like the others, might be the result of Salas' having used another version of the *Premática*. Or perhaps he was merely careless or purposely erroneous in his references to his source. The latter, at any rate, is some form of the *Premática del tiempo*, for Salas did not borrow anything from the earlier *Premáticas y aranceles generales*.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "El poner por delante la cuestión del interés cuando de amores de mujer se trata, es uno de los rasgos más frecuentes en las sátiras de Quevedo ..." (B. Sánchez Alonso, "Las poesías inéditas e inciertas de Quevedo," *Rev. Bib. Arch. y Mus.*, IV [1927], 135, n. 2).

<sup>12</sup> The *buscona* appears in an unfavorable rôle in such plays as *El sembrar en buena tierra*, *El anzuelo de Fenisa*, *La prueba de los amigos*, *El desdén vengado*, *Quien todo lo quiere*, *Porfiando vence amor*. References to the type are scattered throughout Lope's theater.

<sup>13</sup> I am not unaware of the possibility of other hypotheses, such as the assumption of a common source for both Quevedo and Lope. Facetious and satiric rules of conduct were in vogue at the time, appearing in literary works and circulating as separate tracts, sometimes without indication of authorship. Cf. R. H. Williams, "Satirical Rules of Etiquette in the *Siglo de Oro*," *Hispania*, XIII (1930), 293-300. Also, one might question with Mérimée (*Essai*, p. 134) whether the *Premática del tiempo* is really by Quevedo, though against this we have Fernández Guerra's unhesitating belief in its authenticity (cf. *BAE*, XXIII, 438).

CHANGING IDEALS OF ARISTOCRATIC CHARACTER  
AND CONDUCT IN SEVENTEENTH-  
CENTURY ENGLAND

IN ATTEMPTING to sketch some changing ideals in seventeenth-century conceptions of the aristocrat as revealed especially in books addressed to the gentleman, one may profitably begin with things stable and more or less well known, and progress to things which indicate a change in seventeenth-century thinking.

Nothing is more remarkable about Renaissance ideals of nobility and gentility than the prevalence of notions adopted from classical literature. Chivalry plays, by comparison, an unimportant part. Renaissance writers who theorized about nobility or portrayed the perfect courtier made large use of the ancients, particularly the moral philosophers. Castiglione with his portrait of *Il Cortegiano*, Nenna with his debate who is most noble, even Della Casa with his precepts and theories of etiquette—all dipped freely into the stream of moral philosophy. In England Elyot did likewise. One of the most striking things, indeed, about *The Boke of the Governour* is Elyot's penchant for moral philosophy. Ideas of man's place in society were derived by Renaissance writers from Plato and Aristotle and Cicero and the historians; ideals of man's character and of his education were drawn from every conceivable source, but especially from Aristotle and Isocrates, Cicero and Seneca, Quintilian and Plutarch. Two main currents, unbroken through the ages, are observable: the tradition of the Magnanimous Man as set forth by Aristotle; and the Stoic tradition, known to later times especially through Epictetus and Seneca.

No more complete statement of the aristocrat's philosophy—for its time—had been made than that by Aristotle in his portrait of the Magnanimous Man. Upon this concept much that followed in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century was based, beginning notably with Castiglione. The Renaissance added traits from Epictetus and Seneca and other Stoics. It was not difficult to do, for the Magnanimous Man of Aristotle possesses many characteristics which are closely

allied to Stoic philosophy. The *character* of the noble or gentleman (as distinct from his *accomplishments*) is almost completely summed up in these two views. The Magnanimous Man, with Stoic ideas added, is, so far as character is concerned, what the sixteenth century conceived ideally as the aristocrat. The traits which add distinction are for the most part drawn from Aristotle; the traits which insure heroism are largely from the Stoics. It is perhaps not unjust to say that to Englishmen who theorized about aristocracy it was the latter which particularly appealed; whereas the former, taken over intact from Italy, remained somewhat in the background, less intimately felt than merely accepted.

But the Stoic philosophy, which England knew from the ancients as well as through Italian and Spanish and French literature, was not a mere borrowing. The inherent qualities of those races which went largely to make up the population of England predisposed them to such a philosophy.

Well do I know 'tis the way of the high-born,  
Fast in his heart to fetter his feelings,  
Lock his unhappiness in the hold of his mind.

. . . . .  
A haughty hero will hide his suffering,  
Manfully master misery's pang,

sang the unknown scôp of the eighth century who composed *The Wanderer*.<sup>1</sup> What in the eighth century had been a natural response of Englishmen to their environment, was in the sixteenth and seventeenth quite as natural. Indeed, the English have time out of mind exhibited a genius for the Stoic view of life.<sup>2</sup> Little wonder that in seeking ideals of character and of conduct, Englishmen should have drawn many of their notions from this philosophy, whether they found it in Epictetus or Seneca or Boethius, or in Castiglione or Guevara or Du Vair. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Calvinism had added its dour outlook upon life, when the fear of hell fire was superimposed upon the Englishman's traditional distrust of life upon this earth, Englishmen turned eagerly to the comfort which comes from within a man. The fact that, after the break with Rome, they

<sup>1</sup> The modern English version is that by J. Duncan Spaeth in *Old English Poetry* (1921).

<sup>2</sup> It is, of course, the moral aspects of Stoicism with which we are here concerned, not its metaphysics.

stood spiritually isolated, perhaps made them all the more ready to seek consolation in that philosophy which emphasizes the power of the individual to control, within limits, his own destiny, or at all events his own response to his surroundings.

Of the two writers who perhaps best exemplified Stoicism as the seventeenth century understood it, Epictetus best expresses the Stoic doctrine commonly accepted by all writers, which is very close to Aristotle's doctrine of *nil admirari*: So control yourself in all things that nothing can surprise and hence nothing can touch you. The psychological basis of this philosophy of life, as interpreted by Renaissance and later writers, seems to be fear or timidity. Since man is apprehensive of being hurt by life, he builds up a defense by pretending that he does not care what happens, rationalizing the while by arguing that, as man is not in a position to control his fate, he should be unmoved by whatever occurs.<sup>3</sup>

For the student of seventeenth-century English thought the psychology of the moral aspects of Stoicism is of very considerable interest, for its currency is indicative of a spirit of timidity or disillusion observable in England, which seems to have made the Stoic philosophy particularly palatable to Englishmen at this time. No philosophical tendency, indeed, is so observable in English books on the conduct of life, particularly in the seventeenth century, as Stoicism. It takes various forms, becoming now resigned, now cynical. But everywhere its influence upon English thought is apparent. Its implications, however, are by no means always ignoble, as its origin might suggest. Although the defense which it sets up against an unfriendly environment may be based upon fear, the self-confidence which it preaches, in a sort of despair, is plainly one of the heroic virtues. John Healey, in the earliest English translation of Epictetus' wisdom (1610), puts the matter thus:

It is a true marke of vulgar basenesse, for a man to expect neither good nor harme from himselfe, but all from externall euent. Contrariwise, the true note of a Philosopher, is to repose all his expectation, vpon himselfe alone.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The extreme example of Stoic indifference, frequently cited by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers on conduct, is that of Stilpo, the Greek philosopher, who, when his wife and children were destroyed in the burning of the city where he lived, to the question, what had he lost in the conflagration, replied: "I lost nothing" (cited by Henry Crosse, in *Vertues Common-wealth* [1603; ed. 1878], p. 39).

<sup>4</sup> *Epictetus his Manuell* (ed. 1616), p. 91.

It is essentially Satan's philosophy as expressed in Book I of *Paradise Lost*:

The mind is its own place, and in itself  
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.

Such an assertion is founded upon a belief in free will. In fact, it is a vigorous assertion of that belief, only in concrete rather than in abstract terms. To quote again from Epictetus as translated by John Healey:

That man is absolute Lord ouer euery thing, who at his owne pleasure can preserue or deliuer the things which his will is to preserue or deliuer: He therefore that will bee free, must neither desire nor dislike any thing that is in the power of others to dispose of. Otherwise, hee must take the yoake whether he will or no.<sup>5</sup>

Pride which will not admit defeat—which despite the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune asserts the independence of the spirit over external things—is of the very essence of heroism. The Stoic philosopher (and his near relation, the ideal gentleman) becomes a godlike being superior to his fate.

Such self-confidence and independence are not, however, without their drawback. The tight-lipped habit brings inhibitions. Not only shall one not be surprised by any occurrence; one shall abstain from enjoyment—or at least from revealing enjoyment. As Epictetus' English translator expresses it:

And when thou goest from the Play-house, neuer talk much of that which befell, it no way concernes thy reformation. If thou do not as I say, then all the people will perceiue that thou wast taken with admiration of the goodly shewes. . . . For the whootes, and cryes, and laughters, and other turbulent motions, auide them vtterly.<sup>6</sup>

Here apparently is the germ of that notion, also implicit in Aristotle, that all enthusiasm is vulgar. Planted by the disillusion current in England in the early seventeenth century, and watered by Puritanism, stoical self-reliance which would prohibit a display of the feelings becomes the tired, cynical spirit of distrusting every outward show of either enjoyment or grief. Men of the seventeenth century thus became pre-eminently, in England, sayers of Nay rather than of Yea. The phenomenon is peculiarly characteristic of the century and goes far to explain, among other things, why the glory of the Age of Anne

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.



was its satire, and why the great writers of the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century were rational and classical in their tastes and temperament, rather than sensitive to beauty, enthusiastic, and romantic.

For the aristocratic tradition the thing has various meanings. The principle enunciated for the Renaissance by Castiglione, that the well-bred courtier will show surprise at nothing and (the obverse) will seek, by his nonchalant skill, to arouse a feeling of admiration in others, is fortified by such precepts as those of Epictetus until silent, effortless, unsuspected power becomes a main trait in the gentleman. Moreover, such elementary precepts as those codified by Erasmus in the *De civilitate morum puerilium* and by Della Casa in the *Galateo*—that one should, above all, avoid giving offense to others—are closely connected with the Stoic defense: Avoid doing to others what you would not like to have done to you, and so secure yourself against pain.

Epictetus, as interpreted by his first English translator, reinforced certain notions of conduct which fitted in particularly well with seventeenth-century disillusion and seventeenth-century puritanical negations. Another Stoic, however, affected English thought even more profoundly. Englishmen who, like Spenser's friend Bryskett, were irked by having to read the ancient philosophers in the original, after 1614 could approach Seneca through the excellent translation by Thomas Lodge. And there they found, as Lodge translated Seneca, not only the rather negative Stoic philosophy expressed by Epictetus—that, as Lodge translates Seneca, "Resolue thy selfe, that nothing may befall thee that may moue thee"<sup>7</sup>—but a very notable concept unknown to Epictetus, which suited well with Seneca's reputation as "the Christian-Stoic." For the Wise Man portrayed by Seneca will, in Lodge's words, "assist his neighbour that weepeth, without weeping himselfe; he will lend him his hand that is in danger to be drowned; hee will lodge him that is famished, feede him that is poore . . . as a man to a man he will giue, as out of the common purse." "But," proceeds the philosopher, "he will doe all this with a peaceable minde, and without change of countenance. He will not therefore be mooued, but will helpe, will profit, as being borne for the common good and the

<sup>7</sup> Seneca, *Workes*, tr. Lodge (1614), p. 557.

service of the Commonweale . . . will assist all those likewise that deserue, and after the maner of the gods, behold with a bountifull eye the poore that are oppressed."<sup>8</sup>

The difference between Seneca's Wise Man and the cautious, self-centered Stoic philosopher of Epictetus is patent at a glance. So is the difference between Seneca's Wise Man and the ideal courtier of the Italians. Seneca urges sympathetic treatment of all men indiscriminately, and so approaches the humanitarian and romantic point of view; Castiglione reveals the well-bred person only in relation to his peers or his superiors—if he had any contact with lesser persons, one is for the most part left to guess at it. The Renaissance accepted Epictetus, with his cautious, self-centered point of view. It remained for the seventeenth century, with its penchant for adopting seriously a self-imposed obligation to one's fellows, to accept this humanitarian phase of Seneca's doctrine, with its insistence on helpfulness toward others added to the purely Stoic doctrine of being unmoved. No ancient philosopher, save Cicero, was more frequently cited by seventeenth-century writers of conduct books than Seneca. Helpfulness toward others, together with the Stoic attitude which lends the individual that strength from within which enables him to bear up under adversity and personal affront, are important traits in the seventeenth-century English ideal gentleman from Brathwaite to those writers late in the century who joined humanist ideals with the Christian concept of the "good man."

But if Stoicism, particularly Senecan Stoicism, is of the utmost importance in explaining sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ideals of character in England, there is another respect in which English thought is still more notable and in which the change can be easily observed. Interestingly enough, it also seems to be connected with Stoicism, or rather with that phase of Seneca's thought which he joined to Stoicism, amply justifying the title given him of "the Christian-Stoic."

As the Italian writers of the sixteenth century, following Cicero and Seneca and others, had posited virtue as an essential quality in the gentleman, so seventeenth-century English writers insisted that

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 605.

the noble or gentleman devoid of personal virtue was a disgrace to his kind. Owen Feltham, who may be permitted to speak for most, said in the 1620's: "*Earth* hath not any thing more glorious then *ancient Nobility*, when 'tis found with *vertue*," but "A debauched sonne of a *Noble Familie*, is one of the *intolerable burthens* of the *Earth*, and as hatefull a thing as *Hell*."<sup>9</sup> What this "virtue" was it is somewhat difficult to discover. Machiavelli seems to have conceived of it as intellect joined with power. To Castiglione and Nenna it seems to have comprised acquired culture and innate ability—though culture for what, and ability to do what, is rather uncertain.<sup>10</sup> To Elyot it meant two things, both of them thoroughly practical: sound character, in accordance with the principles of moral philosophy; and a will and the ability to serve the state. English writers in large part followed unthinkingly the Italians, who were themselves none too definite about it, and were content to leave the matter vague. "'Tis virtue alone is true nobility," said Ben Jonson, and let it go at that.<sup>11</sup> Although some writers in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, conscious of deriving the word from *vir*, used the term "virtue" as almost synonymous with "valor,"<sup>12</sup> in early seventeenth-century England the term was either left entirely vague or was thought of as Elyot had thought of it in 1531: as qualities of mind and character which made the individual a useful member of society.

But all this is little more than the sixteenth century confessed to, at least in England. A man might say so much and yet, like Jonson, be really quite non-committal. The early seventeenth century, however, saw the emergence of a new concept—or rather, perhaps, of an old concept applied in a new way. To Peacham's "compleat gentleman," whose virtue embraced the humanist view with its love of "good Learning" and the arts, and its emphasis on living as a fine art,<sup>13</sup> was opposed a gentleman of a very different sort, new in the seventeenth century. Peacham is sufficiently in the tradition of the Renaissance to have perpetuated much of the spirit which had been

<sup>9</sup> *Resolves . . . the First Century* (ed. 1628), p. 86.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier* (tr. 1561); Nenna, *Nennio* (tr. 1595), *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> *Underwoods*, "Eupheme," viii.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Breton, *Wil of Wit* (1599; ed. 1860), p. 76; Francis Markham, *The Booke of Honour* (1625), p. 11.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Peacham, *The Compleat Gentleman* (1622), *passim*.

caught and crystallized by Castiglione. Besides praising learning and the arts, Peacham conceives of his "compleat gentleman" as a person who exhibits certain traits of character drawn from the ancient philosophers and appropriated or adapted by sixteenth-century Italian writers. Such is the doctrine that the gentleman and the noble are persons of finer clay than the rest of mankind, and that to be conscious of one's own superiority is not only permissible but a downright duty—a trait taken entire from Aristotle's portrait of the Magnanimous Man, in whom "magnanimity," far from signifying what in ordinary speech it means today, was interpreted as consciousness of the deserts and privileges not only of others but of one's self.<sup>14</sup> Such is that nonchalance which Castiglione made the head of the corner—a trait implicit in Aristotle's Magnanimous Man and expressed in the classic phrase *nil admirari*. Such, also, is the doctrine that the gentleman is the amateur, who specializes in nothing, yet does all things moderately well—a Renaissance development of Aristotle's principle of moderation. And such is the notion that the perfection of the individual is an end in itself—a perfectly natural development of thought in Italy, which lacked that national unity which in England under the Tudors had called forth Elyot's ideal of service to the state, whereas beyond the Alps a man strove to make the most of his own capabilities, for his own benefit rather than for that of the state.

It was the first and last of these notions, as Peacham took them over from Renaissance thought—consciousness of superiority, and unquestioning acceptance of the perfection of the individual as a justifiable end in itself—which apparently roused the ire of an English country gentleman contemporary with Peacham and set him to composing *The English Gentleman* (1630). More especially was it the latter assumption—that perfection of the individual in humanistic ways, a cardinal point in Renaissance thought, is a justifiable end in itself. The culture which Peacham urged his "compleat gentleman" to acquire, Brathwaite was not opposed to; but Brathwaite was opposed to the aim in life which Peacham's book presupposed. To Brathwaite it seemed a selfish aim which took no account of the rest of humanity outside one's own circle. "Virtue," which in the sixteenth

<sup>14</sup> So, at least, the Renaissance argued. Feudal practices are, without doubt, largely to thank for the theory, which found in Aristotle its justification.

century had meant, according to most Italian notions, something not far removed from "culture and ability," and had been quite vaguely conceived by many English writers who repeated Italian commonplaces about it, comes with Brathwaite to have a new meaning. To him learning and *savoir-vivre*, even valor and patriotism, are not enough. Virtue is, says Brathwaite in his Epistle Dedicatory to *The English Gentleman* of 1630, "the greatest Signall and Symbol of Gentry: is rather expressed by *goodnesse of Person*, than *greatnesse of Place*." The truly virtuous person, to Brathwaite, is, in his own words, the "good Christian."

This notion colors all of Brathwaite's pronouncements on aristocratic character and conduct. Though a gentleman born and one who has special faith in his own class, Brathwaite is less insistent on nobility and gentility and their prerogatives than on the necessity for being earnest about leading a good life. Though "gentleman" means to him a man well born, he does not so much draw distinctions between the gentleman and the boor or upstart as between the *good* man and the *bad*. So when he specifies a line of conduct—such as continence or sobriety—he specifies it not on the ground that it is conduct befitting a gentleman, whose pride of place keeps him from stooping, as writers in the Aristotelian tradition did, but rather because such conduct is essential for the soul if it would be saved to eternal life, and because the gentleman, being in Brathwaite's conception a good Christian, is obligated to set a good example to others. It is perhaps noteworthy that Brathwaite is one of the first among English writers on gentility (James I and James Cleland are yet earlier examples)<sup>15</sup> who strew their pages not only with citations from classical story, in the Renaissance manner, but with quotations from Scripture as well.

An instance will make more vivid what I am trying to convey. In the early seventeenth century there was much discussion of the duel. Most writers of philosophic temper decried the duel, arguing with Seneca and the Stoics generally that we should rise above wrongs, which are not injuries unless we feel them as such. With this Brathwaite concurs. But he characteristically goes further. "I know," he

<sup>15</sup> James I, *Basilikon Doron* (1599); James Cleland, *Hropaideia, or the Institution of a Young Noble Man* (1607).

says, "that in passages of this nature, publike imputations require publike satisfaction." But, he adds, "As one may be *angry and sinne not*, so one may revenge and offend not, and this is by *heaping coales of fire upon our Enemies head*: for by this *meeknesse is anger appeased*."<sup>16</sup> Both the use of Scripture to prove his point, and the point itself, are indicative of Brathwaite's spirit and suggest the change, since Renaissance times, which has occurred in aristocratic ideals.

Brathwaite's outlook upon life, like that of many subsequent English writers on conduct, is not only religious, in the sense that he would establish a proper relation between himself and his Maker and so be assured of salvation; it is also earnest, in a way which suggests that aristocratic ideals are being encroached upon by bourgeois philosophy. Useful activity becomes with Brathwaite the gentleman's watchword. "Doe not looke to eat," says Brathwaite, "except you sweat for it. . . . For in heaven onely, which is our *Fathers house*, there are *many mansions* to rest in. In this world, which is not our *Fathers house*, there are not *many mansions* to rest in, but onely *Vineyards* to worke in."<sup>17</sup>

Later in the century writers like Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench under Charles II, and Captain Edward Panton, a man much interested in the education of noble youths, are insistent that gentlemen, be they never so rich, must not be idle—as Panton puts it, "if not for profit, at least for honour."<sup>18</sup> The English notion of "virtue" has in these writers of the later seventeenth century progressed to the point where it corresponds nearly with the general principle of conduct enunciated in 1673 on the Continent by Pufendorf. Slothful persons, says Pufendorf, "and such as being *content* with the Estates their *Ancestors* have left 'em, think they may give themselves up to *Idleness* without blame"; but they are guilty of a breach of the duty of all men to promote the good of others.<sup>19</sup>

The Renaissance envisaged nothing beyond Elyot's conception of the "governour," who, if serviceable, nevertheless retained the prerogatives of his class. After Brathwaite, the seventeenth century fre-

<sup>16</sup> Brathwaite, *The English Gentleman* (1630), pp. 206-7. The italics are Brathwaite's.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>18</sup> Panton, *Speculum juventutis* (1671), p. 214.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel. Freiherr von Pufendorf, *The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature* (tr. 1691; 2d ed., 1693), pp. 105-6.



quently lost sight of prerogatives in its earnest attempt to justify its existence before God and man. "Every man should, like a Bee, bring Hony to the Hive, and not, like the effeminate [sic] Drone, suck out the sweet, and idly live upon the Heroick labour of others," said the Duchess of Newcastle in 1655, writing of "A Gentlemans Study."<sup>20</sup> Indeed, she carried the idea still further, maintaining that "it were better see a Gentleman hew down trees, or dig in the bowels of the earth amongst minerals, than painting, or pencilling."<sup>21</sup> One recalls that in 1647 Sir William Petty (and after him, John Locke) advocated manual trades for gentlemen, though not so much to the end that a gentleman should be a productive cog in the social machine as because such occupations are pleasurable and profitable avocations which have educative value.<sup>22</sup> But Sir Matthew Hale, in 1673, and other writers of his time who, like Brathwaite, confuse aristocratic with bourgeois ideals, go so far as to insist that even at the cost of flouting tradition, which prohibited agricultural pursuits and commerce, the gentleman shall earn his salt.<sup>23</sup>

The motive of such pronouncements, as I have hinted, is frequently moral or theological, looking to the well-being of the individual, rather than ethical, concerned with obligations toward others. "Mans securitie is the Devils opportunitie," said Brathwaite, in language which suggests that he was conscious of idleness as one of the seven deadly sins.<sup>24</sup> "Rather doe nothing to the purpose than be Idle," says Francis Quarles a decade later, "that the Devil may find thee doing. The Bird that sits is easily shot, when flyers 'scape the Fowler."<sup>25</sup> It is chiefly, if not wholly, the good of one's own soul which Quarles has in mind. Yet such a philosophy of life is readily transmuted into a sense

<sup>20</sup> Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle, *The Worlds Olio* (1655), p. 63.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, "How a Gentleman ought to be bred, and spend his time." It is partly the author's admiration of masculine strength which dictates such an astonishing opinion; but there is also the same spirit that is notable in Brathwaite and the others: a gentleman should be "like a God above all other Creatures, and to be like a God is never to be Idle, nor to be employed but about things that tend to some useful, noble, and glorious end."

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Adamson, *Pioneers of Modern Education* (1905), p. 134, and Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693), pp. 241-49.

<sup>23</sup> Hale, *A Letter of Advice to his Grandchildren* (written in 1673; published at London, 1816), pp. 110-12, and *passim*.

<sup>24</sup> Brathwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

<sup>25</sup> *Wisdom's Better than Money* (1698), p. 231. This work, as I have shown elsewhere, is a pirated edition, disguised under a new title-page, of Quarles's *Enchiridion* (1640-41). See "Later Editions of Quarles's *Enchiridion*," in *The Library*, 4th Series, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Sept., 1928), pp. 184-86.

of obligation toward the community. In any case, however much seventeenth-century writers may have been influenced by theological notions, the difference between an Elyot, with his doctrine of service to the state conceived as a political entity, and a Matthew Hale, with his insistence on useful activity in the field of commerce or agriculture, is more than merely theological. Elyot's ideals are at this point not remote from Greek ideals and make no denial of the special position of the aristocrat; Hale's, in so far as they do not merely spring from a recognition of idleness as one of the seven deadly sins, are based upon a conception of the commonwealth as a social group in which all men have more or less similar functions and duties. When taboos about occupations disappear, aristocracy itself is threatened. The earnestness of many writers who urge the gentleman to live a life of usefulness, looks toward bourgeois and democratic ideals.

The tendency toward viewing the gentleman more as the good Christian than as the Magnanimous Man of the ancients or the complete personality of Renaissance writers is reflected in the literature of courtesy and conduct throughout the whole of the seventeenth century. Peacham's *Compleat Gentleman* (1622) is not the last seventeenth-century conduct book which is to some extent at least humanistic in point of view. Such a work as William Higford's *Institutions* (1658) lays much stress on the Renaissance accomplishments of the gentleman—riding the great horse, fencing, dancing, hunting and hawking, travel, and the arts, such as music, drawing, the study of philosophy and languages. Francis Osborne's well-known *Advice to a Son* (1656) contains many of the same matters. And indeed, even such works as Brathwaite's *English Gentleman* and the Earl of Bedford's *Advice* (written about 1650), though religious in tone, contain many of the recommendations common to Renaissance writers and to Peacham. So do works published later in the century. But an English conduct book of the later seventeenth century which is in spirit as purely humanistic as Peacham's it would be difficult to find. Books in the middle of the century and later, which express many of the ideals of Peacham, are in so far concerned chiefly with more or less superficial traits—accomplishments and manners. Although they to some extent perpetuate the humanistic tradition, the most notable thing

about them is not their humanistic traits but the fact that they largely embody the spirit so notably exemplified in Brathwaite's *English Gentleman*. That is, although they may retain many of the traditional Renaissance ideals, essentially they are often so insistent upon religion and the gentleman's Christian behavior toward his fellow-men that the religious and even the democratic element takes precedence over the humanistic. I am not speaking of such works as the anonymous *Gentleman's Calling* (1660), the title of which is misleading, for it is purely a work of piety, nor of such works as the anonymous *The Whole Duty of Man* (1658?, 1660) and Crossman's *Young Man's Monitor* (1664), which are not addressed to members of the upper classes. But in a work like Clement Ellis' *Gentile Sinner* (1660), written by a tutor in the households of members of the nobility, so strong is the religious element that the pagan and humanistic attributes and aims are completely crowded out. The gentleman's "highest ambition," says Ellis, "is to be a favorite in the Court of Heaven. . . . That which he esteems his great Honor indeed, is this, that he can with confidence, and truly, call God his Father, his Saviour his Friend and his Brother, the Church his Mother, and the Angels his fellow servants."<sup>26</sup> In Ellis, indeed, though he was no separatist or violent Puritan, we seem to discover, in the writer of a conduct book for gentlemen, the perfervid divine. "Thus (Sir)," concludes Ellis,

Whilest I goe about to give you the Character of a true Gentleman, I am faine into that of a Christian; and indeed no wonder, for there is such a necessary Connexion betwixt these two, that they seem to be no more then the Different Names of the same man. . . . Take him all in two words, he is a man and a Christian.<sup>27</sup>

Works genuinely intended for members of the upper classes which so uncompromisingly depict the gentleman as Christian would be difficult to find. Ellis' is, after all, a somewhat strident voice, which condemns as ungentle everything which is not Christian, on the basis that man has but one aim on earth: to save his soul to eternity. But less one-sided writers do not lag very far behind Ellis. During the late seventeenth century authors are found insisting, presumably to

<sup>26</sup> 3d ed. (Oxford, 1664), pp. 106-8. The passage seems to have been lifted from *Purchas his Pilgrim. Microcosmus* (1619), pp. 440-41.

<sup>27</sup> Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79.

combat observed tendencies in contemporary life, that gentility and religion are by no means incompatible.

I cannot [says Panton] too much inveigh against the madness, or misfortune of the Youth of these times, that are ashamed to act or speak as Christians, esteeming those men of most pleasant and ingenuous Conversation that deride and flout at what belongs to God's Honor, or Moral Honestie, who are as much Novices in Christian Piety, as if they had been bred in the *Turk's Seraglio*.<sup>28</sup>

Although gentlemen, as Selden put it, may "have ever been more temperate [*sic*] in their religion than the common people, as having more reason, the others running in a hurry,"<sup>29</sup> ever since Brathwaite the tendency had been, as it was later to be with Addison and Steele, to make religion *respectable*, i.e. compatible with good-breeding.

One of the first and most dangerous Temptations that Youth (well descended) are liable unto, is, to fancy that the Practice of Religion, and Devotion is inconsistent with a Gentleman [said Denis Greenville, in 1685]. . . . So far is Christian Vertue from being Incompatible with true Gentility, that to speak properly, and strictly, a Man cannot be a compleat Gentleman who is utterly void thereof.<sup>30</sup>

Numerous late seventeenth-century writers are largely in the same tradition as Ellis and Panton and Greenville.<sup>31</sup> Most, if not all, of these writers accept more or less completely the humanistic interpretation of the gentleman so far as *accomplishments* are concerned. But the character of the gentleman has in their hands undergone the same change so notable in Brathwaite's *English Gentleman* of 1630. The Restoration man-about-town was no exemplar of the Christian virtues. But *ideally* (and it is only ideals we are here considering) the

<sup>28</sup> Panton, *Speculum juventutis* (1671), p. 189.

<sup>29</sup> John Selden, *Table-Talk* (1639), p. 21. The passage was written much earlier, viz., between 1634 and 1654.

<sup>30</sup> Greenville, *Counsel and Directions Divine and Moral* (1685), pp. 58, 112-13. Although the sentiment is not to be wondered at, coming from a divine, such expressions are in the late seventeenth century found also in the writings of laymen. Greenville carries the notion to its logical consequence when he asserts that no more can "a well-grown Christian and right vertuous Man . . . be void of Gentility; a Gentility that may more truly be so called, than what doth only run in the Bloud" (*ibid.*). He is here applying, in terms of religion, what the Renaissance had often maintained in secular wise: that virtue is more significant than mere descent. The trend toward democratic thought is obvious.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. the Earl of Bedford, *Advice . . . to his Sons* (written ca. 1650); Waterhous, *The Gentlemans Monitor* (1665); Ramesey, *The Gentlemans Companion* (1672); Walker, *Of Education* (1672); Gallhard, *The Compleat Gentleman* (1678); Brooke, *The Durable Legacy* (1681)—to mention only some.

gentleman of the late seventeenth century was becoming the Christian and the "good man"—a man who cared more about Heaven than about those qualities of character which spring from Aristotle's Magnanimous Man, and a man of sentiment who cared (or at least who professed to care) quite as much about the treatment he accorded his fellow-men as about humanistic accomplishments and aristocratic prerogatives. The contrast between earlier times and the mid-seventeenth century is neatly pointed by two sayings, both much quoted, by a French monarch and an English. "Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare," Louis XI is reported to have said was the only Latin his youthful son needed to learn. It remained for the seventeenth century to put into the mouth of Charles I the saying for his son, in the *Eikon Basilike*, "It is better to be *Charles le Bon*, than *Charles le Grand*."<sup>32</sup>

Not only is religion respectable, in the late seventeenth century, as well as necessary for the salvation of the soul; the obligation to be of service to mankind—a trait connected with the Christian spirit rather than with the age-old concept of *noblesse oblige*—finds frequent expression in conduct books late in the century. Edward Chamberlayne,<sup>33</sup> writing in the 1660's a sober account of his countrymen, notes that "the true well-bred English have more of inclination to goodness, which the Greek called *Philanthropia*, than other Nations: the Nobility and well-bred Gentry delighting to be gracious and courteous to strangers, compassionate to the afflicted, and grateful to Benefactors." Says Humphrey Brooke, a kindly gentleman of deep religious feeling but no rabid enthusiast or bigot, writing in 1681 a book of counsels to his children: "Esteem not of Gentility from the advantages of title or wealth, but from what the word imports, kindness, affability: readiness to do every body good."<sup>34</sup>

It is this spirit of doing everybody good, hinted at by Brathwaite as early as 1630, which is remarkable in so many of the late seventeenth-century conduct books, even those which present aristocratic ideals. It is peculiarly a seventeenth-century phenomenon, in England, as appears if one compare it with a typical sixteenth-century pronouncement. Sir Francis Walsingham, writing in 1590, states the

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in *Vox clamantis*, by P. A., Gent. (1684), p. 103.

<sup>33</sup> *Angliae notitia* (1669; 3d ed., 1669), pp. 66-67.

<sup>34</sup> Brooke, *The Durable Legacy* (1681), p. 152.

comparatively negative ethical concept which is characteristic of Renaissance thought:

There is required in an Honest man, not so much to doe every thing as he would be done unto, as to forbear any thing that he would not be content to suffer; For the Essence of Honesty consists in forbearing to doe ill: And to [do] good Acts is a proper Passion, and no Essentiall part of Honesty.<sup>35</sup>

From Walsingham's "Honest man" who is scrupulously just in his dealings with his fellows but does not seek to do good to others, whose honesty consists merely in "a quiet passing over the days of a man's life, without doing Injury to another man,"<sup>36</sup> it is a far cry to the more romantically conceived gentleman of the later seventeenth century. Compare Walsingham's "Honest man," for example, with Obadiah Walker's gentleman, portrayed in 1672. Walker's gentleman is one who cultivates a "readines to do courtesies to all," "is ready to *assist* and pleasure all, even the unknown," and "*strives* to render good alwaies even for evil."<sup>37</sup> William Ramesey is yet more outspoken. "To love, and bear good will to all men," says Ramesey, in *The Gentleman's Companion* (1672), "is a part of Generosity"<sup>38</sup>—where "generosity" has still its earlier meaning from *generosus*, i.e., noble. Ramesey's book is a combination (one often found in the late seventeenth century) of Stoic philosophy and Christian teaching; but the most striking thing about it is that it combines ideals of Christian humility with the principle of doing good to others—a principle based upon an indiscriminate love of mankind, which is ultimately religious rather than philosophical. The spirit of the times, which made men distrustful of themselves, seems to have caused men to look searchingly into their own souls, inquiring whether they could justify themselves—not only before their fellows, but before God. Even the aristocrat developed a tender conscience about his own pretensions to aristocracy. Instead of the ancient philosopher's Magnanimous Man, with his self-sufficiency and aplomb, to whom it would never have occurred to question his own motives or virtues, who, if he avoided

<sup>35</sup> Sir Francis Walsingham's *Anatomizing of Honesty, Ambition, and Fortitude*. Written in . . . 1590 (in Cottoni posthuma [1651], p. 332). Although Walsingham does not use the term "Honest man" precisely as the French were soon to use *honnête homme*, the difference in usage is slight compared with the difference in conception of the person intended.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Walker, *Of Education* (3d ed., Oxford, 1673), pp. 229, 233–34.

<sup>38</sup> Ramesey, *op. cit.*, p. 170.



doing ill, avoided it because he scorned it as something beneath him, we discover, in the late seventeenth century, the timid Christian intent upon doing God's will upon earth. "Let him say continually with himself," propounds Walker, speaking of the gentleman, "*for what came I into the World? Why hath God gived [sic] me such riches, such parents, such respect amongst men, but to do more good? Surely I have received five talents, a greater increase and return is expected from me.*"<sup>39</sup>

In so far as foreign influences account for the change from Renaissance to seventeenth-century ideals, those influences are French rather than Italian. Even as early as the late sixteenth century, French works show some tendency toward adding goodness to the traditional traits of the ideal gentleman. La Primaudaye's *French Academie* (translated 1586) combines materials common to the courtesy book, with preachments by a philosopher-divine. Jacques Hurault's *Politique, Moral, and Martial Discourses* (translated by Arthur Golding in 1595) contains at least hints of the gentleman as a person positively, rather than merely negatively, as with Walsingham's "Honest man," solicitous of the welfare of others. Englishmen seem, however, to have developed the ideal of the gentleman as a person who in Christian spirit wishes to do good to his fellows, before ever the French concept of *l'honnête homme* as a good, as well as a polite, person had established itself firmly in France, and certainly before it had become generally known in England. One of the earliest French works to present the gentleman as a man at once cultivated and good was Nicolas Faret's *L'Honneste-Homme ou l'Art de plaire à la Court*, published at Paris in 1630. In this book the attempt is made to graft upon the pagan and humanistic ideals of Castiglione, religious ideals entirely lacking in *Il Cortegiano*. But although Faret's book was promptly translated into English, it seems not to have been an influential book in England; and in any case, Faret's joining Christian ideals with the traditional

<sup>39</sup> Walker, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53. The sentiment may be found, stated now in one way and now in another, in various late seventeenth-century works. Cf., for example, Isaac Borrow, *Of Industry, in Five Discourses* (1693; originally published in *Works* [1686]): "And for Courtesy, how otherwise can it be well displayed, than in sedulous activity for the good of men? It surely doth not consist in modish forms of address or complemental expressions, or hollow professions; . . . but in real performances of beneficence, when occasion doth invite, and in waiting for opportunities to doe good" (pp. 147-48).



aristocratic traits of the gentleman was anticipated by Brathwaite.<sup>40</sup> French ideas of *l'honnête homme* seem to have come into England chiefly after the Restoration, through the writings of such men as Le Chevalier de Méré and La Chétardie and L'Abbé Goussault, whose works were translated into English in 1672, 1683, and 1698, almost immediately after their publication at Paris.<sup>41</sup>

In the writings of these men is expressed a concept already well known in England, as we have seen. One of the most notable traits of *l'honnête homme* of the late seventeenth century (though not necessarily his most characteristic trait) is what Méré calls his "good Heart."<sup>42</sup> That universal benevolence which Richard Cumberland, in opposition to Hobbes, posited in 1672 as the supreme principle of morals<sup>43</sup>—the "Universal Benevolence" which Jeremy Collier in 1694 asserted was "agreeable to humane Nature"<sup>44</sup>—tends to become part of the gentlemanly tradition, in England as in France. In the work of one French writer—the author of an anonymous book translated into English in 1694 as *The True Conduct of Persons of Quality*—together with the concept of *l'honnête homme* as a Christian-Stoic, with the emphasis on his religious side, is something approaching the sentimental view of human nature. The True Person of Quality will show "love" toward all, confident that it will meet with a proper response from even an enemy, for human nature is naturally good and will assuredly respond generously to loving treatment.<sup>45</sup> In the work of yet another Frenchman the notion is carried still further. Not only is *l'honnête homme* of La Chétardie overflowing with goodness toward

<sup>40</sup> Brathwaite's *English Gentleman* was published in 1630. Faret's book was not issued at Paris until November of that year. It is impossible (unless one suppose that Faret's book had been circulated in manuscript) that Brathwaite could have known Faret's work when he wrote *The English Gentleman*. In any case, Faret has not developed the idea of the gentleman as the good man and the Christian to anything like the extent later French writers developed it. Brathwaite is far more insistent on goodness and piety than Faret.

<sup>41</sup> Antoine Gombaud, Chevalier de Méré, *Conversations written in French* (London, 1672; original French ed., Paris, 1668); Le Chevalier Trotti de La Chétardie, *Instructions for a Young Nobleman* (London, 1683; original French ed., Paris, 1683); L'Abbé Goussault, *Advice to Young Gentlemen* (London, 1698; original French ed., Paris, 1695).

<sup>42</sup> *Conversations of the Mareschal of Clerambault and the Chevalier de Méré*, tr. A. Lovell (London, 1677), p. 21. It may seem strange that Méré, of all persons, should be cited in this connection—Méré, the preceptor of Mme de Maintenon and other persons of fashion of his day, and the man of fashion who laid so much stress upon *bien-séance*. But although Méré in his letters concerns himself chiefly with the exterior marks of good breeding, in the *Conversations* the doctrine of *l'homme de bien* is clearly stated. And it was the *Conversations* which Englishmen knew in translation.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Traill, *Social England*, IV, 562.

<sup>44</sup> Collier, *Essays upon Several Moral Subjects* (3d ed., 1698), p. 153.

<sup>45</sup> *The True Conduct of Persons of Quality* (1694), pp. 38-38, 150-51.

humanity; he consciously cultivates such an attitude toward his fellows, and so becomes a thoroughpaced sentimentalist in the sense of one who seeks to enjoy his emotions. Says La Chétardie:

Our Nobleman must have an inexhaustible stock of Goodness and Justice. Valour is not sufficient to make a Man of Honour; he must have Probity, be faithful to his Friend, true to his Word, seek to oblige all Mankind, pity the unfortunate, . . . and take delight in easing and comforting them. . . . Happy is he who has such [a heart] as to be sensible of the Pleasure there is in doing good to others!<sup>46</sup>

Although this is not all that La Chétardie has to say about his ideal Nobleman (for, like other writers of books of instruction, he says the usual things about graciousness of manner, stoical courage, knowledge of the world, and the rest), the most striking thing about La Chétardie's aristocrat is that quality which marks him as the "good man" of tender sensibilities who enjoys doing good to others. One fancies his eyes filling and his throat contracting as in Godlike benevolence he does some good deed to an unfortunate fellow-mortal. For all his decorum and accomplishments, he is chiefly notable as the man of *sensibilité*. It is interesting to contrast him with the Renaissance ideal gentleman, who was so preoccupied with self-culture and with graceful living as a fine art that he seems never to have concerned himself with his relations to those who might need his charitable ministrations or his sympathy. One observes how far the late seventeenth-century *honnête homme* of La Chétardie has got away from Aristotle's Magnanimous Man, in whom disdain and arrogance were cardinal virtues, and how much nearer he is to Seneca's Wise Man.<sup>47</sup> But Seneca's Wise Man, a confirmed Stoic, carefully avoided the soft emotions which may accompany benevolent action toward one's fellows. La Chétardie is still nearer to the notion epitomized in Chaucer's oft-repeated "Pite renneth sone in gentil herte"—a medieval chivalric ideal inspired by Christian doctrine. Or rather, because of the frank enjoyment La Chétardie would have his gentleman take in doing good to others, it is almost as if Laurence Sterne had spoken out of the eighteenth century.

These influences from across the Channel, looking toward a conscientious if not a sentimental acceptance of the gentleman's duty

<sup>46</sup> La Chétardie, *Instructions for a Young Nobleman* (1683), pp. 3-4.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. above, pp. 151-52.

toward his fellows, served to reinforce native English ideals, though they did not create them. From Brathwaite down, the English gentleman as portrayed in the literature of conduct has a strong tincture of that spirit of Christianity which seeks to do good to others and accepts the self-imposed obligation to live a life of usefulness. A sense of responsibility to one's fellows, springing from an acknowledgment that all are children of one Father and are equal in His sight, displaces the pagan notion (and the feudal practice) which complacently put the aristocrat upon a pedestal, from which he looked down condescendingly upon *hoi polloi*. And when the practice of such goodness is accompanied by a feeling of intense satisfaction in the good which one does, sentimentalism is not far off. "Good is diffusive," said Higford as early as 1658, "and it is a happy converse, when we either profit others or ourselves."<sup>48</sup>

Seventeenth-century literature which presents aristocratic ideals shows, on the whole, that English thought, though it preserves much of the thinking of Renaissance times, especially Italian thinking, has begun to carve for itself. The Stoic doctrines applicable to theories of nobility and gentility—doctrines drawn from the Stoic philosophers themselves as well as from Renaissance conduct books—remain a chief influence in England throughout the seventeenth century, but through Seneca become mingled with humanitarian notions characteristic of the time. The humanist ideals of the gentleman's *accomplishments* are little changed in essence, though they may vary in details. But the Renaissance concept of *character*, founded upon the Aristotelian concept of the Magnanimous Man and with its basis of self-perfection, largely gives place, after Peacham, to a concept tinged with the humanitarian and romantic notions the seventeenth century found in Seneca to corroborate the teachings of religion, and later supported by ideas of *l'honnête homme* as *l'homme de bien*, from across the Channel.

Little wonder that Addison and Steele, when they came to present an eighteenth-century Euphuus—the man well grown in virtue—portrayed a Christian gentleman not devoid of sentiment.

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\* Higford, *Institutions, or Advice to his Grandson* (1658); reprinted in *The Harleian Miscellany*, IX (1812), 588.

JOSEPH GLANVILL, WITCHCRAFT, AND  
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SCIENCE

IN 1666 there was published in London a small treatise entitled *A Philosophical Endeavour towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions*, written, as the title-page announced, "By a Member of the Royal Society," and signed with the initials "J. G." This work—now best known as *Sadducismus triumphatus*, the title of the final enlarged edition<sup>1</sup>—was to become the most popular book of a writer who had already gained some attention and who was to continue to produce works covering a wide range of alert intellectual interests. A modern reader perusing these will find it difficult to reconcile readily the treatise on witchcraft with Glanvill's other writings. It will seem not a little astonishing at first that the author of a clever treatise on skepticism and certainty, of several vigorous defenses of the Royal Society and of the principles of the "new science," of sermons based on the best rationalistic and latitudinarian principles—in short, that one who ranged himself in most respects in the advance guard of the thought of his day should at the same time also have written this spirited defense of a decaying superstition. The apparent anomaly has not passed unnoticed; the *Sadducismus triumphatus* is rarely referred to without some expressed or implied astonishment that it should contrast so completely with its author's other writings, particularly those that were inspired by his interest in the scientific thought of his time. It has been variously viewed as a contradiction of the rest of his work, as an example of

<sup>1</sup> This edition appeared posthumously in 1681, the year of Glanvill's death. The following is a list of the editions by short titles: *A Philosophical Endeavour towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions* (1666); *Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft* (1667); *A Blow at Modern Sadducism* (1668); *A Blow at Modern Sadducism . . .* (4th ed., 1668; a different printing from the preceding); *Saducismus triumphatus* (in some editions spelled *Sadducismus*) (1681, 1689, 1700, 1726). The reprint in Glanvill's *Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion* (1676) is called "Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions." An entry in the British Museum catalogue, *Palpable Evidence of Spirits and Witchcraft* (1668), is not to be considered a separate edition; it is taken from an additional title-page which appears in both of the editions of 1668. References in this article will be made to the 1726 edition except in a few special instances. Unless otherwise indicated, it may be assumed that all passages quoted or referred to are to be found in all the editions published in Glanvill's lifetime.

human weakness, as a "monument of superstition."<sup>2</sup> Yet for Glanvill no such contradiction existed; everywhere he suggests his conviction that this work fitted in quite harmoniously with his others.<sup>3</sup>

## I

The most obvious, and the commonest, explanation of this paradox is that many intelligent men of the seventeenth century believed in witches, and that if, from our point of view, Glanvill erred, he was in the best of company in his own day. Glanvill, as a matter of fact, took the security of his position for granted, considering it one of the prodigies of his age that "Men, otherwise witty and ingenious, are fallen into the Conceit, that there is no such Thing as a *Witch*, or *Apparition*,"<sup>4</sup> and expressing surprise and irritation in a letter to Robert Boyle that John Webster's book attacking the belief should have been licensed by a vice-president of the Royal Society.<sup>5</sup> Such views may in part represent a kind of defensive self-confidence, but there is no doubt that Glanvill seriously believed most of the intelligent world to be on his side. In this he was not mistaken. In spite of an increasing amount of opposition—reflected, for instance, in the new edition of Reginald Scot's *Discovery of Witchcraft* (1651; 1st ed., 1584), in the publication of Webster's *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft* (1667) and Wagstaffe's *The Question of Witchcraft Debated* (1669), in the polished incredulity of Francis Osborne, and in the vigorous attacks of Hobbes<sup>6</sup>—most of the important thinkers of the seventeenth century who have left us any record of their opinions on this question expressed a belief—albeit at times with reluctance and

<sup>2</sup> This last phrase is Bury's in *The Idea of Progress* (London, 1924), p. 93. See also J. Tulloch, *Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century* (Edinburgh and London, 1872), II, 449–50; C. de Rémusat, *Histoire de la philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'à Locke* (Paris, 1878), II, 194–95; Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture*, I (New York, 1930), 457–58.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Essays* (1676), 8g. [a3]f; Essay IV, pp. 5–6, 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Sadducismus triumphatus* (1726), pp. 1–2.

<sup>5</sup> Letter to Boyle (Bath, October 7 [1677]), in Boyle, *Works* (London, 1772), VI, 631. There is, of course, no record of any "official" attitude on the part of the Royal Society on this point, since the society excluded from its consideration all questions lying outside the province of physical experimentation and observation. The minutes of a similar organization, however, the Philosophical Society of Oxford, for March 23, 1685/6, and November 8, 1687, indicate that serious consideration of witches and similar phenomena was not thought illegitimate even among groups organized for scientific research. These minutes are printed in R. T. Gunther's *Early Science in Oxford*, IV (1925) 175–76, 208.

<sup>6</sup> For a convenient description of this movement see W. Notestein, *A History of Witchcraft in England from 1558 to 1718* (Washington, 1911), pp. 245–49, 294–302. On the increasing skepticism toward witches see also Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture*, I, 450–58.

hesitation—in the existence of witches and in the reality of the satanic compact.

Sir Francis Bacon,<sup>7</sup> Sir Thomas Browne,<sup>8</sup> Henry More,<sup>9</sup> and Robert Boyle are very appropriate illustrations of this fact, since they were all men who attained intellectual distinction in their day and who, in varying degrees, might be termed "scientific" in their interests. Boyle's views are especially illuminating, as well because he was the greatest English scientist before Newton as because he corresponded with Glanvill on the question of witches. The most direct expression of his belief appears in a letter by him prefixed to Peter du Moulin's *The Devil of Mascon*, an account of a witch disturbance translated from the French of Perreaud, in which, after reminding the reader of his habitual caution—"the powerful inclinations, which my course of life and studies hath given me to diffidence and backwardness of assent"—he states his conviction of the truth of the narrative.<sup>10</sup> His *Excellency of Theology* (1674), moreover, allows for the philosophical possibility of witchcraft in its criticisms of those who consider matter and motion and the inhabitants of this globe as the sole manifestation of God's power: Boyle distinguishes three other groups besides those purely corporeal—men, good angels, and demons or evil angels.<sup>11</sup> Further evidence of Boyle's interest in the subject of witchcraft is to be found in his correspondence, particularly in his communications to Glanvill, in which he repudiates the rumor that he has disowned the Devil of Mascon story, and offers his friend advice on the revision of his work on witchcraft for a new edition.<sup>12</sup>

Information of this sort enlarges one's perspective and shows that

<sup>7</sup> Bacon's statements may have been affected by a desire to flatter James I (see *Advancement of Learning*, in *Works*, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath [London, 1887], III, 331, 490). He also cautions against the possibility of confusing spirit phenomena and the delusions of the imagination (*Sylva sylvarum*, in *Works*, II, 641–42, 656). Nevertheless, his acceptance of witchcraft is more than implicit in his writings.

<sup>8</sup> "For my part, I have ever believed, and do now know, that there are Witches" (*Religio medici*, in *Works*, ed. Keynes [London, 1928–31], I, 38). For an account of Browne's part as a witness in a witch trial, see W. P. Dunn, *Sir Thomas Browne* (Menasha, 1926), pp. 23–31. Cf. also Dorothy Tyler in *Anglia*, LIV (1930), 179–95.

<sup>9</sup> More's views are discussed in some detail below.

<sup>10</sup> This letter is reprinted in Boyle's *Works* (London, 1772), I, ccxxi–ccxxii.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 19.

<sup>12</sup> Letters to Glanvill (September 28, 1677), in *Works*, VI, 58; (February 10, 1677/8), *ibid.*, p. 59. See also a letter from Glanvill to Boyle (n.d.), *ibid.*, p. 632; and the following letters: from Samuel Collins on witchcraft in Russia (September 1, 1663), *ibid.*, p. 640; from J. Beale on the possible effects of witchcraft in the making of butter (April 28, 1666), *ibid.*, pp. 400–401; from the same on the rôle of "etherial intelligents" in prophetic dreams (October 12, 1670), *ibid.*, p. 429.



Glanvill was not an isolated example of what appears an incongruity to modern taste; but to rest the case here is worse than offering no explanation at all, for these facts raise, rather than put to rest, perplexing questions. Glanvill's work can not represent simply a survival of old, ingrained beliefs still lurking uncritically in the thought of a cultivated person, the only condition which the general acceptance of witchcraft might satisfactorily explain. It represents, not passive acceptance, but on the contrary militant defense of a belief which an increasing number of men were beginning to condemn as a wicked superstition—and this in the face of the fact that Glanvill advertised on the very title-page of his treatise his membership in a group that prided itself on its intellectual independence and its complete freedom from superstition and traditional belief. Powerful and serious motives must have urged Glanvill to write so earnestly on this issue; and a suggestion of what these were may be found in the writings of those of his contemporaries who denied the possibility of witches.

## II

Significantly enough, the only English thinker of first-rate importance during the seventeenth century who unmistakably and emphatically opposed the belief in witches was Thomas Hobbes. With his characteristic penchant for paradoxical argument, he approved of the punishment of "witches," but only because he considered them guilty of perpetuating an erroneous and mischievous belief.<sup>13</sup> Such superstitions he believed to have originated in ignorance of natural causes and to have been preserved by crafty men for the purpose of keeping simple men in their power.<sup>14</sup> The sources of these errors he traced to the demonology of the Greeks, the philosophy of Aristotle, and the false opinion of the Jews concerning possession by spirits, into which they fell through "want of curiosity of natural causes."<sup>15</sup> Scriptural references to witches he dismissed, in-

<sup>13</sup> *Leviathan*, in *Works*, ed. Molesworth (London, 1839-45), III, 9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 637-38. The Hobbesian arguments left an unmistakable mark on other attacks on witchcraft. On the point under discussion, for instance, see John Wagstaffe, *The Question of Witchcraft Debated* (1669), pp. 68-77. Many of the arguments in John Webster's *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft* (1677), the most important reply to Glanvill, are based on Hobbesian assumptions: for example, that man can have no actual knowledge of immaterial and spiritual substance since sensation can be caused only by corporeal contact (p. 198); that angels and spirits, if incorporeal, can cause no motion (p. 208); that diabolical fascination is effected by material effluvia (pp. 182-83).

<sup>15</sup> *Leviathan*, in *Works*, III, 605, 616, 674-75, 67-68, 639. Some of the same points are repeated by Wagstaffe, pp. 19-28.



interpreting them in a figurative and metaphorical sense,<sup>16</sup> and insisting that the Bible nowhere makes unmistakable reference to incorporeal spirits or to possession,<sup>17</sup> and that in any case accuracy is no more to be expected from the Bible on this point than on the question of the earth's motion.<sup>18</sup>

Hobbes's motive in urging the falsity of the belief in witchcraft was clearly not just a desire to overthrow a distasteful superstition. He concerned himself with this question chiefly because, in a negative way, it formed part of his general argument for the unreality of incorporeal substance and for the materiality of the "soul," both essential ideas in his attempt to interpret all aspects of the entire universe in terms of matter and mechanical laws. Glanvill, on the other hand, was inspired in his defense of the belief by an opposite desire to prove the existence of immaterial substance, as a service in the cause of religion against materialistic mechanists like Hobbes. Nor was this a question in which the scientists were unconcerned; indeed, in large part it owed its importance as a philosophic issue at the time to the metaphysical implications of certain developments in the work of the scientists themselves.

None of the scientific philosophers of the seventeenth century were unaware of the religious implications of their work, and, whenever their ideas seemed dangerous to church and faith, all of them attempted either to avoid these implications or to explain them away. Such efforts at reconciliation were particularly prominent in England because the greater number of those interested in the new science in that country were at the same time sincerely anxious to conserve the substance of traditional religious belief. Accordingly, they took frequent occasion to insist that the new scientific discoveries did not necessarily lead to atheism and irreligion, expressing this conviction with a mixture of concern and reassurance that revealed a more than casual fear of being misunderstood.<sup>19</sup> All these protestations indicate the awareness on the part of the scientists and their adherents of the

<sup>16</sup> *Leviathan*, in *Works*, III, 66-67, 396, 421, 433, 603-4, 642.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 391-92, 393, 641, 644.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., Bacon, *Novum organum*, in *Works*, IV, 20, 87-88; *Advancement of Learning*, in *Works*, III, 264, 267-68; Boyle, *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 19, 33, 55, 57; *Excellency of Theology*, in *Works*, IV, 37; letter to Baxter (n.d.) in *Works*, VI, 520; Thomas Sprat, *History of the Royal Society* (3d ed.; London, 1722), pp. 351-54, 320; Glanvill, *Scepsis scientifica*, p. 182; *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, pp. 247-48.

new problems which their discoveries and ideas had raised in the minds of intelligent though pious men, and illustrate their desire to forestall condemnation of their scientific aims by the orthodox-minded. By Glanvill's time, the principal issues which arose out of the necessity of reconciling science and religion had been clearly defined, and the answers to the main questions which had been raised had been fully developed.

The most serious philosophical difficulties, it was clear, arose out of the exclusive concern of the "new" scientists with secondary causes; that is, with purely mechanical interpretations of all natural phenomena. The necessary result of this method of approach was a picture of the universe as a beautifully regulated automaton which, by its mechanical perfection, allowed to God a relatively insignificant rôle and left little possibility for the operation of any immaterial principle or spirit.

The scientists, however, were unwilling to relax their persistent search after purely mechanical explanations of natural phenomena, chiefly in terms of atomic assumptions. Attention to mechanical causes had developed into one of the basic methodological principles of the new philosophy of nature, and none of the leading scientists of the period failed to enunciate or imply it. In England, Boyle in particular gave elaborate and frequent expression to it in his writings. He insisted that the naturalist should avoid religious and metaphysical explanations, and that he should reduce his descriptions of all natural phenomena to terms of matter and the laws of motion.<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the scientists, however, persons who did not have Boyle's reputation for sanctity applied this principle in so thoroughgoing a manner as to exclude the philosophic possibility of immaterial substance or spirit and to permit dangerous implications with respect to the original creation by God. Hobbes loomed up as the contemporary horrible example of this development; and although the menace of Hobbes was certainly not the only fact that determined the scientists' defense of their inquiries against the possible charge

<sup>20</sup> *Of the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis*, in *Works*, IV, 73; *Origin of Forms and Qualities*, in *Works*, III, 7. Boyle expressed annoyance at More's attempts to give metaphysical explanations for certain of his experiments in hydrostatics (cf. *An Hydrostatical Discourse Occasioned by the Objections of the Learned Dr. Henry More*, in *Works*, III, 627). Cf. also Bacon: "For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes" (*Advancement*, in *Works*, III, 267); Glanvill, *Scire/i tuum nihil est* (bound with *Scepſis scientifica*), p. 71.

of irreligion, particularly on the issue of the creation,<sup>21</sup> the terrifying consistency of his mechanical principles stimulated such discussion and provided a focus for it.

Like the other scientific thinkers, Hobbes also excluded from the concern of philosophy "all such things as are thought to be neither bodies nor properties of bodies."<sup>22</sup> But this became for Hobbes, not a methodological principle, but a metaphysical assumption. He described the universe as a plenum, in which no vacuum can exist,<sup>23</sup> and in which all motion is caused by direct mechanical contact, declaring in consequence that "there is no such thing as an incorporeal movement."<sup>24</sup> This principle determined for Hobbes two important conclusions. All thought and sense became explainable for him in terms of matter and motion: the thinking substance must be material, and thought and sensation merely the movement of physical particles.<sup>25</sup> And as a logical consequence, even God himself must be corporeal.<sup>26</sup> It is little wonder that with such a system apparently being developed out of their own principles, the more religious-minded writers interested in the advancement of natural science opposed conclusions of this nature so vigorously, and that they often deliberately pointed their arguments against Hobbes.

To offset possible confusion, they made a distinction between a mechanical approach to the study of nature that was dangerous to religion, and one that was, on the contrary, of positive assistance in the cause of faith. Glanvill himself, among others, insisted that a valuable

<sup>21</sup> During the sixteenth century, preoccupation with the danger to religion of mechanical interpretations of nature was stimulated by the revival of interest in Epicurean atomism chiefly through knowledge of Lucretius. On the early diffusion of atomism see G. B. Stones, "The Atomic View of Matter in the XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth Centuries," *Isis*, X (1928), 445-65. A number of texts illustrative of the apprehension with which the mechanistic character of the atomic hypothesis was regarded are cited by George Buckley in an unpublished University of Chicago dissertation, *Rationalism in Sixteenth-Century English Literature* (1931).

<sup>22</sup> *Elements of Philosophy*, in *Works*, I, 10; also *ibid.*, pp. x-xi, 11.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 414-25; *Seven Philosophical Problems*, in *Works*, VII, 17-24; *Decameron physiologicum*, in *Works*, VII, 89-95.

<sup>24</sup> *Elements of Philosophy*, in *Works*, I, 430, 124-25.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 391; *Leviathan*, in *Works*, III, 11-12. See also his criticism of Descartes in *Troisièmes objections* in *Descartes' Œuvres*, ed. Adam et Tannery (Paris, 1897-1913), IX, 135, 138. Even the Cartesian mechanism seemed alarming to certain writers in England, although Descartes established a clear distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, thus effecting a separation of mind from body, and of God, the original creator and mover of matter, from matter itself.

<sup>26</sup> The materiality of God is explicitly stated in Hobbes's reply to Bishop Bramhall, in *Works*, IV, 313. See also *Leviathan*, in *Works*, III, 672; *Decameron physiologicum*, in *Works*, VII, 89.

feature of the work of the Royal Society was "the searching out the true laws of Matter and Motion in order to the securing of the Foundations of Religion against all attempts of Mechanical Atheism."<sup>27</sup> Atomists who were in bad odor, according to these views, were guilty of two fundamental errors: they attempted to account for the formation and development of the universe by the random motion of atoms; and, second, by concentrating only on the physical character of the universe, they encouraged a disbelief in the operation of any spiritual or immaterial principle. In reply to the first of these dangerous conclusions, the point was frequently made that no sensible and exhaustive investigator of nature could possibly entertain the belief that the creation was not the handiwork of a supreme being.<sup>28</sup> But the scientists went farther, and attempted to demonstrate that their study of the mechanical laws of matter and motion provided one of the most unanswerable proofs for the existence of an intelligent deity, the creator of the universe. They adopted the old argument from design, and, giving it a new coloring drawn from the facts revealed by contemporary science, repeated untiringly in its modern form the old theme of the Psalmist, the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> "Address to the Royal Society," *Scepais scientifica*, Sg. (a2). On the anti-Hobbesian aim of Glanvill's thought here see *ibid.*, Sg. (b) f, and "The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion," in *Essays*, Essay IV, p. 33 (this essay is a reprint of his *Philosophia pia* 1671)).

<sup>28</sup> Boyle, *The Excellency and Grounds of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Hypothesis*, in *Works*, IV, 68-69; More, *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More* (London, 1712), pp. 135-36; letter to Glanvill in Glanvill's *A Praefatory Answer to Henry Stubbe* (London, 1671), p. 155; Glanvill, *Essays*, Essay IV, pp. 7-8, 32-33.

<sup>29</sup> It is unnecessary to document this point exhaustively here. Broadly speaking, it might be observed that the argument from design appears most prominently in those writers in whose thought atomic mechanism was an essential element. It appears only casually, for example, in Bacon (*Advancement*, in *Works*, III, 300-301; *Novum organum*, in *Works*, IV, 89). Some typical examples are as follows: Gassendi, *Syntagma philosophicum*, in *Opera* (Lyon, 1658-75), I, 311; II, 231; More, *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection* . . . , pp. 5, 37-85, 40-42; Boyle, *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 20-21, 30, 43; *A Discourse of Things above Reason*, in *Works*, IV, 446; *Some Motives and Incentives to the Love of God*, in *Works*, I, 262-63; Sprat, *History*, p. 349; Glanvill, *Vanity*, pp. 42-46; *Scepais*, pp. 32-34; *Essays*, Essay IV, pp. 5, 7; *Plus ultra*, p. 54. It must also be noted in passing that at times, and in particular in certain writers, the emphasis in the argument from design was placed not simply on the order, regularity, contrivance, and use of the parts of the universe, but on their beauty as well, attention being called occasionally even to the extravagant and surprising flourishes of nature. The most complete development of this turn of the argument is to be found in Henry More (*An Antidote*, in *A Collection*, pp. 54-55, 57; Appendix to *An Antidote*, in *A Collection*, p. 212).

The argument from design derived much of its force from the orderly perfection and mathematical regularity of nature as discerned by the scientist; it therefore inclined toward a view of the universe, already too prominent, that left to God the position of aloof and useless spectator of his own creation, and that thus further encouraged by implication a theistic mechanism which could be little more acceptable than a corporeal deity or no deity at all. By means of the same general set of arguments, however, it was found possible not only to assign a more intimate rôle to God in the universe, but to reply to those who denied a place in nature to immaterial substance or spirit.

The solution of this problem was developed over a wide range of variations.<sup>30</sup> In its simplest form it posited God as essential not only to the creation of the universe but also to its continued existence. It was probably Descartes who gave this view its widest popularity in his provision for God's *concours ordinaire* as essential to the preservation of the present status of matter and motion.<sup>31</sup> But the idea was also to be found in the writings of other prominent scientific philosophers, as, for example, Gassendi<sup>32</sup> and Boyle.<sup>33</sup>

This solution, however, failed to satisfy all possible objections; it was vague, and it still permitted the explanation of all observable phenomena in terms simply of mechanical law. It failed, in short, to give any definite place to immaterial substance. The development of mechanistic science had, of course, completely excluded the possibility of admitting the direct intervention of God in the normal operations of nature; hence, some indirect agent, some all-pervading non-material element, had to be admitted in order to avoid a simple theistic mechanism. Now, such a hypothesis was not without precedent in purely scientific thinking: in the work of an earlier genera-

<sup>30</sup> The present discussion is admittedly inadequate for a full understanding of all the issues involved. An admirable treatment of the whole development may be found in E. A. Burt's *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (New York and London, 1925).

<sup>31</sup> *Principes*, in *Œuvres*, IX, 83-84. See also Gilson's notes to his edition of the *Discours*, pp. 340-42.

<sup>32</sup> *Syntagma*, in *Opera*, I, 323.

<sup>33</sup> Boyle uses the expression "ordinary support and influence." Cf. *Origin of Forms and Qualities*, in *Works*, III, 48-49 and *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 39. For more popular expressions of this view see Sprat, *History*, p. 360, and Glanvill, *Luz orientalis*, pp. 126-27.

tion of natural philosophers, before the "mechanical" theory had become so inflexibly a part of the scientific consciousness, the assumption of a non-mechanical agent had occasionally been made in primarily scientific explanations; for example, by Gilbert in his speculations about magnetism.<sup>34</sup> Even Boyle admitted, with some hesitation, that certain phenomena cannot be readily explained by atomic principles, and that some of them suggest the possibility of a non-mechanical agency.<sup>35</sup> Yet actually Boyle was reluctant to go beyond these general admissions, and on the whole was disposed to limit the physicist strictly to a description of the course of nature in terms of atomic matter and motion.<sup>36</sup> It was Henry More who, largely in opposition to Hobbes and later to Descartes as well, developed with complete fulness the idea of the diffusion through the universe of an immaterial agent which exerts a guiding force on the phenomena even of the regular physico-mathematical world of the physicist—"the Spirit of Nature, *which is the Vicarious power of God upon the Matter. . . .*"<sup>37</sup> Too many phenomena, More insisted, defy explanation in terms of the laws of matter: the opposition of gravity to the first law of motion, the phenomena described in experiments with Boyle's air pump, the cohesion of atoms, etc., all illustrated for him the manner in which this immaterial transmitter of God's power checks or controls purely mechanical impulses and motions.<sup>38</sup>

All these various developments illustrate the desire of the leading scientific philosophers not to exclude at least the possibility of an immaterial principle or substance. The eclectic Glanvill, eager to embrace the newest scientific ideas, yet equally anxious not to endanger the fundamental suppositions of faith, mirrored these tendencies in his writings. He wavered between one alternative and another at times, but he never failed to allow the possibility of an immaterial or

<sup>34</sup> On the development of the idea of a spiritual medium to account for certain natural phenomena see Burt, *Metaphysical Foundations*, pp. 157-60.

<sup>35</sup> *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 35, 38-39, 47-48.

<sup>36</sup> *Origin of Forms and Qualities*, in *Works*, III, 48-49. But see *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 39, 47-48, for his admission of the possibility of the pervading presence of an intelligent being throughout the universe.

<sup>37</sup> *The Immortality of the Soul*, in *A Collection*, p. xlii. For a concise definition of More's idea of the Spirit of Nature see *ibid.*, p. 212.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 212-24; *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection*, pp. 46, 190. Similar arguments were later (1678) used by Cudworth in *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (London, 1743), pp. 47, 148.



"vital" principle in at least some of the operations of nature.<sup>39</sup> Though he never adopted all of More's views completely,<sup>40</sup> he admitted their plausibility and accepted the basic principles which determined them. And it was precisely his concern for these principles that inspired his labors on witchcraft.

### III

The opposition to atheistical and theistic mechanism is unmistakable in the *Sadducismus triumphatus*. Glanvill, after presenting the position of those who deny witchcraft because they deny spirit, points out clearly the dangerous materialistic and mechanistic conclusions which such views encourage:

*The Notion of a Spirit is impossible and contradictory, and consequently, so is that of Witches; the Belief of which is founded on that Doctrine.*

To which *Objection*, I answer, First, If the *Notion of a Spirit* be absurd, as is pretended, that of a God and a Soul distinct from Matter, and immortal, are likewise Absurdities; and then, that the World was jumbled into this elegant and orderly Fabrick by Chance; and that our Souls are only Parts of Matter that came together, we know not whence, nor how, and shall again shortly be dissolv'd into those loose *Atoms* that compound them; that all our Conceptions are but the Thrusting of one Part of Matter against another; and the *Ideas* of our Minds meer blind and casual Motions. These, and a Thousand more, the grossest Impossibilities and Absurdities (Consequents of this Proposition, *that the Notion of a Spirit is absurd*) will be sad Certainties and Demonstrations. And with such Assertors I would cease to discourse about Witches and Apparitions, and address my self to obtain their Assent to Truths infinitely more sacred.<sup>41</sup>

He laments the fashionable disbelief in witches, since in Sadducism, or the denial of spirits, which he believes underlies the ridicule of sorcery, he sees the first step in a chain of reasoning leading to atheism;<sup>42</sup> for he was opposing not simply those who disbelieved in

<sup>39</sup> In particular see "Of Scepticism and Certainty," *Essays*, Essay II, p. 60; and "Anti-fanatical Philosophy and Free Religion," *ibid.*, Essay VII, pp. 50-51.

<sup>40</sup> In particular, he felt that Descartes, unlike Hobbes, did allow for the operation of immaterial substance. Cf. *Scepais*, pp. 64-65; *Vanity*, pp. 87-88; *Essays*, Essay IV, p. 11.

<sup>41</sup> *Sadducismus*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>42</sup> Preface to *Sadducismus*, Sg. A4v. The passage in question appeared first in 1668. Throughout Glanvill's works there runs a lament over the scoffing, athelstical, "Sadduce" temper of the times (*ibid.*, pp. 223-24; *Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains* [1681], pp. 152, 269-70; *The Zealous and Impartial Protestant* [1681], p. 43). This attitude is common during the middle years of the seventeenth century, especially among those who defended the belief in witches. Henry More considered the demonstration of the existence of incorporeal beings "a design, than which nothing can be more seasonable in this age;



witches, but those who maintained that the "Notion of a Spirit is impossible and contradictory, and consequently, so is that of Witches; the Belief of which is founded on that Doctrine."<sup>43</sup> In other words, he realized that the same philosophical assumptions which were used to disprove the belief in witches by such materialists as Hobbes<sup>44</sup> could be, and in fact were being, used to deny the reality of a spirit-soul, if not of God. He believed, therefore, that by showing certain phenomena to be the work of evil spirits operating through witches he could destroy a vital link in the argument of those who denied reality to all spirit, and thus strike at the root of materialistic mechanism.

There was of course nothing new in this argument that disbelief in witches was a step toward atheism. By the beginning of the seventeenth century it had become fairly common. Pierre le Loyer in his *Discours et histoires des spectres* (1605) had denounced the materialist and atheist opponents of witchcraft, and had made a fairly thorough analysis of their position. The enemies against whom he directed his denunciation were "Sadduces," who believe God to be corporeal; Epicureans, who attribute all phenomena to atoms; and Peripatetics—not the true followers of Aristotle, but heretical disciples like Aphrodisius and Pomponazzi.<sup>45</sup> This linking of disbelief in witchcraft with various forms of atheism became the rule in England during the middle years of the century.<sup>46</sup> According to Sir Thomas Browne, "they that doubt these [witches], do not only deny them, but Spirits; and are obliquely and upon consequence a sort not of Infidels, but

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wherein the notion of a spirit is so hooted at by so many for nonsense" (letter to Boyle in Boyle, *Works*, VI, 514). Thomas Bromhall maintained that he wrote his *Treatise of Specters* (1658) because it seemed called for during "these so much Saducean and Socinian times" (Sg. A2). Boyle warned Glanvill to be very careful about the authenticity of his relations, "for we live in an age and place, wherein all stories of witchcrafts, or other magical feats, are by many, even of the wise, suspected; and by too many that would pass for wits, derided and exploded" (letter to Glanvill [1677], in *Works*, VI, 57-58). The fashionable current of disbelief in witches is briefly touched on by Notestein, *A History of Witchcraft*, pp. 245-46.

<sup>43</sup> *Sadducismus*, p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> Glanvill mentions Hobbes directly in the Preface to the *Sadducismus*, Sg. [A5]v and p. 229. The attack on Hobbesian materialism, however, is plain enough without these direct references.

<sup>45</sup> *Discours et histoires des spectres* (Paris, 1605), pp. 7-31.

<sup>46</sup> Notestein refers to this view in Thomas Cooper's *The Mystery of Witchcraft* (1617) as if it were a fairly new element in English discussions (*A History of Witchcraft*, pp. 231-32).

Atheists."<sup>47</sup> Bromhall, in his *Treatise of Specters* (1658), mentions among the disbelievers of witches Sadducees, Epicureans, certain Peripatetics, "and all sorts of *Atheists* whatsoever."<sup>48</sup>

In most of these writers the argument was not developed with the same fulness and subtlety as in Glanvill; moreover, it was not directed against so immediate and conspicuous an enemy, nor did it draw from precisely the same background. In fully elaborated form, it found expression before Glanvill's treatise in the works of Henry More, who undoubtedly exercised the most direct influence on this aspect of Glanvill's thought.

In a letter to Glanvill, dated May 25, 1678, and printed in the *Sadducismus* of 1681, More analyzed succinctly his general position:

And forasmuch as such course grain'd Philosophers as those *Hobbians* and *Spinozians*, and the rest of that Rabble, slight Religion and the Scriptures, because there is such express Mention of Spirits and Angels in them, Things that their dull Souls are so inclinable to conceit to be impossible; I look upon it as a special Piece of Providence, that there are ever and anon such fresh Examples of Apparitions and Witchcrafts, as may rub up and awaken their benumm'd and lethargick Minds, into a Suspicion at least, if not Assurance, that there are other intelligent Beings, besides those that are clad in heavy Earth or Clay; in this, I say, methinks the Divine Providence does plainly outwit the Powers of the dark Kingdom, in permitting wicked Men and Women, and vagrant spirits of that Kingdom, to make Leagues or Covenants one with another; the Confession of Witches against their own Lives, being so palpable an Evidence, besides the miraculous Feats they play, that there are bad Spirits, which will necessarily open a Door to the Belief that there are good Ones; and, lastly, that there is a God.<sup>49</sup>

A good many years before the writing of this letter, however, More had fully developed the details of this chain of reasoning in several of his works, in which his concern with witches was clearly bound up with his desire to prove the existence of an immaterial spirit of nature. The arguments from design and from the incompleteness of mechanical explanation furnished, in his opinion, one line of proof; but to these he added witches and apparitions as constituting a more tangible kind of demonstration.<sup>50</sup> He gave prominence to this latter type of evidence because he believed that it furnished an empirical, and hence

<sup>47</sup> *Religio medici*, in *Works*, I, 38; also *Pseudodoxia epidemica*, in *Works*, II, 75-76.

<sup>48</sup> P. 343.

<sup>49</sup> "Dr. More's letter to Mr. Glanvill," in *Sadducismus*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>50</sup> *Immortality of the Soul*, in *A Collection*, pp. 36-37.

an undeniable, proof of the existence of spirits and incorporeal substances:

The third and last ground which I would make use of, for evincing the Existence of *Incorporeal Substances*, is such extraordinary Effects as we cannot well imagine any natural, but must needs conceive some free or spontaneous Agent to be the Cause thereof, whenas yet it is clear that they are from neither Man nor Beast. Such are speakings, knockings, opening of Doors when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room floating in the air, and then passing and vanishing; nay, shapes of Men and several sorts of Brutes, that, after speech and converse, have suddenly disappeared. These, and many such like extraordinary Effects . . . seem to be an undeniable Argument, that there be such things as *Spirits* or *Incorporeal Substances* in the world. . . .<sup>51</sup>

More conceived God as "an Essence of which this *Matter* depends, and in which he is, penetrating and possessing all things"; and in the phenomena of witchcraft he found sufficient proof that spirit can penetrate and actuate matter.<sup>52</sup> That is why he took his witch stories so seriously, and why he considered ridicule of them "a dangerous Prelude to *Atheism* it self, or else a more close and crafty profession and insinuation of it."<sup>53</sup>

Such motives inspired much of the seventeenth-century defense of witchcraft,<sup>54</sup> and they are of particular importance in understanding Glanvill's earnest efforts on behalf of the belief.<sup>55</sup> Much of Glanvill's

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>52</sup> An Appendix to the Foregoing Antidote [against atheism], in *A Collection*, p. 223.

<sup>53</sup> An Antidote against Atheism, in *A Collection*, p. 142. One view developed by More in his discussion of spirits Glanvill never wholly accepted, though he entertained it as a possibility; i.e., the conception of spirit as "extended, penetrable, indiscrptible, and self-motive." He was undoubtedly expressing his own state of mind in "Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy," his continuation of Bacon's *New Atlantis*, when he represented the clergy of Bensalem amicably divided between this view of spirit and the Cartesian, which assigned extension and motion only to matter (*Essays*, Essay VII, p. 53). Glanvill never repudiated Descartes entirely, as did More.

<sup>54</sup> See also Meric Casaubon, *Of Credulity and Incredulity*, pp. 7, 40-41; Benjamin Camfield, *A Theological Discourse of Angels*, Sg. A3v, pp. 171-72.

<sup>55</sup> Other closely associated influences did, of course, combine to encourage belief in spirits and consequently in witches, in particular the preference of such men as More and Glanvill for the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian philosophy. Glanvill frequently appeals to the Platonic theories of the soul and of spirit (*Sadducismus*, pp. 5, 8-9, 23-24). One of these arguments which Glanvill admittedly draws from a Platonistic background—i.e., that judging from the analogy of nature "all the upper stories of the Universe are furnished with Inhabitants" (*ibid.*, pp. 5, 23-25)—seems to have had some currency: Browne wonders "how so many learned heads should so far forget their Metaphysics, and destroy the ladder and scale of creatures, as to question the existence of Spirits" (*Works*, I, 88); and Boyle seems to argue from similar premises when he insists that there must be other classes of creatures besides those purely corporeal (*The Excellency of Theology*, in

treatise, it is true, represents a survival of older discussions of the problem: a good portion of his argument is theological; in the later editions there is considerable quibbling over Webster's *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft* (1677), which was apparently a reply to Glanvill, on the question of the much-discussed Witch of Endor; many of his stories were taken over from earlier collections such as those of Jean Bodin; and all the conventional features of the witch dogma he accepted with little question.<sup>56</sup> Glanvill, however, was neither without judgment in what he adopted nor unaware of earlier criticisms of the belief. In fact, one of the disarming features of his book in its later form was his complete acceptance of all that had been objected against the possibility of witchcraft.<sup>57</sup> His defense took account of what had already been said on the subject and attempted to put the problem on a philosophical basis. And for the "philosophic" features of the *Sadducismus triumphatus*, Glanvill drew largely, with perhaps only a new emphasis, on arguments and assumptions characteristic of those of his works which had nothing to do with occult tradition and which had grown out of his interest in the new science. The unique quality of his book did not lie so much in his use of any basically new materials or proofs as in the new attitude which guided his manipulation of the traditional speculations about spirits and witches. What he did was to impose a scientific pattern on to the usual form of defense. He was attracted to the problem of witches largely because of his interest in certain metaphysical questions made

*Works*, IV, 19). Glanvill further insists that the philosophy of the schools leads to Sadducism (*Essays*, Essay VII, p. 53). This view was not unfounded: rationalistic Aristotelians like Pomponazzi and Cardan in general disbelieved in spirits, whereas Platonists were usually believers (cf. Henri Busson, *Les Sources et le développement du rationalisme dans la littérature française, 1533-1601* [Paris, 1922], pp. 45, 238, and n. 4). Ferris Greeneslet in his *Joseph Glanvill: A Study in English Thought and Letters of the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 1900), pp. 150-51, and John Owen in the introduction to his edition of the *Sceptis scientifica* (London, 1885), pp. xi ff., refer to Glanvill's early Puritan training as a partial explanation of his belief in witches. No recent student of witchcraft will take this connection very seriously. G. L. Kittredge, in his *Witchcraft in Old and New England* (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), demonstrates at some length (pp. 329-73) that there is no necessary or unique relationship between Puritanism and the belief in witchcraft.

<sup>56</sup> Since these traditional features of witch dogma stand outside of our main problem, and have been discussed adequately in other studies, they will not be fully dealt with here. For Glanvill's definition of witchcraft see the introduction to Part II of *Sadducismus*, pp. 225-26. This passage did not appear before 1681.

<sup>57</sup> Introduction to Part II of *Sadducismus*, pp. 227-29. This passage appeared first in 1681.

peculiarly important by developments in science, and he self-consciously brought to bear on his discussions the approved axioms of scientific methodology.

## IV

The usual proof on which seventeenth-century natural philosophers relied for the existence of spirit was of a negative and indirect character: by indicating the inadequacy of explanations of physical phenomena which considered only matter and the laws of motion, certain scientists allowed room for inference concerning the possible part played by immaterial substance. Glanvill saw no reason, however, why scientists could not with great profit conduct direct investigations into the operations of spirit itself. Here was an unexplored field, and here a group of men, the members of the Royal Society, trained in the only methods by which it was possible to unravel the mysteries of any phenomenon. With this in mind he went so far as to propose a scientific study of this unknown world by the Society:

*Indeed, as things are for the present, the LAND of SPIRITS is a kinde of AMERICA, and not well discover'd Region; yea, it stands in the Map of humane Science like unknown Tracts, fill'd up with Mountains, Seas, and Monsters: For we meet with little in the Immaterial Hæmisphere, but Doubts, Uncertainties, and Fables; and whether we owe our ignorance in these matters, to the nature of the things themselves, or to the mistakes and sloth of those that have enquired about them, I leave to your Lordship's happy sagacity to determine. Only, perhaps more of the supra-mundane light had shone in upon us, but for Superstition, Despair, and the wranglings of the Schools. And did the SOCIETY of which your Lordship is an illustrious Member, direct some of its wary, and luciferous enquiries towards the World of Spirits, I believe we should have other kind of Metaphysicks, than those are taught by men that love to write great Volumes, and to be subtle about nothing. For we know not any thing of the world we live in, but by experiment and the Phenomena; and there is the same way of speculating immaterial nature, by extraordinary Events and Apparitions, which possibly might be improved to notices not contemptible, were there a Cautious, and Faithful History made of those certain and uncommon appearances. At least it would be a standing evidence against SADDUCISM, to which the present Age is so unhappily disposed, and a sensible Argument of our Immortality.<sup>58</sup>*

The implication is that, although spirits probably do not follow the laws of matter, there is no reason to suppose that they do not follow

<sup>58</sup> *A Blow at Modern Sadducism* (1668), pp. 115-17. This passage does not appear in any of the other editions.

laws peculiar to themselves, which careful "histories"—that is, observed data critically collected and classified—and experiments might reveal.<sup>59</sup> In his own estimation, Glanvill was a scientist when he compiled the material for his work on witchcraft. Nor was he without precedent in this: Henry More believed that in his witch relations he was meeting the mechanistic atheist on his own grounds, as a naturalist: "But that he might not be shie of me, I have conform'd my self as near his own *Garb* as I might, without partaking of his Folly or Wickedness; and have appear'd in the plain shape of a mere *Naturalist* my self. . . ."<sup>60</sup>

No doubt it was a contradiction to consider the investigation of the spirit-world a legitimate possibility for the natural philosopher since science had definitely limited its field to a study of mechanical causes only, and the Royal Society had carefully excluded the topics of God and the soul from its province; yet various leaders of the scientific movement saw some justification for such inquiries. Bacon had asserted that, with regard to evil spirits, "the contemplation or science of their nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom," and that "it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits that to enquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sins and vice in morality."<sup>61</sup> The study of witchcraft and marvels, in his opinion, could be of considerable use to the naturalist because it would help him distinguish between different types of phenomena and hence would be useful "for the further disclosing of nature."<sup>62</sup> Boyle communicated to Glanvill his belief that knowledge of the phenomena which the latter was studying might help to enlarge the philosophical horizon, restricted perhaps too much by the limitations within which the physicist usually worked:

. . . I might add, that some of the particulars you mentioned to me, as (especially) those of the insensible marks of witches, and the way of detecting them, may suggest odd speculations to a naturalist, and help to enlarge the somewhat too narrow conceptions men are wont to have of the amplitude

<sup>59</sup> Glanvill states his belief that spirits are "dispos'd of by a law proper to themselves" in *Lux orientalis* (1662), pp. 128–29. See also Benjamin Camfield, *A Theological Discourse of Angels* (1678), p. 202.

<sup>60</sup> Preface to *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection*, p. 7.

<sup>61</sup> *Advancement*, in *Works*, III, 351.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331. A similar suggestion appears in Sprat's *History*, p. 214.



and variety of the works of God; since, if it appear, that there are intelligent agents that are able to increase; whereas men can but determine the motions of the parts of matter, the discovery of it may advantageously enlarge our knowledge, though not, perhaps, in physics, strictly so called, yet in philosophy. . . .<sup>63</sup>

In spite of their "official" dictum that their concern was only with mechanical causes and with the phenomena of matter and motion, most of the scientific philosophers were reluctant to restrict the field of their interest and study too closely, since they also felt that anything whatever which provided them with material for observation and investigation was not unworthy of their attention. Moreover, however guardedly they tried to concentrate on matter, they found themselves unable, as we have seen, to avoid the subject of spiritual and immaterial forces. This being the case, such ambitions as those of More and Glanvill to make a careful "history" of spiritual phenomena were not scorned as chimerical extravagances but rather encouraged in some quarters as sober efforts to enlarge the philosophical horizon.

Glanvill was not content, however, to account for the amazing facts of witchcraft merely by asserting that spirits act in an extraordinary manner peculiar to themselves which careful scientific investigation might in time discover. Confronted with a growing incredulity about the various popularly accepted conventions of witch dogma, he attempted to give these a degree of probability by showing that they might be explained in terms of theories proposed to account for the operation of the more obscure and mysterious phenomena observed by the naturalist—though he warned the reader of the inaccuracy of measuring "the World of *Spirits* by the narrow Rules of our own *impotent Beings*."<sup>64</sup> His purpose was to checkmate those who disbelieved because of the impossibility and incomprehensibility of the reputed behavior of witches. Is it really impossible, he asked, to conceive how witches fly out of windows, raise tempests, or transform themselves into cats, or why they are sucked in certain parts of their bodies by their familiars? For himself, he was satisfied that "there is nothing in the *Instances* mention'd, but what may as well be ac-

<sup>63</sup> Letter to Glanvill (September 18, 1677), in *Works*, VI 58-59.

<sup>64</sup> *Sadducismus*, p. 7.



counted for by the Rules of *Reason* and *Philosophy*, as the ordinary Affairs of *Nature*."<sup>65</sup> It is hardly necessary to describe all the scientific folly which this opinion leads Glanvill to indulge in. He places emphasis, now on the effects of the imagination, now on the physiological effects of the ointment used by witches, now on the possibility of poisonous ferments being infused into the witch during certain of the rites. A characteristic example of his reasoning is his explanation of the evil eye:

. . . I am apt to think, there may be a *Power* of real *Fascination*, in the *Witch's Eyes* and *Imagination*; by which, for the most Part, she acts upon *tender Bodies*. . . . For the *pestilential Spirits*, being darted by a *spightful* and *vigorous Imagination* from the Eye, and meeting with those that are weak and passive in the Bodies which they enter, will not fail to infect them with a noxious Quality, that makes dangerous and strange Alterations in the Person invaded by this poisonous Influence; which Way of acting, by subtle and invisible Instruments, is ordinary and familiar in all natural *Efficiencies*. And 'tis now past Question, that *Nature*, for the most Part, acts by *subtile Streams* and *Apphoræa's* of *minute Particles*, which pass from one Body to another.<sup>66</sup>

Underlying this explanation, and most of the others, though often only by implication, is the theory that obscure and remote operations of nature are performed by streams of minute and invisible particles, or "effluvia," transmitting their force through a distance. This hypothesis had been applied to such various problems as the nature of magnetism, sympathetic healing, the cures of the famous Greatrak who healed by stroking, and the like. These were not speculations indulged in merely by the popular mind. The old belief that wounds might be healed by anointing the weapon with salve, seriously referred to by Bacon,<sup>67</sup> was described also by Boyle,<sup>68</sup> who further discussed the nature of cures by magnetism, the physiological effects of wearing precious stones, etc. And he usually accounted for such phenomena

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14. Pp. 9-18 are largely devoted to explanations of this order. More had attempted the same thing less elaborately in his *Antidote against Atheism* (in *A Collection*, pp. 122-23).

<sup>67</sup> *Sylva sylvarum*, in *Works*, II, 670-71.

<sup>68</sup> *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 164-65. A book by Nathaniel Highmore, *The History of Generation* (1651), which contained an appendix on sympathetic healing, was dedicated to Boyle. This method of healing wounds was usually connected with the name of Sir Kenelm Digby. For a brief sketch of the history of sympathetic healing see H. S. Redgrove, *Bygone Beliefs* (London, 1920), pp. 47-56.

as the workings of "subtle effluvia."<sup>69</sup> Such theories were essentially physical in character, but, concerned as they were with effects that had all the appearance of the marvelous, they were easily applicable to the mysterious doings of witches which Glanvill tried to render probable for the purpose of forestalling the incredulous.

It was of course illogical of Glanvill to employ physical theories in his explanation of spiritual phenomena, particularly as this should have weakened the force of his witch stories as proof for the reality of immaterial agents.<sup>70</sup> More illustrious men than he, however, made errors just as egregious. Scientists of undoubted distinction had played with the idea of giving probability to essentially mysterious and extra-natural effects by applying to them physical and mechanical principles. None of Glanvill's attempts to restore faith in the witch dogma by interpreting it in terms of physical theories is any more extravagant, for example, than those of Descartes to find a plausible explanation of transubstantiation.<sup>71</sup> It must not be overlooked, too, that Boyle wrote an entire treatise, *Some Physico-theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection* (1675), the purpose of which was to suggest how chemical transformations give us some intimation of the possibility of the resurrection. Such instances illustrate the interest among even the most distinguished scientists of the day in a kind of illegitimate speculation, usually in the interest of religion, which disregarded the limits they had carefully imposed upon themselves, and attempted to apply to non-material problems the methods and hypotheses used in physical research.

Glanvill was thus quite in harmony with a strain of theorizing countenanced even by certain major figures in seventeenth-century science, both in his belief that the unexplored world of spirits was a legitimate and fruitful field for study and in his efforts to demonstrate the probability of witchcraft by means of well-recognized physical theories. Contradictory though these efforts seem to have been, they were both, in Glanvill's mind, appropriate to his rôle as scientific in-

<sup>69</sup> *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 167-68. See also *Cosmical Suspicions* (1670), in *Works*, III, 317-18, and his letter to Stubbe (March 9, 1665/6), *Works*, I, lxxxiii-lxxxiv. Boyle has something to say as well on cures for diseases probably caused by witchcraft (*Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 159).

<sup>70</sup> The logical contradiction was not as great or as naive as it sounds for the moment. See below, pp. 188-89.

<sup>71</sup> Letter to P. Mesland (February 9, 1645), in *Œuvres*, IV, 162-70.

vestigator in immaterial forces. Moreover, throughout all his discussions, Glanvill was conscious of maintaining the attitude and employing the methodological principles which in his other writings he was extolling as the distinguishing characteristics of the "new philosophy."

## V

In 1668 Glanvill included for the first time as part of his treatise the story of the Demon of Tedworth, a notorious witch disturbance which he had personally investigated. He later revised and added to this account so that the posthumous edition of 1681 contains an elaborate collection of such stories, made up of contemporary accounts, recent trials, and narratives from older treatises on witchcraft. This feature of his book he took seriously, protesting that he was not interested in these stories as entertainment but as serious proof. For such minds as were either indifferent to any evidence that did not come in through the senses or too common to be impressed by subtle philosophic reasoning, he included these empirical proofs for the existence of spirit, his "history" of witch behavior:

. . . they are *both* best convinced by the Proofs that come nearest the *Sense*, which indeed strike our Minds *fullest*, and leave the most *lasting* Impressions; whereas high Speculations, being more *thin* and *subtile*, easily *slide off*, even from Understandings that are most capable to receive them. For this Reason, among some others, I appear thus much concerned, for the Justification of the Belief of *Witches*, it suggesting *palpable* and current Evidence of our *Immortality*. . . .<sup>72</sup>

These relations, Glanvill felt, should satisfy the objections of those who insisted that we can have no conception of immaterial substance since we can know only those things which we have experienced through our senses;<sup>73</sup> for in his witch stories he believed he had provided, on the basis of the soundest kind of empirical method, evidence of phenomena that could not be brought about by the ordinary processes of matter.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Epistle dedicatory to *Sadducismus*, Sg. A2v; also Preface, *ibid.*, Sg. [A5]. These passages appeared first in 1668.

<sup>73</sup> E.g., Hobbes, *Human Nature*, in *Works*, IV, 61; *Leviathan*, in *Works*, III, 27; Webster, *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft*, pp. 198, 202-3.

<sup>74</sup> Leslie Stephen, in his article on Glanvill in the *DNB*, recognizes this element in the *Sadducismus*: "His defense of witchcraft was the natural result of an attempt to find an empirical ground for the supernatural . . ." (XXI, 408). Limited to the portion of the *Sadducismus* dealing with witch stories alone, this statement is approximately correct; but it cannot be considered an adequate interpretation of the entire treatise, especially as it can apply only to a section of the book added after several editions had already appeared.

It was generally admitted, to be sure, that many witch stories were plain frauds; but to Glanvill's mind this fact did not necessarily discredit such testimony altogether.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, Boyle himself, although he warned Glanvill that the unreliability of most narratives should make him cautious of the selection and verification of those which he did publish, encouraged the use of well-established relations on the theory that, as in science, one authentic account is sufficient to establish a truth in opposition to a host of false ones.<sup>76</sup> Few names during the seventeenth century could have been better guaranty for the validity of any method of procedure or for the acceptability of any assertion of fact. It was with considerable flourish that Henry More had referred to the belief of "that excellently-learned and noble Gentleman Mr. R. Boyle" in the Devil of Mascon story in order to silence objections to his own use of relations and in order that "nothing may be wanting to convince the incredulous."<sup>77</sup> As a matter of fact, the evidence on which these witch relations rested was in many cases no less secure than that on which a large number of the items in such "histories of nature" as Bacon's *Sylva sylvarum* were based. Meric Casaubon was on safe ground when he urged in defense of his own collection of witch stories that the history of nature would suffer if absence of first-hand observation and occasional imposture were made the basis of total disbelief.<sup>78</sup> The confidence, therefore, with which Glanvill employed his narratives was not founded on a naïve credulity peculiar to himself. He thought of his collection of stories as a "*Cautious, and Faithful History* made of those *certain and uncommon* appearances" which he had urged as a possible project for the Royal Society. And he had the sanction of no less a person than Boyle to convince him of the correctness of his procedure.

Glanvill was equally conscious of adapting another principle of scientific method to his problem in his attempts to render the phenomena of witchcraft credible by explaining them in terms of recognized physical theories: this was the doctrine of hypotheses. He frankly admitted that he made no claims for these explanations as

<sup>75</sup> *Sadducismus*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>76</sup> *Works*, VI, 58, 59.

<sup>77</sup> *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection*, p. 95. More's defense of his use of stories is similar to that of Glanvill and Boyle (see *ibid.*, pp. 87, 88, 126, 162-63).

<sup>78</sup> *Of Credulity and Incredulity*, pp. 8-9.

final and certain, insisting on their probability only, in imitation of the naturalist's procedure in assigning causes to physical phenomena:

... in resolving *natural Phenomena*, we can only assign the probable *Causes*, shewing how Things *may be*, not presuming how they are. And in the Particulars under our *Examen*, we may give an Account how 'tis *possible*, and not unlikely, that such Things (though somewhat varying from the common *Road of Nature*) may be acted. And if our narrow and contracted Minds can furnish us with Apprehensions of the Way and Manner of such Performances, though, perhaps, not the true ones, 'tis an Argument that such Things may be effected by Creatures, whose Powers and Knowledge are so vastly exceeding ours.<sup>79</sup>

The mere establishment of probable explanations undermined, in Glanvill's estimation, the objection that such actions as were ascribed to witches were inconceivable; it would, moreover, also afford a basis for further serious consideration of the problem, and would thus lead in the future to a more exact knowledge.<sup>80</sup> He saw no difference, that is, between the method used by the scientists in assigning causes and explanations in their study of natural phenomena and that which he was applying in his interpretation of witch behavior. The scientist formulated his explanations as hypotheses because he knew that he must expect no more from the present state of knowledge than probability, and because he wished to supply suggestions for further and more accurate study.<sup>81</sup> Like him, and for approximately the same reasons, Glanvill was establishing a hypothesis of witch behavior, and he referred to his explanations directly as such.<sup>82</sup>

But the most extraordinary weapon which his scientific background afforded him against extreme skeptics who denied positively the existence of spirits was "scientific skepticism" itself, the attitude which he had developed, principally in his *Vanity of Dogmatizing* and *Scepsis scientifica*, with a mixture of ancient pyrrhonic and modern argument. Those who discounted the doings of witches because they could not conceive how such things could be he classed with the rustics who do not think that the things performed "by the *Mathematicks*

<sup>79</sup> *Sadducismus*, p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> Preface to *Sadducismus*, Sg. [A5]. This passage did not appear before 1668.

<sup>81</sup> For formulations of this doctrine see Bacon, *Advancement*, in *Works*, III, 351-52; *Plan of the Work*, in *Works*, IV, 31-32; Boyle, *Certain Physiological Essays*, in *Works*, I, 303; *Sceptical Chymist*, in *Works*, I, 460-61; Sprat, *History*, pp. 38-39; Glanvill, *Plus ultra*, p. 87.

<sup>82</sup> *Sadducismus*, p. 11.

and *Mechanick Artifice*" can be "effected by the honest Ways of Art and Nature."<sup>83</sup> He condemned as an unreasonable method of inference "first to presume the thing *impossible*, and thence to conclude that the *Fact* cannot be *proved*."<sup>84</sup> In reality, he pointed out with a reference to his earlier writings, we are no more familiar with the why of many obvious performances of nature than with the remarkable feats of witches:

And we can no more, from hence [the impossibility of witch performances], form an Argument against them, than against the most ordinary *Effects in Nature*. We cannot conceive how the *Fœtus* is form'd in the *Womb*, nor as much as how a *Plant* springs from the *Earth* we tread on; we know not how our *Souls* move the *Body*, nor how these distant and extreme *Natures* are united; as I have abundantly shewn in my *SCEPSIS SCIENTIFICA*. And if we are ignorant of the most *obvious* Things about us, and the most *considerable* within ourselves, 'tis no wonder that we know not the *Constitution* and *Powers* of the *Creatures*, to whom we are such Strangers.<sup>85</sup>

It was therefore not perverseness, but scientific caution born of skepticism, that prompted Glanvill's reply to many of the objections raised against the things he was describing: "... the *Laws, Liberties, and Restraints* of the *Inhabitants* of the other *World*, are to us utterly *unknown*; and this *Way* we can only argue ourselves into *Confessions* of our *Ignorance*, which every *Man* must acknowledge, that is not as *immodest* as *ignorant*."<sup>86</sup>

Such views may seem improperly described as skepticism, but the skepticism of Glanvill was not the simple pyrrhonism of antiquity, nor yet wholly like the elaborated form of that philosophy in such of its sixteenth- and seventeenth-century disciples as Montaigne, Charon, Agrippa, or La Mothe le Vayer. Its peculiar character is to be understood in the light of the part which pyrrhonism played in the development of scientific methodology. To realize the importance of this philosophy in the thought of the scientists, one need only consider the direct way in which the pyrrhonic axioms are incorporated

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7. See *ibid.*, p. 230, for a similar passage (added in the edition of 1681), with a reference again to the *Scep sis*.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15; also pp. 17-18, 20-21. Somewhat the same use of this type of argument was made by More in connection with witchcraft in *An Antidote against Atheism*, in *A Collection*, pp. 14-15, 189-90. See also Camfield, *A Theological Discourse of Angels*, p. 203.



in the "Idols" of Bacon, the extensive exposition given them by Descartes in the first two *Meditations*, and the systematic manner in which they are set forth in Gassendi's *Syntagma philosophicum*.<sup>87</sup> The elaborated pyrrhonism of the seventeenth century represented the most complete extant critique of human knowledge, and philosophers, therefore, whose aim was to develop methods which would overcome the disadvantages of former students and place human learning on a new and solid footing could hardly avoid taking it into account. Having admitted the validity of many of the skeptical positions, the scientists, however, endeavored to provide new methods that would overcome the difficulties proposed, and thus declined to accept skepticism as an end in itself, or its ultimate conclusion that final knowledge was impossible.<sup>88</sup> But they did retain skepticism as an essential element in good method, as an attitude of mind necessary in any investigation destined to lead to truth and certainty. As Bacon put it, "if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties."<sup>89</sup> In an equally simple form the principle is embodied in the title of one of Glanvill's early works: *Scepsis scientifica: or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science; in an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatizing*. This was the type of skepticism that lay back of the constant insistence by the scientists on open-minded investigation, the attitude which Glanvill described as "free philosophy."<sup>90</sup> The only fundamental similarity between this skepticism and pyrrhonism was the systematic opposition to dogmatizing—and the scientists opposed not only the dogmatism of credulity and tradition but also the dogmatism of unbelief.

The former emphasis predominated, since the scientists were compelled to combat age-old learning and academic inertia, but the latter was also called into service. It was the attitude, for example, which animated William Harvey's reply to those "who repudiate the circula-

<sup>87</sup> *Opera*, I, 73 ff.

<sup>88</sup> Bacon states the case succinctly in describing himself as "one who maintains not simply that nothing can be known, but only that nothing can be known except in a certain course and way" (*Plan of the Work*, in *Works*, IV, 32).

<sup>89</sup> *Advancement*, in *Works*, III, 293. See also Descartes, *Discours*, ed. Gilson, pp. 28-29; Boyle, preface to the appendix of the *Sceptical Chymist*, in *Works*, I, 591.

<sup>90</sup> "Of Scepticism and Certainty," in *Essays*, Essay II, p. 44; *Scire/i tuum nihil est*, in *Scepsis*, pp. 3, 5-6, 12 (separate pagination).



tion because they neither see the efficient nor final cause of it, and who exclaim, *cui bono?*"—"how many things we admit in physiology, pathology, and therapeutics, the causes of which are unknown to us?"<sup>91</sup> And he concludes a series of answers to objections with a fuller statement of the same argument, that we must not deny simply because we do not understand:

I would ask of those who profess a knowledge of the causes of all things, why the two eyes keep constantly moving together, up or down, to this side or that, and not independently, one looking this way, another that; why the two auricles of the heart contract simultaneously, and the like? Are fevers, pestilence, and the wonderful properties of various medicines to be denied because their causes are unknown? Who can tell us why the foetus in utero, breathing no air up to the tenth month of its existence, is yet not suffocated?<sup>92</sup>

It was the same principle, moreover, which Boyle made use of in arguing for the possibility of such things as vacuum and spirit:

And as for the way of arguing, so often employed (especially against the truth we now contend for) and so much relied on by many modern philosophers, namely, that they cannot clearly conceive such or such a thing proposed, and therefore think it fit to be rejected; I shall readily agree with them, in the not being forward to assent to any thing, especially in philosophy, that cannot well be conceived by knowing and considering men. But there is so much difference among men, as to their faculty of framing distinct notions of things, and through men's partiality or laziness, many a particular person is so much more apt, than these men seem to be aware of, to think, or at least to pretend, that he cannot conceive, what he has no mind to assent to, that a man had need be wary, how he rejects opinions, that are impugned only by this way of ratiocination.<sup>93</sup>

Glanvill adopted this argument, giving it perhaps a more skeptical coloring. It was, however, a skepticism which took the form, not of the classical *epoché*—the suspension of belief—but of the tentative suspension of disbelief that was for Glanvill a necessary element of the scientific attitude. Hence the paradox that Glanvill believed in witches because he was a skeptic. Nor is this to be wondered at; for

<sup>91</sup> *An Anatomical Disquisition on the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals* ("Everyman's Library"), p. 148.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>93</sup> *Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, in *Works*, II, 46-47; also *Works*, IV, 450; VI, 694. The same argument was developed quite fully by "T. E." in *Some Considerations about the Reconcilableness of Reason and Religion* (1675). He argued that although such conceptions as matter and time are difficult to comprehend, they are not therefore to be considered unreasonable, and that anyone unfamiliar with magnetic phenomena would consider them contrary to reason (in Boyle, *Works*, IV, 173-74, 178).

seventeenth-century scientists—impressed by the difficulty of discovering causes for natural phenomena; willing, as a result of the striking reversals of old views by new discoveries and the restoration of older theories that had once been discarded, to entertain any hypothesis until they were convinced that it was untenable; and ambitious enough to consider all obscure, trivial, or extraordinary events worthy of their serious attention—allowed their opposition to dogmatism to lead them to an extreme of scientific skepticism that at times verged closely on credulity. And it was particularly tempting and easy to call in the aid of this systematic opposition to dogmatism in the interest of an assumption for which they had such tender concern as the reality of spirit.

To consider Glanvill's work on witchcraft as a complete contradiction of all his scientific scruples is, therefore, to commit the common error of thinking of science in the seventeenth century only in terms of what has survived in modern textbooks of physics. In reality the movement was a complex of attitudes, intentions, and beliefs, not all of which were strictly compatible. To understand the character of the "new science" it is necessary to consider not only Kepler's well-known three laws but the mathematical follies which incumber his works, not only Boyle's experiments but his *Excellency of Theology*. The science which formed the background of the Royal Society was a fusion of intricate elements, and Glanvill mirrored it in all its complexity in his works. Of this movement, his work on witchcraft is almost as legitimate an offspring as his *Scepsis scientifica*, his *Plus ultra*, or his *Philosophia pia*. It was precisely because he was one of the new scientists that he interested himself in the problem, and that he felt sure enough of the arguments and methods of his book to justify his confident title, *Sadducismus triumphatus*.

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## AN INTRODUCTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE STUDY OF PROVERBS

IN SO large a field as the study of proverbs it is altogether desirable to assemble in convenient form the more useful and important scholarly aids: the bibliographies of proverb collections, the standard collections in different languages, and the significant books and articles about proverbs. Interest in proverbs extends over a very long period of time, from the writing of the Old Testament to the present day, and every language of any cultural importance has made some contribution to the proverbial stock. Historically and linguistically, then, the study of proverbs is a subject of wide scope. A review of the available materials will serve a useful purpose in pointing out an attractive field for investigation. The problems involved are usually not very difficult; and they are often very interesting and attractive because they may deal with important cultural, philological, or linguistic facts. Until now, a regrettably small number of scholars have given any attention to them.

### BIBLIOGRAPHIES

*General bibliographies.*—In large measure the works of Nopitsch, *Literatur der Sprichwörter* (Nürnberg, 1822; 2d ed. [1833], unchanged), and Duplessis, *Bibliographie parémiologique* (Paris, 1847), with the useful but not very extensive supplement of Brunet, "Bibliographie des proverbes," *Bulletin du bibliophile belge*, IX (1852), 233-40, are superseded by W. Bonser and T. A. Stephens, *Proverb Literature* ("Publications of the Folk-Lore Society," Vol. LXXXIX [London, 1930]). Yet the many excerpts and critical comments in Duplessis are still very useful. Occasionally, the indications in Nopitsch and Duplessis are untrustworthy, since they rest only partially on first-hand information; and the same, although perhaps less often, is true of Bonser-Stephens. In common with all branches of folkloristic studies, the study of proverbs suffers from the want of a good annual survey of what has been accomplished.<sup>1</sup> During the past fifteen years, however,

<sup>1</sup> For a review of the various annual bibliographies of folk-lore see Taylor, *Modern Philology*, XXIV (1926), 124-27.

we have had Eduard Hoffmann-Krayer's *Volkskundliche Bibliographie* (Strassburg, Berlin, 1919 ff.), which aims to collect the materials in the European languages completely and in Asiatic and savage languages less completely. The works which I have named aim at comprehensiveness, although they do not attain it. In particular, journal articles are likely to fail to find a place in them. The annual bibliographies of folk lore include journal articles with relative completeness. Smaller essays of this sort are especially important because the proverb is so small a bit of popular tradition that it ordinarily needs only a brief study.

Two catalogues of important collections of proverb literature make no pretense whatever to completeness and are yet very useful tools in general paremiological bibliography. Their special importance lies in the fulness and accuracy of the bibliographical descriptions. They list the books in the collections of William Stirling (*An Essay towards a Collection of Books relating to Proverbs, Emblems, Apophthegms, Epitaphs, and Ana* [London, 1860]) and Ignace Bernstein (*Catalogue des livres parémiologiques composant la bibliothèque de Ignace Bernstein* [Warsaw, 1900]). The Stirling catalogue was privately printed in 75 copies and is consequently very difficult to come by. It describes somewhat over 500 items then owned by William Stirling. The collection was later increased to about 1,200. In 1866 William Stirling succeeded to the name, baronetcy, and estates of his uncle, Sir John Maxwell, and thereafter bore the name Stirling-Maxwell. The Bernstein catalogue is a beautiful example of modern book-making. Although issued in a limited edition, copies can still be found with comparative ease. It lists 4,761 items—many of them manuscripts and reprints of magazine articles—and is therefore much the largest existing bibliography of proverbs. The description of the books is extremely complete, and title-pages are often reproduced. Like the Stirling catalogue, it names only the books in Bernstein's possession; the omissions are sometimes surprising. The indexes to the Bernstein catalogue are full and helpful.

At present, one can form a complete general bibliography only by using Bonser-Stephens as a basis and adding the titles in the Stirling and Bernstein catalogues, the national bibliographies (which are next to be mentioned), and the annual bibliographies of folk lore.

*National bibliographies.*—In general, the standard proverb collections for each country contain a bibliography of the significant books and articles; a list of such standard collections is given below. The indexes of the Bernstein catalogue provide useful lists according to languages. Nopitsch, Duplessis, and Bonser-Stephens are arranged according to separate languages. There are, furthermore, special bibliographical aids for certain languages: CATALAN: A. Bulbena e Tosell, *Assaig de bibliografia paremiològica catalana o sta catàlech d'aquelles obres o fragments contenint dites, aforismes, consells, adagis, proverbis, màximes e sentencies en llénga catalanesca* (Barcelona, 1915). CZECH: I. J. Hanuš, *Literatura příslovnictví slovanského a německého* (Prague, 1853) and F. Longin, *Slavistische Schulblätter* (Prague), II (1928), 13 ff. ENGLISH: R. Jente, "The Proverbs of Shakespeare with Early and Contemporary Parallels," *Washington University Studies* ("Humanistic Series"), XIII (1926), 391-98; and M. P. Tilley, *Elizabethan Proverb Lore in Lyly's "Euphues" and in Pettie's "Petite Pallace"* ("University of Michigan Publications, Language and Literature," Vol. II [New York, 1926], pp. 53-62. FRENCH: C. Friesland, "Verzeichnis der seit 1847 erschienenen Sammlungen französischer Sprichwörter," *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur*, XVIII, Part II (1896), 221-37; XIX, Part II (1897), 122-23; XXVIII, Part I (1905), 260-87. GERMAN: J. Meier, "Deutsche und niederländische Volkspoesie," [Paul's] *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*<sup>2</sup>, II, i (Strassburg, 1909), III, "Sprichwörter," pp. 1258-81 (Zacher, *Die deutschen Sprichwörter Sammlungen* [Leipzig, 1852], is superseded); F. Seiler (*Deutsche Sprichwörterkunde* [Munich, 1922], pp. 98-149) gives an admirable critical survey of the more important collections. CLASSICAL GREEK: see the bibliography below. ICELANDIC: H. Hermannsson, *Catalogue of the Icelandic Collection Bequeathed by W. Fiske* (Ithaca, 1914), p. 739. ITALIAN: G. Pitre, *Bibliografia delle tradizioni popolari d'Italia* (Turin, 1894); a continuation down to 1912 exists in manuscript and its publication has long been promised. LATIN: W. H. D. Suringar, "Lijst van geschriften over de latijnsche spreekwoorden," *Tijdschrift voor de nederlandsche gymnasiën* (Leiden, 1861), pp. 111-34. SCANDINAVIAN: J. A. Lundell, "Skandinavische Volkspoesie in mündlicher Überlieferung," in [Paul's] *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*<sup>2</sup>, II, i (Strassburg, 1909), 1172-75. SLAVIC: G.

Krek, *Einleitung in die slavische Literaturgeschichte*<sup>2</sup> (Graz, 1887), "Sprichwörter, Aberglaube, Zaubersprüche und Rätsel," pp. 786-818. SPANISH: M. García Moreno, *Catálogo paremiológico* (Madrid, 1918); J. Haller, *Altspanische Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten* (Regensburg, 1883); and J. M. Sbarbi, *Monografía sobre los refranes, adagios y proverbios castellanos y las obras o fragmentos que expresamente tratan de ellos en nuestra lengua* (Madrid, 1891).

G. Meyer ("Zu den mittelgriechischen Sprichwörtern," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, III [1894], 396-408, particularly pp. 397-99) gives a good bibliography of Balkan (Albanian, Bulgarian, modern Greek, Rumanian, and Turkish) proverbs, and an even better list may be found in N. G. Polites, *Παροιμίες* (Athens, 1899-1902). W. H. D. Suringar (*Erasmus over nederlandsche spreekwoorden en spreekwoordelijke uitdrukkingen* [Utrecht, 1873]) surveys in admirable manner the Renaissance proverb.

#### COLLECTIONS

*International collections.*—Mayreder's bibliography ("Die polyglotte Sprichwörterliteratur," *Rivista di letteratura popolare*, I [1877], 241-65) is, although old, still useful. International collections are of two main types: a thesaurus without particular limitations and a collection according to some principle. Unfortunately, most international collections of either type are worth very little to the scholar, since references to sources are ordinarily lacking. For the most part, such collections appear to be calculated for the general reader.

In international collections of the thesaurus type we can distinguish two varieties according to the arrangement of the proverbs in one or several alphabets. The most useful works which give a general survey of proverb lore in a single alphabet are Ida von [Reinsberg-] Düringsfeld and O. Freiherr von Reinsberg-Düringsfeld, *Sprichwörter der germanischen und romanischen Sprachen vergleichend zusammengestellt* (Leipzig, 1872-75), and G. Strafforello, *La sapienza del mondo ovvero dizionario universale dei proverbi di tutti i popoli* (Turin, [1883]). Strictly speaking, the two volumes of Reinsberg-Düringsfeld do not give a general survey, since they limit themselves to the Germanic and Romance peoples. Notwithstanding the lack of references, which are in a sense provided for by the fact that the authors ordinarily use



but a single source for each language or dialect, it is a useful work. It is arranged in a single alphabet according to the German proverbs. Strafforello translates most of the proverbs into Italian and omits references. Although his work is very extensive (three volumes quarto), its value is not in proportion to its size. K. F. W. Wander has translated a considerable number of foreign proverbs in his comprehensive German lexicon (*Deutsches Sprichwörter-Lexikon* [Leipzig, 1867-80]). The epoch-making *Chiliades* of Erasmus might also be mentioned here, although the materials are not arranged in alphabetical order. Erasmus based his work on classical proverbs, but added so many illustrations from the vernacular (ordinarily Dutch in Latin translation) that, in the latest editions with the usual supplements, the work is a huge compendium of proverb lore. The best recent alphabetical index of international proverbs is sufficiently described by its title: A. Arthaber, *Dizionario comparato di proverbi e modi proverbiali italiani, latini, francesi, spagnuoli, tedeschi, inglesi e greci antichi con relativi indici sistematico-alfabetici* (Milan, ca. 1929).

There is an abundance of dictionaries of proverbs which devote a section to each of several languages. One of the first in English, for example, is the admirable ΠΑΡΟΙΜΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ, *Proverbs or old Sayed Savves & Adages, in English (or the Saxon Toung), Italian, French and Spanish whereunto the British, for their great Antiquity, and weight are added* (London, 1659) of James Howell, which sometimes appears separately and sometimes as a part of his *Lexicon Tetraglotton*. G. von Gaal (*Sprichwörterbuch in sechs Sprachen, deutsch, englisch, Latein, italienisch und ungarisch* [Vienna, 1830]) includes six languages. Typical collections of this sort published in English are H. G. Bohn, *A polyglot of Foreign Proverbs, comprising French, Italian, German, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and Danish* (London, 1857), W. K. Kelly, *A Collection of the Proverbs of All Nations* (London, 1st ed., n.d.; <sup>2</sup>1859; <sup>3</sup>1870), D. W. Marvin, *The Antiquity of Proverbs* (New York, 1922) and *Curiosities in Proverbs* (New York, 1916), E. B. Mawr, *Analogous Proverbs in Ten Languages* (London, 1885), J. Middlemore, *Proverbs, Sayings and Comparisons in Various Languages* (London, 1889). Perhaps none of these is very important to the scholar; most of them may serve some useful purpose in bringing to light chance references or miscellaneous information not otherwise readily accessible.

The value of international collections based on some principle of selection is naturally determined by the merit of the principle and the care in the assembling of materials. Of course, the principle of selection varies in every instance. Collections based on a linguistic principle are unusual: Čelakovsky (*Mudrosloví národu slovanského ve příslovích* [Prague, 1852]), for example, gives a convenient survey of Slavic proverbs in a single volume; and the previously mentioned *Sprichwörter der germanischen und romanischen Sprachen* by Baron von Reinsberg-Düringsfeld and his wife is, in a sense, an analogous work, since it reviews the proverbial stock of a comparatively homogeneous group. For Scandinavia we have an undertaking similar to Čelakovský in K. Stroembaeck, *Nordiskt ordspråkslexikon*, which lists Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish proverbs; but, although the work, a manuscript in the Royal Library (Stockholm), is cited in the usual bibliographies, it was never published. In collections of proverbs according to subject the collector ordinarily illustrates the reactions of the folk to certain classes of people (the trades, women, or children), things (weather or dogs), or ideas (God or humor). The bibliography of such collections—for there are many of them—is best found in Bonser-Stephens, *Proverb Literature* (London, 1930), and in Taylor, *The Proverb* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931). Characteristic examples of such collections are the volumes issued by the Baron and Baroness von Reinsberg-Düringsfeld, independently or in collaboration: *Die Frau im Sprichwort* (Leipzig, 1862); *Internationale Titulaturen* (Leipzig, 1863); *Das Kind im Sprichwort* (Leipzig, 1864); "Das Sprichwort als Gastrosoph," *Magazin für die Literatur des Auslandes*, XXXII (1863), 555-56, 569-71, 603-5; *Das Sprichwort als Kosmopolit: I, Das Sprichwort als Philosoph, II, Das Sprichwort als Praktikus, III, Das Sprichwort als Humorist* (Leipzig, 1863); *Das Wetter im Sprichwort* (Leipzig, 1864). Works of this sort ordinarily translate the proverbs quoted and give no sources. Their purpose is the entertainment of the general reader. An example of a scholarly work which deals with a particular subject is M. Besso, *Roma nei proverbi e nei modi di dire* (Rome, 1889; 1904).

*The classical Greek proverb.*—Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive standard collection of classical Greek proverbs. The Greek paremiographers (edited by Leutsch and Schneidewin [Göttingen,

1839-51]) do not provide us with such a collection. We should note, moreover, that there is a complete break between ancient and modern Greek proverbial tradition (see W. von Christ, W. Schmid, and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, II<sup>5</sup>, 700-702; II<sup>6</sup>, 879-81). In the absence of even a bibliography of what has been accomplished in this direction (see, however, Christ, Schmid, and Stählin, p. 879, n. 1), the following list of collections of proverbs from the various classical Greek authors will prove useful: A. Baar, *Sprichwörter und Sentenzen aus den griechischen Idyllendichtern* (Görz, 1887); L. Bauck, *De proverbii aliisque locutionibus ex usu vitae communis petitis apud Aristophanem comicum* (Königsberg, 1880); O. Crusius, *Plutarchi de proverbii Alexandrinorum libellus ineditus* (Tübingen, 1887); "Zu Plutarch [de paroemiis Alexandrinorum]," *Rheinisches Museum*, XLIII (1888), 461-66; "Ad Plutarchi de proverbii Alexandrinorum libellum nuper repertum," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, CXXXV (1887), 241-57, 657-75; "Ad Plutarchi de proverbii Alexandrinorum libellum commentarius de proverbii Alexandrinorum libelli inediti fasciculus alter," *Verzeichnis der Doktoren* (Tübingen, 1895); "Ad Plutarchi de proverbii Alexandrinorum libellum addendum," *Philologus*, LIV (1895), 746; E. Geisler, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des griechischen Sprichwortes* (Breslau, 1908); M. Goebel, *De graecarum civitatum proprietatibus proverbio notatis* (Breslau, 1915); L. Grasberger, *Die griechischen Stichnamen* (Würzburg, 1877, <sup>2</sup>1883); E. Grünwald, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Plato* (Berlin, 1893); G. Hoffmann, *Schimpfwörter der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin, 1892); A. Hotop, *De Eustathii proverbii* (Leipzig, 1888) = *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Supplementheft XVI, 249-313; J. Keim, *Sprichwörter und parömiographische Überlieferung bei Strabo* (Munich, 1909); J. Koch, *Quaestionum de proverbii apud Aeschylum, Sophoclem, Euripidem*, Vol. I (Königsberg, 1887); Vol. II (Bartenstein, 1892); E. Kurtz, "Die Sprichwörter bei Eustathius," *Philologus*, Supplementheft VI (1891-93), 307-21; C. Linde, *De proverbiorum apud tragicos graecos usu* (Gotha, 1896); J. W. Lingenberg, *Platonische Bilder und Sprichwörter* (Cologne, [1872]); P. Martin, *Studien auf dem Gebiete des griechischen Sprichwortes* (Plauen, 1889); E. von Prittwitz-Gaffron, *Das Sprichwort im griechischen Epigramm* (Giessen, 1912); T. W. Rein, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Lucian*

(Tübingen, 1894); Rohdewald, *De usu proverbiorum apud Aristophanem* (Burgsteinfurt, 1857); E. Salzmänn, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Libanios* (Tübingen, 1910); O. Schmidt, *Metapher und Gleichnis in den Schriften Lukians* (Zürich, 1897); T. Schmidt, *Florilegium palatinum sententias continens ex poetis graecis collectas* (Heidelberg Programm, Leipzig, 1890); C. Schwidop, *Observationum Lucianearum specimina*, Vols. I-V (Königsberg, 1848-72), particularly Vol. II (1850); P. Tribukait, *De proverbii vulgaribus quae aliis locutionibus apud bucolicos graecos obviis* (Königsberg, 1899); L. Weber, *Anacreontea* (Göttingen, 1895); M. Wiesenthal, *Quaestiones de nominibus propriis quae graecis hominibus in proverbio fuerunt* (Barmen, 1895); C. Wunderer, *Polybios-Forschungen, I, Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Polybios* (Leipzig, 1898-1909). For the bibliography of Renaissance and later collections of classical Greek proverbs and for the bibliography of the paremiographers, see Bonser-Stephens, *Proverb Literature* (London, 1930), pp. 39-47, Nos. 314-99.

*The classical and medieval Latin proverb.*—A. Otto (*Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* [Leipzig, 1890]) collects the classical Latin proverbs and supplies parallels from classical Greek. The additions are rather abundant (see M. C. Sutphen, *A Collection of Latin proverbs* [Baltimore, 1902] = *American Journal of Philology*, XXII [1901], 1-28, 121-48, 241-60, 361-91; V. Szelinski, *Nachträge und Ergänzungen zu "Otto, Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer"* [Jena, 1892]) but are concerned often with sententious rather than proverbial matter. The medieval Latin proverbs have never been assembled in a satisfactory collection. A. Novarinus (*Adagia formulaeque proverbiales ex sanctorum patrum, ecclesiasticorumque scriptorum monumentis* [Verona, 1651]) gives the very difficultly accessible patristic and ecclesiastical sources. J. Wegeler enlarged his collection very greatly in the course of its various editions (*Philosophia patrum* [Coblenz, 1869; 1872; 1874; 1877; Nachträge . . . and Register, 1879]; but, although he gave translations into German, he neglected to tell whence he took the proverbs. Unfortunately, all the editions of Wegeler's privately printed collection, which he finally withdrew entirely from the book trade, are very hard to come by. E. Margalits, whose large collection and its supplement (*Florilegium proverbiorum universae latinitatis* [Budapest, 1895]; *Sup-*

*plementum ad opus florilegium* [Budapest, 1910]), are undeservedly little known, includes patristic, medieval, and classical proverbs in great abundance, but ordinarily without naming the sources. The most extensive edition of medieval Latin proverb collections from the manuscripts is J. Werner, *Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sinnsprüche des Mittelalters* ("Sammlung mittellateinischer Texte," Vol. III [Heidelberg, 1912]); his notes are very sparse. Several editions of medieval Latin manuscript collections and didactic poems which came out before the end of the last century have admirable comparative notes; see K. Müllenhoff and W. Scherer, *Denkmäler deutscher Poesie und Prosa aus dem 8.-12. Jahrhundert* (3d ed. by E. Steinmeyer [Berlin, 1892]); E. Voigt, *Egberts von Lüttich "Fecunda ratis"* (Halle, 1889; the author's galley proof is in the University of Chicago Library, shelf-mark PA. Eg 17 F); "Florilegium gottingense," *Romanische Forschungen*, III (1887), 281-314 (and "Nachträge," p. 464); "Proverbia rustici," *Romanische Forschungen*, III (1887), 633-41; *Ysengrimus* (Halle, 1884). Perhaps the best general collection is L. DeMauri (i.e., Ernesto Sarasino), *Flores sententiarum. Raccolta di 5,000 sentenze, proverbi e motti latini di uso quotidiano in ordine per materie con le fonti indicate, schiarimenti e la tradizione italiana* (Milan, 1926).

*Medieval vernacular proverbs.*—Although there is little or no justification for separating the medieval from the modern vernacular proverb, there are, nevertheless, some important and useful collections which restrict themselves to the Middle Ages. The separation is merely for convenience and rests on no logical or necessary basis. W. W. Skeat's English collection (*Early English Proverbs* [Oxford, 1910]) does not pretend to give more than his casual jottings by the way. Morawski's French collections (*Proverbes français antérieurs au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* ["Les Classiques français du moyen âge," XLVII (Paris, 1925)]) is excellent. Zingerle's good, but antiquated, German collection (*Die deutschen Sprichwörter im Mittelalter* [Vienna, 1864]) is supplemented by C. Schröder's notes ("Hundert niederdeutsche Sprichwörter," *Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen*, XLIII [1868], 411-20; "Aber hundert niederdeutsche Sprichwörter," *ibid.*, XLIV [1869], 337-44) and S. Singer's admirable Swiss collectanea ("Alte schweizer-

ische Sprichwörter," *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde*, XX [1916], 389-419).

There are German dissertations dealing with the proverbs in particular medieval authors. Those in the field of English are especially good and merit praise for the generous quotation of parallels: J. Duschl, *Das Sprichwort bei Lydgate* (Weiden, 1912); W. Haeckel, *Das Sprichwort bei Chaucer* ("Erlanger Beiträge zur englischen Philologie," Vol. VIII [Erlangen, 1890]), with the addenda of A. Andrae ("Noch einmal Chaucer's Sprichwörter," *Beiblatt zur Anglia*, III [1893], 276-82; "Sprichwörtliches bei Chaucer," *ibid.*, IV [1894], 330-41) and those in E. Koeppl's review of Haeckel (*ibid.*, II [1892], 169-73); Kissel, *Das Sprichwort bei dem mittelschottischen Dichter Sir David Lyndesay* (Nuremberg, 1892); G. Walz, *Das Sprichwort bei Gower* (Nördlingen, 1907). See the excellent bibliography of R. Jente ("The Proverbs of Shakespeare," *Washington University Studies* ["Humanistic Series"], XIII [1926], 392). Dissertations on French and Provençal writers are equally numerous, although perhaps not so amply annotated: E. Bouchet, "Maximes et proverbes tirés des chansons de geste," *Mémoires de la société d'agriculture ... d'Orléans*, XXXI (1892), 81-130; E. Ebert, *Die Sprichwörter der altfranzösischen Karlsepen* ("Ausgaben und Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der romanischen Philologie," Vol. XXVIII [Marburg, 1884]); C. Homann, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Wortschatzes des altfranzösischen Wortschatzes* (Greifswald, 1900), a very useful tool in locating proverbs; A. Kadler, *Sprichwörter und Sentenzen der altfranzösischen Artus- und Abenteuerromane* ("Ausgaben und Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der romanischen Philologie," Vol. XLIX [Marburg, 1885]); J. Loth, *Die Sprichwörter und Sentenzen der altfranzösischen Fabliaux* (Greifenberg i. P., 1896); F. Schepp, *Altfranzösische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen aus den höfischen Kunstepen über antike Sagenstoffe und aus einigen didaktischen Dichtungen* (Greifswald, 1905); O. Wandelt, *Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des altfranzösischen Dramas* (Marburg, 1887). For medieval Provençal proverbs see E. Cnyrim, *Sprichwörter, sprichwörtliche Redensarten und Sentenzen bei den provenzalischen Lyrikern* ("Ausgaben und Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der romanischen Philologie," Vol. LXXI [Marburg, 1871]), and B. Peretz, *Altprovenzalische Sprichwörter mit einem kurzen Hinweis auf den mittelhochdeutschen Freidank* (Göttingen, 1892).



gen, 1887) = *Romanische Forschungen*, III (1887), 415-57. Strange as it may seem, collections of proverbs from individual Middle High German authors seem not to have been made, except in so far as they may appear in the special vocabularies attached to the editions.

*Modern vernacular collections.*—In the more important cultural languages—English, French, and German—the standard collections are not particularly meritorious. The English collections are incomplete, badly arranged, and uncritical in details, although the new historical dictionary of G. L. Apperson (*English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* [London, 1929]) marks a considerable advance. The French collections are antiquated and especially unsatisfactory. The German collections are comparatively good, but the most important collection (K. F. W. Wander, *Deutsches Sprichwörter-Lexikon* [Leipzig, 1867-80]) is far from critical in its choice of matter and contains many duplications. In less readily accessible languages, the standard collections are often models of completeness, accuracy, neatness, and availability: Bohemian, Danish, Dutch, Greek, Rumanian, and Ukrainian all possess collections of great value. The generosity of such collections with Latin, English, French, and German parallels often provides useful information on matters with which the collections are not directly concerned. Of all these collections, Polites' great thesaurus of modern Greek proverbs, which with its four quarto volumes reaches only into the letter *D*, is the most ambitious in its plan and execution. Zanne's Rumanian collection in ten quarto volumes is an invaluable guide to the Balkan and Near Eastern proverb, and often supplements Polites.

There are a few important collections which record the proverbs current in oral tradition; models for work of this sort are E. T. Kristensen, *Danske ordsprog og mundheld, skjæmtesprog, stedlige talemåder, ordspil och samtaleord* (Copenhagen, 1890), and V. Solstrand, *Ordstäv* ("Finlands svenska folkdiktning," Vol. III = "Skrifter utgivna av svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland," Vol. CLXXII [Helsingfors, 1923]). In these works, and particularly in Kristensen, as the title indicates, we have collections of proverbial and analogous materials of sorts which have rarely been included in proverbial investigations.

In the following list I name the standard collection of proverbs for each of a number of languages. Where it has seemed desirable, a sec-



ond collection or a word of comment is added. ARABIC: J. L. Burckhardt, *Arabic Proverbs; or the manners and customs of the ancient Egyptians* (London, <sup>1</sup>1830, <sup>2</sup>1875; German trans., Weimar, 1834); G. W. Freytag, *Arabum proverbia* (lists the classical Arabic proverb; Bonn, 1838-43); C. Landberg, *Proverbes et dictons de la province de Syrie* ("Proverbes et dictons du peuple arabe," Vol. I [Leiden, 1883]) lists the colloquial Levantine Arabic proverb; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekkanische Sprichwörter* (The Hague, 1886), reprinted in *Verspreide geschriften*, V (Bonn and Leipzig, 1925), 1-112; A. Socin, *Arabische Sprichwörter und Redensarten* (Tübingen, 1878). CATALAN: J. Musso y Fontes, *Diccionario de las ... refranes de la lengua catalana* (Barcelona, 1876). CZECH: V. Flajšhans, *Česká přísloví* (2 vols., Prague, 1911-13). DANISH: E. T. Kristensen, *Danske ordsprog og mundheld* (Copenhagen, 1890) lists the modern oral traditional proverb; E. Mau, *Dansk ordsprogs-skat* (2 vols., Copenhagen, 1879). DUTCH: P. J. Harrebomée, *Spreekwoordenboek der nederlandsche taal* (Utrecht, 1858-70). ENGLISH: G. L. Apperson, *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* (London, 1929); W. G. Benham, *Book of Quotations, Proverbs, and Household Words* (London, 1924); H. G. Bohn, *A Handbook of Proverbs; Comprising an Entire Republication of Ray's "Collection of English Proverbs"* (an easily available handbook; London, 1855); W. C. Hazlitt, *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* (London, <sup>1</sup>1869, <sup>2</sup>1882, <sup>3</sup>1907); V. S. Lean, *Collectanea* (Bristol, 1902-4). In all these collections proverbs are included on insufficient evidence and older collections are excerpted without acknowledgment. Obvious errors which are perpetuated for centuries occur. Many proverbs are taken from sources which are not English but translations. The lack of arrangement in Lean is extremely inconvenient. FINNISH: A. V. Koskimies, *Kokoelma suomen kansan sananlaskuja* ("Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seuran toimituksia," Vol. CXIII [Helsingfors, 1906]). FRENCH: Le Roux de Lincy, *Le Livre des proverbes français* (Paris, <sup>1</sup>1842, <sup>2</sup>1859). Although antiquated and incomplete, the citation of sources is excellent. GERMAN: K. F. W. Wander, *Deutsches Sprichwörter-Lexikon* (comprehensive, but includes much translated or unsupported matter; Leipzig, 1867-80). Smaller collections are: J. Eiselein, *Die Sprichwörter und Sinnreden des deutschen Volkes in alter und neuer Zeit* (Donauöschingen, 1838, <sup>2</sup>[unchanged] Freiburg i. Br., 1840);

W. Körte, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Deutschen* (Leipzig, 1837, 21861); K. Simrock, *Die deutschen Sprichwörter* (no sources; Frankfurt a. M., 1846, and many later editions, all unchanged except for the omission of the serial numbers for the proverbs in all editions after the first). MODERN GREEK: N. G. Polites, *Παροιμίες* ("Βιβλιοθήκη Παράσλη," V [Athens, 1899-1902]). ICELANDIC: F. Jónsson, *Íslenskt málsháttasafn* (Copenhagen, 1920). IRISH (in English): T. F. O'Rahilly, *A Miscellany of Irish Proverbs* (Dublin, 1922). NORWEGIAN: J. Aasen, *Norske ordsprog* (Christiania, 1856, 21881); R. T. Christiansen, *Gamle visdomsord* (Oslo, 1928). POLISH: S. Adalberg, *Księga przysłów, przypowieści i wyrażeń przysłowiowych polskich* (Warsaw, 1894). PORTUGUESE: Carolina Michaëlis de Vasconcellos, *Tausend portugiesische Sprichwörter* (*Festschrift Adolf Tobler zum 70. Geburtstage* [Braunschweig, 1905]), pp. 13-48. RUMANIAN: J. A. Zanne, *Proverbele românilor* (Bucharest, 1895-1901). RUSSIAN: V. Dal, *Poslovitsy russkago naroda* (Moscow, 1862). SCOTCH: GAELIC: A. Nicholson, *A collection of Gaelic proverbs and familiar phrases* (Edinburgh, 1881, 21882). SLOVAK: A. P. Zaturecký, *Slovenská prísloví, porokadla a úsloví* (Prague, 1896). SPANISH: G. Correas, *Vocabulario de refranes y frases proverbiales y otras fórmulas comunes de la lengua castellana* (Madrid, 1906, 21924); F. Rodríguez Marín, *Más de 21,000 refranes castellanos no contenidos en la copiosa colección del maestro Gonzalo Correas* (Madrid, 1926), and *12,600 refranes más* (Madrid, 1931); J. M. Sbarbi and M. García Moreno, *Diccionario de refranes, adagios, proverbios ... de la lengua española* (Madrid, 1922). J. M. Sbarbi (*El refranero general español, parte recopilado, y parte compuesto* [Madrid, 1874-78]) reprints manuscripts and older books of proverbs. SWEDISH: F. Ström, *Svenskarna i sina ordspråk* (Stockholm, 1926). SWEDISH (in Finland): V. Solstrand, *Ordstäv* ("Finlands svenska folkdiktning," Vol. III = "Skrifter utgivna av svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland," Vol. CLXXII [Helsingfors, 1923]). SWISS (German): O. Sutermeister, *Die schweizerischen Sprichwörter der Gegenwart* (Aarau, 1869). See also S. Singer, "Alte schweizerische Sprichwörter," *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde*, XX (1916), 389-419. UKRAINIAN: I. Franko, "Galits'ko-rus'ki narodni pripovidki," *Etnografični Zbirnik* (Lemberg), Vol. X (1901), and later volumes. YIDDISH: I. Bernstein, *Jüdische Sprichwörter und Redensarten* (Warsaw, 21908; the

first edition [1888-89] was reprinted from a magazine, *Der Hausfreund*).

*Special collections of modern authors.*—Since such collections give us first hand information regarding proverbs which are actually in use, they are extremely important aids for the scholar. A number of German writers<sup>2</sup> have been searched for proverbs: Abraham à Santa Clara: F. Lauchert, *Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei P. Abraham à S. Clara* (Bonn, 1893); and K. F. Wander, *Abrahamisches Parömiakon* (Breslau, 1838). Bismarck: H. Blümner, *Der bildliche Ausdruck in den Reden des Fürsten Bismarck* (Leipzig, 1891). Goethe: H. Henkel, "Sprichwörtliches bei Goethe," *Goethe-Jahrbuch*, XI (1890), 179-83; and F. Seiler, "Goethe und das deutsche Sprichwort," *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift*, X (1922), 328-40. Grimmelshausen: M. Lenschau, *Grimmelshausens Sprichwörter und Redensarten* ("Deutsche Forschungen," Vol. X [Frankfurt a. M., 1924]). Luther: J. A. Heuseler, *Luthers Sprichwörter aus seinen Schriften gesammelt* (Leipzig, 1824). Melancthon and Burkhard Waldis: F. Sandvoss, *Sprichwörter aus Burkhard Waldis mit . . . einem Verzeichniss von Melancthon gebrauchter Sprichwörter* (Friedland, 1866). Moscherosch: A. Stöber, "Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten aus J. M. Moscherosch," *Alsatia*, 1868-72, pp. 319-38. Murner: A. Risse, "Sprichwörter und Redensarten bei Th. Murner," *Zeitschrift für den deutschen Unterricht*, XXXI, 1917, 215-27, 289-303, 359-69, 450-58. Hans Sachs: C. H. Handschin, *Das Sprichwort bei Hans Sachs, I: Verzeichnis der Sprichwörter* (all pub., Madison, 1904); C. Schweitzer, "Sprichwörter und sprichwörtliche Redensarten bei Hans Sachs," *Hans Sachs Forschungen* (ed. A. L. Stiefel; Nürnberg, 1894). Martha Lenschau's collection of Grimmelshausen's proverbs is a model for later workers. In English practically nothing has been done: Lyly: M. P. Tilley, *Elizabethan Proverb Lore in Lyly's "Euphues" and Pettie's "Petite Pallace"* ("University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature," Vol. II [New York, 1926]). Scott: Anon., *The Waverly Proverbial Birthday Book* (London, 1890). Shakespeare: R. Jente, "The Proverbs of Shakespeare with Early and Contemporary Parallels," *Washington University Studies* ("Humanistic Series"), XIII (1926), 391-444. Scattered through *Notes and Queries*

<sup>2</sup> See a list in F. Seiler, *Deutsche Sprichwörterkunde*, pp. 53-65.

(London) one can find many useful notes on proverbs in different authors. For French the appendixes in Le Roux de Lincy (*Le Livre des proverbes français*<sup>2</sup> [Paris, 1859]) contain proverbs extracted from several authors. In Spanish, the proverbs in *Don Quixote* have been excerpted by U. R. Burke (*Sancho Panza's Proverbs and Others Which Occur in "Don Quixote"* [London, 1892]) and by J. Coll y Vehi (*Los refranes de Quijote* [Barcelona, 1874]).

## BOOKS AND ARTICLES ABOUT PROVERBS

*General treatises.*—Unfortunately, most works on proverbs are written for the "general reader" and are regrettably superficial in treatment and inaccurate in detail. I have endeavored to survey the field in *The Proverb* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931). In this book I have considered the proverb almost solely as it occurs in European tradition and have passed over without mention the problems which African, Asiatic, or American Indian proverbs might raise. F. Seiler's various works, although primarily concerned with German proverbs, have a general usefulness and value and supply a good introduction to many sides of proverb study: see *Deutsche Sprichwörterkunde* ("Handbuch des deutschen Unterrichts," IV, iii [Munich, 1922]), *Das deutsche Sprichwort* ("Grundriss der deutschen Volkskunde," Vol. II = "Trübners Bibliothek," Vol. X [Strassburg, 1917]). Comparable works are the long preface (pp. lxxi–cxxxiv) to G. Pitre, *Proverbi siciliani* (Palermo, 1880), and J. M. Sbarbi, *Monografía sobre los refranes, adagios y proverbios castellanos* (Madrid, 1891). R. C. Trench's discussion of the moral values in proverbs (*On the Lessons in Proverbs* [London, 1853; best ed. by A. S. Palmer, 1905]) has enjoyed a deserved popularity. F. E. Hulme, *Proverb Lore* (London, 1902, <sup>2</sup>[unchanged] 1906) is not so useful as its title might suggest.

*Studies of individual proverbs.*—The problems in proverb study are so definite and attractive that we might expect to find many brief essays with clearly conceived aims. Yet, such essays are rare; see J. Bolte, "Den Hund vor dem Löwen schlagen," *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, XVI (1906), 77–81; XXX–XXXII (1920–22), 145–46; XXXVII (1927), 19; R. Jente, "Morgenstunde hat Gold im Munde," *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, XLII (1927), 865–72, and (forthcoming) "German Proverbs of Eastern

Origin," *ibid.*, XLVII (1932); A. A. Koskenjaakko, *Koira suomalaisissa ynnä virolaisissa sananlaskuissa* = *The Dog in Finnish and Estonian Proverbs* (Helsingfors, 1909) and *Sananlaskututkimuksia I: Laki, oikeus ja oikeudenkäynti suomalaisissa sananlaskuissa* = *Proverb Studies, I: Law, Right, and Legal Procedure in Finnish Proverbs* (Helsingfors, 1913); B. Salditt, "Der Schneider und die Geiss im deutschen Volksmunde bis zum 17. Jahrhundert," *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, XXX (1931); Archer Taylor, "In the Evening Praise the Day," *Modern Language Notes*, XXXVI (1921), 115-18, and "Sunt tria damna domus," *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, XXIV (1926), 130-46, and "The Proverbial Formula 'Man soll,'" *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde*, XL (= neue Folge II; 1930), 152-56. A. Wesselski has a number of altogether admirable essays in *Erlesenes* ("Gesellschaft deutscher Bücherfreunde in Böhmen," Vol. VIII [Prague, 1928]).

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## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

### MINUTIAE TASSIANAE

In one and the same month last year, two curious misstatements appeared in two widely separated journals, both highly authoritative. One is in connection with two shirts immortalized by Torquato Tasso in a letter; the other with two cats which the same poet celebrated in a sonnet.

The first occurs in an article on "Documenti italiani nel Belgio" in the *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, XCVII (giugno, 1931), 305-6. It is in connection with a previously unpublished letter by Torquato Tasso, addressed to the agent of the Cavaliere Cattabene, and concerned wholly with certain shirts which had been promised to the poet by that agent "in the name of Messer Flaminio."<sup>1</sup>

In commenting on the letter, its present editor (Mario Battistini) observes: "Essa ci ricorda quel Flaminio de' Nobili, insigne filologo e grecista, uno dei cinque pedanti ai quali il Tasso affidò la revisione della sua opera...."<sup>2</sup> But interesting as it might be to think of the learned Professor de' Nobili as having promised through Cattabene's agent to let the poet Tasso have a couple of his shirts, the letter, unhappily, does not admit of any such interpretation.

The letter is addressed, as we have seen, merely "to the agent of the Cavaliere Cattabene"; another letter, published long ago, addressed in 1583 "Al Cavalier Flaminio Cattabene,"<sup>3</sup> makes the matter clearer by informing us that the Cavaliere Cattabene's Christian name, unmentioned in the newly found epistle, was, like De' Nobili's, Flaminio. Obviously, then, the Signor Flaminio in whose name the agent promised Tasso certain shirts must be that agent's master, Cavalier Flaminio Cattabene, *not* Flaminio de' Nobili.

Had Tasso written only his *Discorsi*, we might possibly have been content to see him borrowing a professor's shift; but for the author of the *Gerusalemme* we insist upon correction: the shirts could be—and *were*—those of none lesser than a knight!

The second misconception occurs in a study of "Pythagorean Echoes in the Savoy and French Political Ethics and Art of the XVth and XVIth Centuries" (*PMLA*, XLV [June, 1931], 341-52), a study which cites, apparently

<sup>1</sup> "[a tergo] All'agente dell'Ille. Sig. Cavalier Cattabene a San Giorgio." The letter runs: "Mag. co mio carissimo. Io non ho prima dimandate le camicie promessemi da voi in nome del Sigr. Flaminio, perche non ho prima havuto di bisogno.... Hora....vi prego che me ne mandate due.... etc."

<sup>2</sup> For a study of De' Nobili see P. Paganini, *Flaminio de' Nobili, studio biografico* (Turin, 1884). See also P. D. Pasolini, *Il trattato, dell'Amore Umano di Flaminio de' Nobili con le postille autografe di Torquato Tasso* (Rome, 1895).

<sup>3</sup> *Le lettere di Torquato Tasso*, ed. C. Guasti (Florence, 1854), II, 235-36.

for Pythagorean purposes, cheeses, cats, Croce, Columbia University, and a number of other matters. The reference to Tasso is a purely incidental one. On page 345, in reference to the Blessed Mary or some other virgin, we read (making due correction of some minor slips or misprints in the Italian quoted):

Her character, typical of the lady *coile et rassise* in the new enlightenment, seems to dictate down to Tasso at least, as on into Corneille, the apology of the *honestas* love:

Così lo mi volgo, o bella gatta, in questa  
Fortuna avversa a le tue luci sante,  
E mi sembra due stelle aver davante  
Che tramontana sian nella tempesta.

It is to be noted that it is a question of one *bella gatta* only, the gratuitous pluralism of the *Oxford Book of Italian Verse* title calling for due correction, with a better sense for both antiquity and its revival of Carducci's no less authentic selection from Tasso:

Santa Pietà, ch'in cielo  
fra gli angelici cori  
siedi beata e l'alme eterne e sante,

Between the two we have elucidation for the lay refinement upon monastic tradition of the tertiary religious orders, Knights of the Holy Ghost, etc., which is the spirit of the *noblesse de la robe* in its Pythagorean echo. . . .

The *Santa Pietà* canzone,<sup>4</sup> as we learn both from its content and from a contemporary manuscript note written (before August, 1585) by Biagio Bernardo,<sup>5</sup> was composed during Tasso's imprisonment. It prays that Pity may descend from heaven into the heart of the Duchess of Urbino (Lucrezia d'Este), who lacks no virtue save this, in order that she may be moved to intercede with her brother, Duke Alfonso of Ferrara, on the poet's behalf. To a non-Pythagorean, this canzone has nothing in common with the cat sonnet to which it is here paired save that both were written while Tasso was confined in Sant'Anna. Our present concern, however, is rather with the sonnet, and specifically with the number of its cats.

The sonnet is so well known that it is hard to see how any doubt could have arisen in the matter. It was printed, in all, eight times during the life of its author; seven times with the title "A le gatte," once simply "Le gatte." The pluralism of the *Oxford Book* thus had ample precedent, especially as the critical edition, reprinting the fullest of the early captions, heads it "A le gatte de lo spedale di S. Anna." In the poem itself, the first eight lines declare that the eyes of a cat, shining in the darkness of Tasso's prison, are two stars of light, to him like the Pole Star to the navigator in a tempest. The ensuing verses declare that the poet sees also a second, smaller, cat; and that the two are for him as the constellations of the Great Bear and the Little Bear. Finally, he addresses the cats as Lamps of his Study; and adjoins them, as they

<sup>4</sup> The proper reference for it is, of course, to Solerti's critical edition *Le rime di Torquato Tasso* (Bologna, 1898-1902), III, 222-26.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*; and cf. I, 177-78.



hope to escape beatings and to be fed on meat and milk, to give him light that he may write his verses.

These last lines run:

....o gatte,  
Lucerne del mio studio, o gatte amate,  
Se Dio vi guardi da le bastonate,  
Se 'l ciel voi pasca di carne e di latte,  
Fatemi luce a scriver questi carmi.<sup>6</sup>

And so, unless the sum of one and one can be considered pythagorically singular, it is the statement in the *PMLA* article, not the title in the *Oxford Book*, that is, and loudly, "calling for correction."

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#### SOME NEGLECTED ITEMS OF THE *JOURNAL* *D'UN POETE*

The *Journal d'un poète* of Alfred de Vigny appeared first in 1866 in the *Revue moderne*. Ratisbonne, who was responsible for the order and arrangement of Vigny's notes in that periodical, republished them the following year in a small volume which was destined to be reproduced a number of times. In 1928 M. Baldensperger undertook a new edition of the *Journal*, based on previous editions but including a considerable amount of new material.<sup>1</sup> Vigny's notes were rearranged, and known errors were corrected in order to bring the work as near to the state of a definitive edition as can be hoped for until the original manuscripts become available.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime a comparison of the various editions of the *Journal*, including this latest one, with the version printed serially in the *Revue moderne* brings to light certain omissions and, possibly, one or two inaccuracies in reproducing the text.

Under the year 1834, for example, a passage<sup>3</sup> dealing with Vigny's favorite theme, honor, and another concerning boredom have been printed together since 1867 as though they were two divisions of one idea. They should, in reality, be printed separately, in order to clear up the passage and disabuse the reader of the thought that a possible connection exists between them.

In the same year Vigny wrote this bit of advice: "Multipliez votre valeur par votre travail." This appeared in the *Revue moderne* immediately after a passage concerning Raphael.<sup>4</sup> It might well be re-entered among the poet's notes for 1834.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 18: "Come ne l'ocean s'oscura e 'nfesta...."

<sup>3</sup> P. 94.

<sup>1</sup> London: Scholartis Press.

<sup>4</sup> P. 98.

<sup>2</sup> See the preface and bibliography of M. Baldensperger.

In 1835 Vigny wrote:

J'aime l'humanité. J'ai pitié d'elle. La nature est pour moi une décoration dont la durée est insolente, et sur laquelle est jetée cette passagère et sublime marionnette appelée l'homme.

L'Angleterre a cela de bon qu'on y sent partout la main de l'homme.

Tant mieux. Partout ailleurs, la nature stupide nous insulte assez.<sup>5</sup>

The four lines beginning, "L'Angleterre a cela de bon ..." were printed as a separate thought in the *Revue moderne*. A study of the manuscript will be necessary to reveal whether these are actually a part of the preceding remarks on nature.

On page 104 of M. Baldensperger's edition of the *Journal* there is an item dated 12 février, à minuit. Directly above it is one containing Vigny's comments on the first presentation of *Le Monomane* by Duveyrier. Since this play was given for the first time in April, 1835,<sup>6</sup> it is evident that the order of the two passages should be reversed.

An interesting development in prose of the unwritten sequel to *Éloa* has unfortunately been omitted from all editions of the *Journal*. In the *Revue moderne* it is printed under the year 1838. Vigny had often thought of completing his poem on *Éloa*, the sister of the angels, born of the tear Jesus shed over his friend Lazarus, and fallen from heaven through a fatal love for Satan. *Éloa* was to be redeemed. And we see in the following passage how that redemption would have been accomplished.

*Éloa*.—*Lucifer*. Lucifer pendant les siècles qui suivirent la chute d'*Éloa* ne pouvait l'approcher.

Et une force invisible le tenait très éloigné d'elle ...

Elle monta tout à coup près de Dieu et de là lui parla pour le faire remonter.

—Viens, dit-elle, viens. Ce qui fait le malheur de la créature c'est d'être condamnée à penser.

Viens, nous allons nous reposer.

L'enfer, c'est la pensée et la contemplation de soi-même et de la nature.

Le sentiment vague sera notre essence. Viens.

Et ils se perdirent sur le cœur de Jésus. Le sacré-cœur.

It has been a real loss not to have had this enlightening passage at hand. It rightly belongs after a short poem in the *Journal* entitled "Rêverie,"<sup>7</sup> printed under the year 1838.

The year after Vigny was elected to the French Academy, that is, 1846, he refers to a source of grievance in regard to Molé. The latter had been very ungentlemanly in his treatment of the poet. In the first place he had delayed Vigny's reception as long as he could; and, then, in his speech of reply, he went out of the way to criticize in malicious terms the romanticism for which Vigny stood. Vigny hints at this in the *Journal*, concluding thus: "L'attaque

<sup>5</sup> P. 106.

See the *Revue de Paris*, XVI, 218-23, for a review of the first performance.

<sup>7</sup> P. 139.

de M. Molé est une offense *impardonnable et irréparable*."<sup>8</sup> The preceding references of Vigny do not clear up this cryptic sentence. Nor can the remark be understood without recourse once again to the *Revue moderne*. Here one finds that this concluding sentence not only was not originally a part of the foregoing notes, but that it was actually the introductory remark of a new section in which Vigny listed his reasons for calling the offense "*impardonnable et irréparable*." We can see from the following what the nature of the grievance was:

—Refuser de me communiquer son discours pour une heure après avoir gardé le mien un mois.

—Lire un discours et en prononcer un autre.

—Promettre des corrections et n'en faire aucune.

—*Envenimer* son discours d'attaques amères qui changent le sens des paroles.

—Ajouter à ces marques de haine par un débit violent, agressif, hostile.—*Est-ce assez?*

The enigmatic remark is cleared up at once.

Finally, toward the end of the *Journal*, left undated by Ratisbonne, but assigned to the year 1859 (?) by M. Baldensperger, is a passage entitled "*Le Char de Brahma*."<sup>9</sup> As it originally appeared in the *Revue moderne* there were two incomplete verses which made an Alexandrine couplet following the heading, thus:

LE CHAR DE BRAHMA

Lorsque vient le grand jour des ... Wichnou

Les ... marche sur le genou.

Then, parenthetically, Vigny added:

(La fête indienne en cent vers au moins.)

We have here a hint of another of those beautiful unwritten poems of the great romantic pessimist.

There remains, without doubt, a considerable amount of work to be done on Vigny's *Journal*, aside from the unedited items that M. Baldensperger is collecting. The chief difficulty which stands in the way of the accomplishment of this task is the inaccessibility of the original notebooks Vigny willed to his friend Ratisbonne. Successive efforts to bring these to light have failed through non-co-operation of the hypothetical possessors. As a result the work must necessarily remain in suspense for the time being.

C. WESLEY BIRD

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SWINBURNE ON COLERIDGE

The admiration of Swinburne for Coleridge is too well known to need a detailed comment. As early as 1868 he wrote to his publishers:

I shall be happy to undertake the "Coleridge" [selections] on the terms proposed. . . . It will be a more congenial labour to me than the selection from

<sup>8</sup> P. 201.

<sup>9</sup> P. 257.

Byron, who is not made for selection—Coleridge is. In my eyes his good poems have no fault, his bad poems no merit; and to disengage these from those will be a pleasure to me.<sup>1</sup>

The preface to *Christabel and the Lyrical and Imaginative Poems of S. T. Coleridge* (1869) is eulogistic, but necessarily conservative in tone. In 1902 E. H. Coleridge, the poet's grandson, dedicated his edition of Byron's *Don Juan*<sup>2</sup> to Swinburne. The following unpublished letter was written by Swinburne in acknowledgment of the dedication and of a copy of the book E. H. Coleridge had sent to him. The handwriting is clear and steady, and the letter is very deliberately written, as if Swinburne were trying to say exactly what he meant. We can, therefore, assume that Swinburne intends no exaggeration when he calls Coleridge "the greatest poet ever born into this world" or says that "Coleridge, at his best and highest, is the supreme poet of all time." The holograph letter is now in the possession of the Rev. G. H. B. Coleridge, who kindly allows me to print it here.

THE PINES  
11 PUTNEY HILL  
March 28, 1903

MY DEAR SIR

The book arrived this morning, a few hours before your letter. Many thanks for both, as well as for the dedication. I need not say how keenly interested I was to read the new fourteen stanzas. They seem to me quite to support my old opinion that the poem begins to rise again—on the whole—after an interval of comparatively inferior or perfunctory work, as soon as we get to England.

Anything from the unpublished notebooks of the greatest poet ever born into this world will interest me more deeply than anything connected with Byron could do—unless indeed it should relate to the Pentad, the Logos, or the Trinity. I cannot pretend to take interest in those divine creatures of a maker who was so much better employed in the creation of *Christabel* and *The Ancient Mariner*. When I was twelve or thirteen I thought there could be no poems comparable with these—and now I know I was right. The man who cannot see that Coleridge, at his best and highest, is the supreme poet of all time does not know and cannot see or feel what is the special and indefinable quality which distinguishes poetry pure and simple from every other form or norm of human genius.

Yours very sincerely  
A. C. SWINBURNE

This letter shows that as late as his sixty-sixth year Swinburne still felt an unbounded admiration for the poetry of Coleridge.

EARL LESLIE GRIGGS

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<sup>1</sup> From the original letter in the possession of Mr. H. T. Butler, published in *The Letters of Algernon Charles Swinburne*, ed. E. Gosse and T. J. Wise (London, 1919), I, 61-62.

<sup>2</sup> The dedication reads: "This edition of a great Poem is dedicated with his permission to Algernon Charles Swinburne. MDCCCXII" (*The Works of Lord Byron . . . Poetry*, Vol. VI, ed. E. H. Coleridge [1903]).

## BOOK REVIEWS

*On Being Creative and Other Essays.* By IRVING BABBITT. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1932. Pp. xlv+266.

*On Being Creative* is a collection of essays reprinted from the *Bookman*, the *Forum*, and other magazines, together with the substance of three lectures on "The Primitivism of Wordsworth," delivered at the University of Toronto. It is thus no pronouncement of new doctrine, but a reassertion of old. I shall not therefore use this space in attempting to expound Mr. Babbitt's aesthetic philosophy, important though it would be to have such an exposition, but shall be content with giving examples of some characteristics of this book which may prove interesting. These examples are, first, of opinions which may be called errors; second, of certain inconsistencies; third, of confusions of thought.

Among the opinions, then, which may be qualified as at least questionable—I should myself call them erroneous—are the following:

1. "As a rule . . . the Greek did not, even in the extremity of his revolt from convention, cease to be rationalistic" (p. xii).

First, there was no such person as "the Greek" who "as a rule" thought in any way rather than in another. The Greeks on most subjects were divided and, if we knew more about the Sophists than we do, the divisions would seem even greater than they now do. But Mr. Babbitt is fond of "the Greek" and we find him later (p. 178) telling us what he "normally" conceived beauty to be.

Second, there are as many non-rationalistic and even anti-rationalistic Greeks as Hindus, Germans, or contemporary Americans. The skeptics were Greek enough to take over Plato's Academy, and there was indeed a strong skeptical strain in Plato as in Socrates. There were also mystical Greeks and, in fact, most of Plato and a good deal of Aristotle were transmitted to us through mystical interpretations. Mr. Babbitt in his desire—to use Mr. Norman Foerster's lyric cry—to be "true to Hellas," may have a meaning of "rationalistic" which includes skepticism and mysticism. As we shall see, he can make a word cover a multitude of sins.

2. "The eighteenth century preparation for primitivism . . . was in its essential aspect a reaction from the two great traditions of the Occident, the classical and the Christian" (p. 39).

This contains three questionable opinions:

a) The eighteenth century did not prepare for primitivism; it found its primitivism all prepared for it. Primitivism in all its "essential aspects" goes

back to the Greeks. The longing for primitive times is in Hesiod; the distinction between learning and natural endowment is in Pindar with the supposed primitivistic deprecation of learning; the admiration of the Noble Savage is at least as old as the fifth century, B.C., and there are traces of it in Homer.

b) Eighteenth-century primitivism was not a reaction against anything, except possibly in France where Cartesian rationalism and aesthetic formalism seem to have held a predominant place for some time in the seventeenth century. But even in France, as Mr. Babbitt knows better than I, all was not smooth sailing for the Cartesians and classicists. The eighteenth century simply carried on and developed this collection of ideas known as "primitivism" today.

c) There is nothing non-classical or un-Christian in primitivism unless the terms are so defined as to be mutually exclusive. Lactantius was a good Christian, I should imagine, and he even believed in the reign of Saturn. By "Christianity" Mr. Babbitt here is referring to its "central emphasis" on the doctrine of the Fall. But it was precisely the doctrine of the Fall which made possible a Christian version of primitivism. As for classicism, I have already suggested that all forms of primitivism are found in Greece. But by "classicism" Mr. Babbitt here seems to mean the "doctrine of decorum." I am not quite sure just what the doctrine of decorum was, unless it was the proverb, "Nothing in excess." Pindar may be too indecorous a poet for a humanist to accept as a classicist, but surely Homer and Hesiod are unblemished. And both are traditional sources of primitivism. Or does Mr. Babbitt mean by classicists only those poets who preached the doctrine? If he does, it would be an excellent idea to give a few examples which will show us just what in his eyes constitutes a tradition.

2. A propos of Wordsworth's grasping at walls to recall himself "from this abyss of idealism to reality," Mr. Babbitt remarks, "This 'idealism' is of a distinctly Berkeleyan type" (p. 46). It is possible that Mr. Babbitt—and Wordsworth too—like Dr. Johnson, think that, according to Berkeley, walls give rise to no tactual impressions, but Berkeley, of course, believed nothing of the sort. The history of philosophy, it will be recalled, is not Mr. Babbitt's strongest point. Witness his famous locating of Mr. Lovejoy among the German idealists. If he does that sort of thing with his contemporaries, what may he not do with the dead?

4. "If the imagination is to play freely, it must, according to Schiller, be free from any purpose" (p. 152). The inaccuracy of this has already been pointed out in Mr. Lovejoy's review of *Rousseau and Romanticism* (*MLN*, XXXV, 305-7; XXXVII, 270-73). Curiously enough Mr. Babbitt himself in a footnote gives two ways proposed by Schiller of restraining the imagination while preserving what he thinks of as its freedom. One way is by art and the other by the attainment of what Schiller called "the ideal." Either the footnote ought to be deleted or the text. For even if Schiller meant by "art"

"outer form," and by "the ideal" "an escape from, rather than an acceptance of, limitations"—which is a condition, I think, contrary to fact—he did not say that the free imagination must be free from any purpose whatsoever. For the attainment of outer form and the escape from limitations are purposes. Mr. Babbitt wobbles on the point. One has only to turn the page to find him admitting that Schiller protested against the "purely recreative" art which is held by Mr. Babbitt to be a probable outcome of the play-theory. And yet later in the book (p. 181) one is startled to find the unqualified statement, "One may become 'free' and truly human simply by 'playing.'"

5. "Beauty as a Greek normally conceived it" (p. 178).

We have already protested against the notion that there was any normal Greek conception of anything. But when it is a matter of beauty, a normal Greek conception becomes laughable. The beautiful is not the subject of any Greek work (except the possibly Platonic *Hippias Major*) until the third century of our own era, and what its author—Plotinus—had to say on the subject would surely not be proper food for a humanist. Plato's scattered remarks on the subject with their emphasis on symmetry suggest much more "outer" form than "inner," and other than Plato, what have we in classical Greek thought? If we turn to Greek art in order to draw out of it an aesthetics—a dubious project at best—we find it as persistently changing as any other art. Where in the whole of Greek art does one find *normally* the "conscious imitation of a model built up from certain constant factors in human experience"?

These samples are typical of Mr. Babbitt's historical erudition. Nor are they saved by such words as "normally," "on the whole," and "in general." For Mr. Babbitt forgets his qualifications as soon as they are made and their sole purpose seems to be to confound critics who may charge him with exaggeration.

Such carelessness in the use of terms is apparent elsewhere in the book. One of the terms most used, for instance, is "primitivism." "Primitivism," like "romanticism," or "Christianity," or "idealism," is notoriously ambiguous. In using it, therefore, one must be especially careful to indicate what type of primitivism one is talking about, for what one says about one type does not apply necessarily to another.

Now "primitivism" is used by Mr. Babbitt to have the following traits, some of which may be logically related, others not.

1. It has its "point of departure in some form of the contrast between the 'natural' and the 'artificial,' presumably preferring the natural" (p. xii).

2. It is an attempt to get rid of the "humanistic dualism" between appetite and reason (p. xv).

3. It is a glorification of origins (p. 39).

4. It evaluates the peasantry, the humble (p. 52). At the expense of the bourgeoisie and the lofty?



5. It finds instruction in rural landscape and the starry sky and hills (p. 68). (Is the author of "I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills," a Wordsworth *avant la lettre*?)

6. It seeks—at any rate it finds—love in the habitations of the poor (p. 78).

7. It is analytical (?). This is very strange. By confusing the ultimate constituents of matter with historical origins, Mr. Babbitt turns physicists into primitivists. What is worse, if possible, he then proceeds to make chromosomes the biological analogue of electrons.

8. It hopes "that man may escape from his present disharmony by a recovery of the unity of instinct that he is supposed to have possessed before his fall from 'nature'" (p. 158).

9. It conceives of nature as "simple or naïve in contrast with the sophistication of an advanced civilization" (p. 160).

10. It substitutes "emotional expansion" for "a concentration of the ethical will" (p. 161).

There may have been people whose beliefs have had all ten of these traits. But the ten do not stand or fall together. Even historically the ideas they represent have not always been held together and that at no peril to consistency. Juvenal admired primitive man at times but he was emphatic in not admiring the idyllic and the pastoral, nor did he ever urge the Romans of his day to be impelled by a vernal wood. Similarly Messrs. Morgan and Jennings are our greatest sinners in respect to chromosomes, but so far they have not felt the necessity of urging man to recover his unity of instinct. Pindar believed that natural endowment was superior to learning, but I do not recall his believing that the peasantry had more natural endowment than the aristocracy.

A man more accustomed to the analysis of ideas would have seen at once that he is talking about a collection of doctrines, fads, attitudes, and not one. But Mr. Babbitt seems to lack the ability to know when two ideas are two. This applies even to the presentation of his own thoughts. Thus within a single page he scourges the primitivists for insisting upon creation as a standard for judging artistry and then uses the same standard himself for judging imitation (p. 14). If to be creative is bad, why is a creative imitator good? Again (p. 55) he ridicules Wordsworth's admiration for "spontaneity" and then praises him for being spontaneous (p. 58). He attacks what he imagines to be *surréalisme* and other "recent literary cults" (p. 126) for their emphasis upon originality and self-expression and immediately about faces and tells us how to achieve "true" originality. He both attacks Americans for imitating Europeans, saying that "it is time for us to initiate something of our own" (p. 223), and exhorts them to be true to traditional standards (p. 205).

But to see this sort of thing at its worst, let us take a continuous series of sentences: "It follows from all that has been said that *The Ancient Mariner*, judged by the quality of the imagination that informs it, is not only romantic but ultra-romantic. One should not therefore disparage it"—the ultra-

romantic is not to be disparaged—"or in general regard as the only test of its poetry its degree of conformity with the model set up by Aristotle in his *Poetics*"—that is, poetry may be great though violating the supposed canons of the *Poetics*. "One must insist that in the house of art are many mansions"—there are different kinds of poetry, Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian. "It does not follow that the mansions are all on the same level or of equal architectural dignity"—but does one *disparage* the lower levels? "That the *Ancient Mariner* is good in its own way—almost miraculously good—goes without saying"—by what standard is it good? "The reason for thinking that this way is inferior to the way envisaged by Aristotle"—is this disparagement or is it not?—"is that it is less concerned with moral choices in their bearing on the only problem that finally matters—that of man's happiness or misery."

Let us paraphrase. "There are two ways of measuring lengths, the metric system and the English system. Both are equally good. But the English system is better because real lengths are expressible only in yards."

This review is already too long. But Mr. Babbitt's eminence in the field of American letters makes anything but a careful study of his works a display of insolence. Its general disagreement with Mr. Babbitt's opinions and modes of expression should not be taken to imply a disagreement with his fundamental purpose. His effort to build up a school of literary criticism in this country is one for which all members of my generation are especially grateful. But our gratitude should not blind us to the fact that his purpose is being defeated by the manner in which he is trying to realize it.

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*Die nordischen Literaturen.* Von HILMA BORELIUS. ("Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft.") Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1931. Pp. 170. Pls. 11.

To give a historical survey of the Scandinavian literatures in one volume is not an easy task; to give, in addition, a critical estimate of the interdependence of these literatures and of their direct and indirect indebtedness to those of the Continent makes the task doubly hard. That Dr. Borelius, even in part, achieves her goal calls for high praise. In a stately volume, beautifully illustrated, she outlines clearly the trends and achievements of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish literature from the time of Saxo in Denmark and St. Bridget in Sweden to our own day. The Old Norse poetry and prose are not included; modern Icelandic is dismissed with a few lines, and Swedish Finland receives only passing notice. That these are beyond the scope of the volume should have been clearly stated; the impression might otherwise be that they were of no significance. Of necessity critical estimates are short; literary influences are suggested rather than analyzed; but the suggestions, often keen and stimulating, can readily be pursued by the aid of the fairly adequate bibliography.

The need of brevity results often in an unbalanced treatment, and the author's likes and dislikes at times distort her critical judgment. Inadequate is the discussion of Kierkegaard, whose stimulation of creative production deserves more attention. Any treatment of Norwegian literature that omits Asbjørnsen and Moe loses one of the most significant forces in nineteenth-century development. Hamsun displeases the author, is dismissed with slight understanding (Hamsun, by the way, was born in 1859, not in 1860, an error that Dr. Borelius helps to perpetuate). Hans Kink's forty-odd volumes receive no attention; Kink himself Dr. Borelius brushes aside in the one phrase *der dekadente Erotomane*. Sigrid Undset cannot be so ignored; but the author seems unwilling to accord her the possession of any ideals or genuine art. At times the presentation is obviously built on secondary sources. The author's comment on the *verse form* of Ibsen's *The Pretenders* and her comparison of it to that of *Love's Comedy* could have been made only by one who had not read the play, for the vigorous *prose* of this work marks one of the significant steps forward (possibly under Bjørnson's influence) in Ibsen's development. And, finally, though much is said of European influence on Scandinavia, the reverse is ignored—even in the case of Ibsen and Strindberg.

The bibliography, arranged by chapters, is on the whole adequate, at least for German readers. If, however, the publishers desire their "Handbuch" to find a wider public, it seems strange that English and French works are ignored. Of Ibsen studies J. Lavrin's *Ibsen and His Creation* is the only work in the English language cited. Archer and Gosse are ignored, Miss Franc likewise; and no American study of Ibsen, or of any other author, is listed. In the case of Ibsen, the listing of Hjalmar Pettersen's bibliography would have made other omissions less serious. Reque's *Trois auteurs dramatiques scandinaves* possibly appeared too late for inclusion. Frequently, too, the best and most easily accessible editions of authors are not listed. Thus the *Standard Utgave* of Kielland, of Lie, and of Ibsen receive no mention.

In spite of these shortcomings the volume is the most satisfactory survey of the field available. It is, furthermore, a stimulating guide that suggests new approaches to and new analyses of the interdependence of the Scandinavian literatures.

HENNING LARSEN

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*Classical Mythology and Arthurian Romance: A Study of the Sources of Chrétien de Troyes' "Yvain" and Other Arthurian Romances.* By CHARLES BERTRAM LEWIS. London: Humphrey Milford, 1932. Pp. 332.

The purpose of this book is to give the results of a systematic search for classical sources of Chrétien's romances. The author proposes, in fact, classical sources for *Erec et Enide*, *Lancelot*, *Yvain*, and *Perceval*. By far the largest

portion of the book is devoted to *Yvain*, *Erec* et *Enide* being treated incidentally along with *Yvain*. Chapters have been added to give opinions concerning the relation of the Mabinogion tales to Chrétien's poems, concerning the question of the Celtic origin of the Arthurian material, and to offer concise indications of classical and mythological sources for the other two romances. The author has gathered his conclusions into a final chapter; and he has appended an excellent bibliography and a useful index. The book is attractively printed and it has two illustrations: one of the gong of Dodona and the other of the plan of the palace hall at Tiryns.

Before Mr. Lewis began to write his book it was already known that Chrétien de Troyes used Latin sources. His essential conceptions of literary art and his idea of how a connected piece of fiction could be constructed were furnished by Vergil and Ovid. In addition to supplying him, as well as other writers of his time, with the most highly esteemed model for the artistic structure of his romances, the *Aeneid* also offered Chrétien for the *Erec*, his first romance, the important theme of an uxorious hero and his awakening from that condition. For *Yvain* the *Aeneid* furnished the same theme of amorous sloth and an awakening, plus the theme of the easily consoled widow, a confidant (Anna = Lunete) to encourage her, and the suggestion of a psychological development in the feminine mind *varium et mutabile*. From Ovid came the material for the works adapted from the *Metamorphoses* and the *Ars amatoria* (*Philomena*, *L'Art d'amors*, *Mors de l'espaule*), as well as the whole love technique and the figurative style in which Chrétien develops it in most of his romances. There are also other suggestions from Ovid, Statius, and other Latin authors. The enthusiasm of the period for Latin literature, the use of such literature in schools, the extensive use of Latin sources and abundant allusions to them by writers in France in the twelfth century, and the evidence of the various "poetic arts" of the time were known. This mass of evidence regarding Chrétien's classical sources existed and pointed the way clearly to a plentiful well-spring of inspiration.

The original contribution of Mr. Lewis is the indication of certain vague similarities in portions of Chrétien's poems to the plots of some classical myths, of a similarity in certain relationships between the characters in some of the romances and in certain classical stories, and of suggestions that some of the objects (cup, lance, grail, whip, fountain, garden) that appear in the romances may be due to classical influences.

For *Erec* and *Yvain*, Mr. Lewis proposes as a source the story of Theseus and the Minotaur. Erec's early adventures would represent those of Theseus; and the episode of the Joie de la Cort would correspond to the fight with the Minotaur, and the garden with its walls of air to the labyrinth at Crete. Both *Erec* and *Yvain*, then, had as their source the story of a fight between the hero and a monster at the court of some king or nobleman who maintains a "custom," the king's daughter being the reward for success in the adventure and for the destruction of the monster. In *Yvain*, according to Mr. Lewis, Chrétien

Chretien used this material twice, presenting two adventures of a similar nature: that of the rain-fountain and that of the *Pesme aventure*, combining with the first material connected with the cult of Zeus at Dodona.

A considerable part of Mr. Lewis' researches are concerned with this Zeus cult. He speculates on the details of the scene at Dodona and of the worship there, and arrives at the conclusion that the famous gong was a device for inducing rain, thunder, and lightning by means of imitative magic.

For *Lancelot* he suggests as a source the abduction of Helen of Troy by Paris and her rescue by Achilles; for *Perceval*, the story of the family of Atreus and the vengeance of Orestes on Aigisthos and Clytemnestra for the murder of his father Agamemnon. The Red Knight who took King Arthur's cup corresponds to Aigisthos. In an English version of this story the Red Knight is the slayer of Perceval's father and in one of the continuations of Chrétien's *Perceval* the vengeance motive appears. Agamemnon's scepter, sometimes called a spear, has, according to this theory, become the lance; and a cup which was an heirloom in Agamemnon's family has become both Arthur's cup and the grail. Mr. Lewis sees a striking similarity between the plan of the grail castle and that of certain halls in ancient Greek palaces. This would be the most interesting of all Mr. Lewis' suggestions if there were any reason to believe that Chrétien had any knowledge of the plans of such palaces.

According to Mr. Lewis these myths had been retold and handed down orally through the centuries, becoming extremely corrupt, until they reached Chrétien in the form of *contes d'aventure*, now written. These *contes* are the *livres* furnished to Chrétien by his rich patrons.

These suggested sources appear quite inadequate to the present reviewer. Any of them may of course have offered suggestions to Chrétien. His sources were numerous. He knew the story of Helen. He even alludes to her in one of his poems. He knew the Theseus story, and it is quite likely that it was, in part at least, the source of the *Pesme aventure*. But anything beyond this is mere supposition, devoid of any great probability.

Chrétien's acquaintance with this classical lore, moreover, demands no hypothetical stories in unspeakably corrupt form. He used standard Latin texts. The existence of the corrupt stories to which Mr. Lewis alludes is not proved nor is their transmission satisfactorily explained.

Valuable as Mr. Lewis' suggestions may be for present or later scholars, his method of erecting mere suppositions into facts appears to the present writer to result in the construction of a "card castle" that rivals the fairy walls of air and the magical disappearing castles of the romances themselves. We are not convinced that the author has proved any of his contentions. His conclusion that his findings tend to controvert the Celtic hypothesis seems particularly unfortunate.

FOSTER E. GUYER

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*La vita, i tempi e le opere di Dante.* Per NICOLA ZINGARELLI. Milano: F. Vallardi, 1931. Parti II: Pp. xxx+1388.

*Il settecento.* A cura di GIULIO NATALI. Milano: F. Vallardi, 1929. Parti II: Pp. viii+1243.

For three decades the *Storia letteraria d'Italia* of the Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi has been a standard work of reference. Although called a second edition of the series which the same publisher brought out in the 1880's, it was an entirely new work, treating each century in a separate volume by a different author, with additional volumes on *Le origini* (begun by the late F. Novati and recently completed by A. Monteverdi) and on Dante (by N. Zingarelli, issued in fascicoli between 1899 and 1903). A series of volumes on the same plan, called "terza edizione completamente rifatta," is now appearing; some of the volumes are entirely new: G. Toffanin's *Cinquecento* replacing that of Flamini, Natali's *Settecento* that of Concari; others are reissues with more or less revision: Bertoni's *Duecento*, Belloni's *Seicento*. New or revised volumes on *Le origini*, *Trecento*, *Quattrocento*, *Ottocento*, *Novecento*, are expected. The general appearance of the series is as before, but each volume is issued as a whole, not in fascicoli, and with the date of publication (previously omitted) given as it should be, on the title-page.

Zingarelli's *Dante*, not only nearly doubled in size but re-written from beginning to end, is called by its author a new work rather than a new edition. It now covers much of the material treated in the *Duecento* and *Trecento*; thus the first two chapters are on the history and culture of Florence, chapters vi and vii on the poetry of France and Italy before the time of Dante, chapter xxiii on Emperor Henry VII; long portions in other chapters concern the "times" rather than the "life and works" of the poet. On the other hand, in the *Duecento* and *Trecento* volumes the virtual exclusion of Dante naturally renders the treatment of those centuries incomplete; this feature has sometimes been criticized, but it has the advantage of devoting to Dante an adequate monograph, encyclopedic in scope, which has been and will continue to be useful as a member of the series and also independently. Zingarelli's purpose is to present not merely the poet, but the great personality whose inner life, as expressed in his writings, is illuminated by a study of external events and of the political, ethical, and philosophical ideas of the age. The *Convivio* is not to be regarded as a systematic treatise, nor the *Divina Commedia* as primarily a piece of artistic virtuosity or an allegory; these and the other works are expressions of Dante's individual character. His superiority to the men of his time, which was the cause of his personal misfortunes, is now the chief obstacle to correct interpretation of his works, according to Zingarelli; many scholars, even such men as Flamini, Busnelli, and Vossler, ascribe too much importance to Dante's "sources." Beatrice, Vergil, the *donna gentile*, are not so much symbols as personages in Dante's inner life; thus his ideal of moral perfection is impersonated in Beatrice, whom he made the keystone of his



thought. Since his personality is reflected in his actions as well as in his writings, the book is arranged as a biography in which the works are taken up chronologically against a background of the history of the age. This arrangement is superior to that of the earlier *Dante*, in which the life and the works were treated separately.

Although there is no novelty in the arrangement of the subject matter, Zingarelli's book belongs to no school, and frequently his opinions are at variance with those usually held. In general his interpretation commends itself to this reviewer as essentially sound; his solution of problems is based on a common-sense attitude and on broad knowledge of the bibliography of the subject. While citing divergent opinions, he is inclined to stigmatize them as *inaccettabili*, and to state his own dogmatically, sometimes failing to give due weight to the arguments of others. It is too much to expect a work of such scope to be composed with equal care in all its parts; sometimes the discussion is vague and the conclusion obscure. For instance, one chapter is devoted to the *Vita nuova*, but it is also discussed fragmentarily in other chapters; thus it is not always easy to get a comprehensive view. Nevertheless, the book makes fascinating reading; it is, of course, not adapted to use by a beginner, but it is not intended exclusively for specialists in Dante-study. One is filled with admiration for the diligence, the intelligence, the general precision of the work; even though its conclusions seem in some cases questionable, the opinions of a scholar like Zingarelli are always worthy of consideration. The reviewer desires to commend him here in a minor matter, the system of abbreviating the titles of journals, which is an improvement on other systems; he cites *GSLI*, *ZRP*, *SD*, etc., which is economical and adequate. By way of contrast, we may note that in the 1930 edition of his *Duecento*, Bertoni cites the *Zeitschrift* in the notes to chapter i in *six different abbreviations*, all cumbersome, instead of saying *ZRP* once for all. On the other hand, Zingarelli has seen fit to adopt a new method of printing the plural of nouns in *-io*, with an apostrophe, thus: *studi'*, instead of following one of the numerous better methods already widely used. There is an index of proper names, but unfortunately what Toynbee calls "notable matters" are not included in it.

A few details may be selected for comment here. In discussing the origin of the sonnet, Zingarelli (pp. 112, 130) reverts to the old view that it was a stanza of a *canzone*; he rejects Biadene's theory, now generally accepted, that it came from the popular *strambotto*, his only argument being that no *strambotto* is now known as old as the earliest sonnets. He does not cite Wilkins, "The Invention of the Sonnet" (*MP*, Vol. XIII); nor the useful little manual by Flamini, *Notizia storica dei versi e metri italiani* (1919), page 57, where a compromise between the two theories is attempted. Quite rightly he omits to mention Bertoni's unfounded theory (*Duecento* [1930 ed.], pp. 115-17) that the sonnet was invented by one of a group of poets assumed to have existed previous to the Fredericians. Both Zingarelli and Bertoni admit that the oldest extant sonnets are those by Giacomo da Lentino. The sonnet "Di penne di paone e



d'altri assai" is assigned to Maestro Francesco by Zingarelli (pp. 121), as in Cod. Vat. 3214, rather than to Chiaro Davanzati as in Vat. 3793, for the totally inadequate reason that the criticism contained in the sonnet could have been directed to Chiaro as well as written by him. The study of Palmieri on this subject (*Giornale Dantesco*, Vol. XXIII), with far more plausible reasons for the ascription to Francesco, is not cited. The reviewer hopes at an early date to present arguments in favor of the ascription to Chiaro. Zingarelli denies (pp. 585-87, 1121) that the phrase *dolce stil nuovo* can be properly used in reference to a group or school of poets, as is usually done; he believes that in *Purg.* XXIV Dante means to apply the term exclusively to his own style. Interpreting literally the words "Tu se' solo colui da cu' io tolsi Lo bello stile," he implies that Dante derived his style from Vergil, and owed little to his Italian contemporaries and the Troubadours. This is in line with his presentation of Dante as a superman not only in poetical genius but in every element of his character; he attempts to explain away all Dante's assertions, direct or implied, as to his own moral lapses. Thus the *tenzone* with Forese Donati is for Zingarelli merely a series of somewhat coarse jests, having no basis in fact. (To his references on the *tenzone* are now to be added Guerri's *La corrente popolare nel Rinascimento* and Barbi's rejoinder in *Studi Danteschi*, Vol. XVI.) The *canzoni dette pietrose*, Zingarelli maintains (pp. 351-66), are wrongly taken as *documento di un traviamiento morale*; the love expressed in them is not for any woman, but is that devotion to science and art which is the essential basis of Dante's character. Pietra, the stony-hearted lady, is Philosophy, and we are released from the idea that Dante could be the victim of *sconcia e torbida passione*. It is a consolation to small men, Zingarelli says, to attribute weaknesses to the great. One does not have to follow the current historical method of "debunking" in order to find such arguments inconclusive. Zingarelli's explanation of the reproaches of Beatrice in *Purg.* XXXI is unsatisfactory, and his interpretation of the last lines of the *canzone* "Io son venuto al punto de la rota" (p. 361) seems to be based on complete misunderstanding of the poem.

On the other hand, Zingarelli is admirable in his defense of the reality of Beatrice, and of her identification with Bice Portinari. The *Vita nuova* is not for him a romance or an allegory, but a narrative of real events, with a doctrinal purpose. However, the *donna pietosa* is not real even in the *Vita nuova* (p. 294): "deve trattarsi d'altra consolatrice che di una donna vera." The *Vita nuova* and the *Convivio* are the stories of Dante's love—the one for Beatrice, the other for philosophy. It is gratifying that Zingarelli rejects the common opinion, now thoroughly disproved by Shaw, that *nuova* in the title means 'youthful' (p. 303: "non semplicemente vita giovanile dunque"); but he does not accept the meaning 'new' (p. 279: "vita diversa dalla comune ... per nuova intende non novella, ma quasi miracolosa, straordinaria"). His discussion (pp. 296, 307) of the symmetrical structure of the *Vita nuova* is unsatisfactory. Following Scherillo, he rejects as imaginary the obvious pat-

tern of the lyrics arranged according to form; he groups them according to subject in three parts (10 plus 10 plus 11—more properly it should be three 10's plus 1), giving no credit for this grouping to Norton, who first made it plain, although he wrongly ascribes to Norton certain symbolistic suggestions of Gabriele Rossetti. It is difficult to follow him when he characterizes his central group of lyrics as *felicità dell'amore corrisposto*. Without intending to do so, he misrepresents the scheme in the reviewer's edition of the *Vita nuova*, which was devised, as he correctly says, *con forte propensione all'architettura nortoniana*. If Zingarelli had been able to consult Shaw's *Essays on the "Vita nuova"* before completing his own book, he would have found in some cases confirmation of his opinions, and in other cases he would have had to modify his argument. In regard to the time when the *Vita nuova* was composed, he accepts the current view that it was not later than 1293 (p. 301), and adds that Dante wrote it when twenty-eight years old, so that according to him it was not earlier than 1293. Both he and Shaw date the *canzone*, *Voi che intendendo*, in August, 1293; Shaw maintains that it was written some months after the composition of the *Vita nuova*, which he pushes back to 1292 or even 1291, while Zingarelli places the *canzone* between the final sonnet of the *Vita nuova* and the composition of the prose, which is thus delayed until after August, 1293. Possibly both scholars interpret too literally statements that were meant to be only approximate. Zingarelli is certainly correct in saying that the *Vita nuova* was composed *durante un novello fervore spirituale, e anzi da esso*, and that there is harmony between it and the *Convivio*; but his argument could be strengthened by consideration of Shaw's treatment of the subject.

The second part of the work is devoted chiefly to analysis of the *Divina commedia*. According to Zingarelli, the poem was begun after the death of Henry VII (August, 1313); this theory renders superfluous the assumption of interpolations in the text, and rejects the argument of Egidi and Vandelli, based on a reference in Francesco da Barberino, that part of the *Inferno* was written before 1313. Zingarelli admits no inconsistencies in the *Divina commedia*, and no distinction between *poesia* and *non-poesia*; the whole was written under a continuous inspiration, and it is always consistent with Dante's earlier works as well. Zingarelli has no illusions as to the accuracy of the *Testo critico* published by the Società Dantesca in 1921; he criticizes in several cases the procedure of the editors in establishing the text, as he also criticizes the text issued by Casella, and he differs from Barbi in some of the ascriptions of the *Rime*. At the same time, he naturally admits the great value of the *Testo critico*. His interpretation of the opening canto of *Inferno* is highly suggestive and in general satisfactory. The wild forest is not, as with Flamini, a prefiguration of hell (p. 851: "chi vede una cosa medesima con l'inferno, fa confusione e non intende nulla"); it represents the condition of human society in 1300, a condition portentous of disaster. The light of his youthful love for

Beatrice enables Dante to see the way of escape and to point it out to others. His own escape is impeded by fear of the "three beasts," namely, the faults of corrupt society, not Dante's personal sins which are the venial errors of a just man. In the *lonza*, Zingarelli sees, not the traditional *lussuria*, but *orgoglio*, which he distinguishes from *superbia* (the lion); the wolf is obviously *cupidigia*, a more general term than *avarizia*. Thus Dante's predicament exemplifies the state of humanity. The puzzling line *che non lasciò già mai persona viva* means simply that no person who was living in 1300, except Dante, had escaped from the forest. The *piaggia* is *deserta* because no one tries to ascend the mountain; *'l piè fermo sempre era 'l più basso* indicates that Dante walked on without stopping. The *vellro* is not Can Grande, but an ideal hero. These items indicate the method followed by Zingarelli in his comments on disputed passages.

Many other points in the book invite discussion, but we can mention only one or two. In his earlier *Dante*, page 18, Zingarelli accepted the traditional date of the birth of Cacciaguida, 1091, based on *Par.*, XVI, 37-39. Without explaining the change, he now gives (p. 57) the date as 1099-1101. Apparently the difference arises in this way: Dante's authority for astronomy, Alfraganus (*Il libro dell'aggregazione delle stelle*, ed. R. Campani [1910], p. 131), says that Mars completes its revolution "in anno Persico et 10 mensibus et 22 diebus fere"; allowing 365 days to the year and 304 to the 10 months, Zingarelli gets 691 days; multiplying this by Dante's figure 580 and dividing the result by 365, gives 1,098 years, to which are added 274 days for leap years, etc. But Zingarelli has ignored the express statement of Alfraganus (*ed. cit.*, p. 59) that the months of the Persian year are of thirty days: "Quia numerus quidem dierum cuiusque mensis eorum est 30 et invenitur inter ebenmeh et idramah 5 dies qui non numerantur alicuius mensis, sunt ergo dies anni 365." Thus ten months have 300 days, not 304, and the number to multiply by 580 is 687, not 691; so that the resultant date, 1091, is the correct one.

The treatment by Zingarelli of the Giotto portrait is peculiar (pp. 1330-33). He believes that Giotto began the frescos in the chapel of the Bargello after the fire of 1332, but that the portrait of Dante was painted by someone else after his death, from designs left by him; however, it is not really a portrait of Dante in his youth, as generally supposed, nor is it, strictly speaking, an ideal figure, but rather it is a representation of the poet as a kind of saint in perennial youth with symbolic attributes. As to the well-known sonnet by Antonio Pucci which testifies that the portrait represents Dante as he really looked, Zingarelli observes that it was *anteriore al 1390*—a safe statement, since Pucci died in 1388. The reviewer has shown elsewhere that the sonnet was probably written at about the time when the portrait was painted, and that the best critical opinion now regards the latter as the work of Giotto himself, painted shortly before his death in 1337.

It will be evident that Zingarelli has achieved a work of monumental scope,

in which he is not content to reproduce traditional opinions, but approaches every problem with an open mind and an individual interpretation. As a book of reference it is invaluable, but it must be recommended with the reservation that Zingarelli often states his personal theories as if they were ascertained facts. There are problems in Dante-study of which any solution is simply hypothetical, and no more susceptible of proof than are alternative solutions.

In attempting to present a comprehensive account of the eighteenth century, Natali was faced by a very different task. Here no personality dominates the period, but a host of major and minor writers require attention. In Italy, as in France, there has been a great increase of interest in the eighteenth century; but as Natali points out, there is still a lack of synthetic criticism, and of adequate monographs on most of the writers of the period. Thus in correlating previous studies of detail and in investigating many individuals and their relation to the thought of the day, he was engaged in pioneer work; and in his formidable task he has achieved notable success. The pages devoted to the chief figures are veritable monographs, while the other writers are not neglected, and the bibliographical information is ample. The book is divided into thirteen very long chapters (Zingarelli, with approximately the same number of pages, has forty chapters), those in the first volume are general in character, while those in the second include lyric poetry, melodrama, comedy, tragedy, built respectively around the "big four" of the century—Parini, Metastasio, Goldoni, Alfieri.

Natali protests against the view that the Settecento, especially after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, was a period of decadence, and that the reawakening of vitality which prepared the political struggles and the literary achievements of the nineteenth century was due to foreign influences. The reawakening was aided, but not caused or conditioned, by these influences; before Mme de Staël told them to do so, Italians had studied foreign literatures, even to excess; but without this study, the reawakening would have come. The seeds were purely Italian. For instance, Vico with his *Scienza nuova* in 1725 initiated the modern appreciation of Dante by insisting on the poetic imagination rather than on science; and Vico, the most original thinker of the eighteenth century in Italy, was preceded by Gravina and Bianconi. It is significant that the century preferred Dante and Machiavelli to the idols of the preceding age, Petrarca, Boccaccio, and Tasso; it marks a return to native classicism, in which even Arcadia helped, and in the midst of which the rise of original geniuses prepared the way for Italian romanticism. Even without the influence of Germany, France, and England, romanticism would have developed. In following this line of argument, it may be thought by some readers that Natali is led by his enthusiasm to go too far—that he underestimates the importance of internationalism and tends to make over into virtues what were really defects in native Italian culture. But in any case his book brings out clearly the enormous significance of the eighteenth century;

it was much needed, since previous works on the subject are entirely inadequate. It is a credit to the scholarship and breadth of view of its author, and is indispensable for all serious students of modern Italian literature.

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*Molière and Terence, a Study in Molière's Realism.* By KATHERINE ERNESTINE WHEATLEY. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1931. Pp. 124.

"The purpose of this study is to evaluate anew the Terentian influence in *Les Fourberies de Scapin* and *L'École des Maris* by a more detailed comparison than has been hitherto attempted and to set forth the relation of Molière's theory of comedy and that of Donatus" (p. 9). The study of Molière's realism extends only to a not very large number of adaptations of the Terentian material to contemporary conditions and hardly justifies, I think, the existence of the subtitle. Dr. Wheatley has, however, carried out her chief purpose with admirable thoroughness, precision, and restraint. She has compared very carefully the plots, the characterizations, and the corresponding passages which she presents, without overdoing it, in parallel columns.

Inasmuch as it has long been recognized that Molière drew upon the *Phormio* of Terence for some of the material which he incorporated in *Les Fourberies de Scapin*, Dr. Wheatley is chiefly concerned, after having determined what the poet's borrowings or reminiscences amount to, with the technique displayed in utilizing this material. The problem is more important and the conclusion more debatable in the case of the relation between *L'École des Maris* and the *Adelphoe* of Terence because there is a Spanish entry for consideration which has received a great deal of recognition: *El Marido hace mujer* of Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza. On the whole it seems to me that Dr. Wheatley has made out a strong case against Martinenche and Michaut for her contention that "the Latin [Terentian] influence is the more fundamental and organic" (p. 97). One arrives at this conviction, not only because of the strong arguments which the writer adduces in support of her position, but also because of an impression which a reading of her study gives that the Terentian material was more deeply imbedded in the poet's consciousness and that the rest is superstructure for which he might well have taken materials from any number of sources with which he was familiar in his triple rôle of actor, stage director, and poet. And then *L'École des Maris* was composed at a time when the poet was being criticized as a mere *farceur*, and it was very natural that he should go back rather purposefully to the poet who was regarded at that time as the highest exponent of Latin comedy. I should have great difficulty, however, in accepting Molière's own statement before a notary that he "had the Latin text before him" (p. 79) when he composed his play, for I cannot conceive of him as writing plays in that fashion.

I do not see, however, that such an assumption on the part of an amateur of the French poet makes Molière's imitation any the less "deliberate," or his use of details any the more "fortuitous," although Dr. Wheatley seems to think it would (p. 78). A complete study of *L'École des Maris* will involve the consideration of a larger number of plays than have been hitherto taken into account. But such a research will necessarily find its *point de départ* in this study by Dr. Wheatley.

The third chapter, "Donatus and Molière's Theory of Drama," offers more that is new and suggestive than the other two could possibly furnish. There is every reason to suppose that Molière had come early into contact with the *Commentary on Terence* ascribed to Donatus, for it very frequently accompanied the text of Terence's plays and was, no doubt, used in the schools in much the same fashion that, for example, our contemporary school texts of *Hernani* include *La Préface de Cromwell*. Dr. Wheatley presents some very precise internal evidence in support of her thesis. She deals here principally with *La Critique de l'École des Femmes* and essays to explain how Molière could "break so positively with contemporary theory" in the play and yet assert in *La Critique* that he had violated no rules. It is a very interesting and suggestive contribution to Molière study.

A Conclusion, an Appendix ("Dorimond's *La Femme industrielle* as a Source of *L'École des Maris*"), and a Bibliography complete the study. There are occasional typographical errors but none of them serious. At the beginning of the second paragraph of the *résumé* of the plot of *Les Esprits* (p. 46), the addition of a phrase at the end of the first sentence, to make it read: "in his house in the city," or, "in the house which he owned in the city," would have relieved me of the necessity of rereading Larrivey's comedy in order to arrive at a clear notion of the situation which was being presented.

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*A French Draft Constitution of 1792 Modelled on James Harrington's Oceana: Theodore Lesueur, Idées sur l'espèce de gouvernement populaire qui pourroit convenir à un pays de l'étendue et de la population présumée de la France.* Edited with an Introduction on Harrington's influence in France, and notes by S. B. LILJEGREN. ("Skifter utgivna av Kungl. humanistiska vetenskapssamfundet i Lund," XVII.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup; London: Oxford University Press, 1932. Pp. vi+180.

It is only natural that an enthusiast about a relatively obscure writer should come to feel that the influence of the man about whom he is concerned has been unduly minimized. It is equally natural that he should set about to



rectify the historical injustice by demonstrating the influence of his subject upon the future development of ideas. When such a study of intellectual ancestry is done with sophistication and caution it frequently yields results of some significance.

There is very little, however, that is more intangible and difficult of direct proof than the influence of one writer upon another. Ideas have a way of becoming part of the atmosphere in which they subsist. Names inevitably associated with certain ideas belong frequently to men who themselves found the ideas in the air they breathed; and the same ideas already definitely associated with those very names become part of the spiritual paraphernalia of later writers who perhaps have never heard of their predecessors. Every congressman who speaks of the will of the majority is an intellectual descendant of Rousseau, of whom perhaps he knows but little, just as Rousseau was himself, probably without knowing it, descended from the Jesuit Suarez. By the criterion of mere similarity of ideas Christianity can be derived from Ikhnaton and Omar Khayyam from Horace. Therefore, unless more definite evidence is also advanced, such as direct quotation, avowed citation, proof of familiarity or acquaintance, or even unconscious admiration, the argument from similarity to establish the influence of one political writer upon another is not convincing.

Mr. Liljegren proves quite conclusively that Lesueur's ideas were very similar to Harrington's. Unfortunately, Lesueur was so obscure that nothing but the information given in the pamphlet here reprinted can be found out about him. And so Mr. Liljegren is forced to rest his case for Harrington's influence on Lesueur entirely upon the argument from similarity. Yet there are so many other sources from which Lesueur might have derived his proposals that one is skeptical. The partitioning of France into a hierarchy of local subdivisions, one might think, came from the fact that France was already so divided (though it must be said Lesueur's nomenclature sounds more like the *Oceana* than the Constitution of 1791). The division of the male population into youth and manhood might have been derived from the Constitution of 1791 as much as from Harrington (though Lesueur like Harrington suggested the age of thirty as the dividing line, whereas the Constitution of 1791 suggested twenty-five). The division into *plus possidentes* and *minus possidentes* reminds one more of the active and passive citizens created by the Constitution of 1791 than of Harrington's division into horse and foot. It is highly probable that Lesueur knew his Harrington; it is even possible that he was more directly influenced by the *Oceana* than by the Constitution of 1791. It is only intended to maintain here that such ideas were in Lesueur's atmosphere and that exactly how he imbibed them no one probably will ever be able to tell.

Mr. Liljegren is not content, however, to argue that Lesueur alone plagiarized Harrington. In introducing Lesueur, he insists that Harrington was a major influence in French thought throughout the Enlightenment. His meth-



od here is somewhat open to question. It consists largely of quoting the comments of others who have said that such was the case. Some of these comments are quite close to the scenes of which they speak—such as Rutledge's and Barère's. But even these are based on no better evidence than similarity. In Montesquieu Mr. Liljegren finds Harrington's name mentioned once (unfavorably, to be sure; but he argues that away). He also finds that the *Encyclopédie* stated that Harrington's *Oceana* was little known outside of England. But because the *Oceana* was referred to in the *Bibliothèque britannique* in 1700 and 1737, and was translated into French in 1737, and because Rutledge, a French-born Englishman, wrote about Harrington in his *Éloge de Montesquieu* in 1786, and a French periodical in 1785 urged Mably to read Harrington, Mr. Liljegren, encouraged by the many similarities in thought which he found, argues that Harrington was very influential upon the writers of the Enlightenment.

His argument in favor of Harrington's part in the French Revolution itself is even less satisfying. Here, in addition to the resemblance of ideas, the argument is chiefly that Harrington's philosophy was imported indirectly from America and from England (through Gordon). Direct evidence of Harrington's influence reduces itself to an article on him in the *Gazette nationale* for July 4, 1794; a new translation of Harrington in 1795; and a single mention of him in a legislative address of 1796. Mr. Liljegren tries to prove that Sieyès was especially under Harrington's domination, but here there is no direct evidence advanced at all, and the argument is solely from similarity.

Mr. Liljegren sees some of the shortcomings of this method, but uses it none the less, though with occasional words of apology. The result is that one comes away with the feeling that Harrington had some effect on French thinkers of the eighteenth century—as witness the two translations of *Oceana*, occasional comments upon it in periodicals and speeches, infrequent quotation by other writers—though not nearly as much as Mr. Liljegren would have one believe.

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## BRIEFER MENTION

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The death of Charles Carroll Marden means more than the passing of a colleague and friend. For Marden was the first philologist in the Hispanic field who was trained at an American university; his teaching and his writing set a standard for all whose work touched his sphere. He represented in Spanish what I think of as the Hopkins ideal: the complete mastery of a single discipline. His devotion to accuracy, to thoroughness, was almost a cult. Carelessness, slipshod methods, superficial generalization, were to him actually immoral. To know the fact, to be sure of the validity of a theory, that was for him worth any amount of labor. The outstanding trait of Marden the scholar, and also of Marden the man, was his integrity. For a generation he inculcated his methods in his students at the Hopkins, at Princeton, and for seven summers at Chicago, which is proud to boast of him as one of its staff. But the unique thing about Marden was that his influence reached far beyond his students. There is hardly a man in his field who has not profited by his searching, yet friendly, criticism; there is none who has not found in his work a finer model for emulation. Now that he is gone, there is still for those who were close to him the memory of his genial personality; for all who work in his field there remains in every word he wrote the embodiment of those ideals to which he dedicated his life.—HAYWARD KENISTON.

It is a pleasure to announce that the first number of the *Hispanic Review*, a quarterly journal devoted to research in the Hispanic languages and literatures, will be published by the University of Pennsylvania Press on the first of January, 1933. The new journal, which is sponsored by the Spanish sections of the Modern Language Association, will be edited by J. P. Wickersham Crawford, of the University of Pennsylvania, assisted by M. Romera-Navarro and Otis H. Green, of the same institution, and by a staff of associate editors which includes Milton A. Buchanan, Alfred Coester, J. D. M. Ford, Joseph E. Gillet, Harry C. Heaton, Hayward Keniston, Rudolph Schevill, Antonio G. Solalinde, F. Courtney Tarr, and Charles P. Wagner.

Beginning with the number for May, 1933, *Modern Philology* will publish annually a bibliographical review of recent publications relating to English literature during the Victorian period. The scope of the review will be wider than that of any existing bibliography which touches on the literature of this period. It will attempt to list studies of the literature, and, in addition, to note material dealing with Victorian politics, economics, philosophy, religion, law, art, and society—in so far as this material has a recognizable bearing on

the literature. The preparation of the bibliography is in the hands of a committee appointed last December by the Chairman of the Victorian Literature Group of the Modern Language Association; the members are Charles Frederick Harrold, Michigan State Normal College; Frederic E. Faverty, Northwestern University; Helen C. White, University of Wisconsin; and William D. Templeman, University of Illinois, Chairman.

Like the sheep's head of the Scotch laird, Miss Margaret Ashdown's *English and Norse Documents Relating to the Reign of Ethelred the Unready* (Cambridge University Press, 1930; pp. xiii+311) supplies a considerable quantity of "fine confused feeding," and may have its value as a "hunger-waker" for those who have not gone far in the study of Old English or Old Icelandic, and have sufficient interest in early literature and history to wish to read the sources for the reign of Ethelred in the original tongues. A translation of the passages from *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, and even of *The Battle of Maldon*, can hardly be needed by anyone who has acquired a working knowledge of Old English. The text and translation of these two sources, and the copious notes to each, occupy 106 pages of the book; while Part II, consisting of "Norse" (more correctly "Icelandic") texts, with translation, notes, and appendixes, take up 166 pages. There is a lack of proportion here, for much of this second part has only the very slightest connection with England and Ethelred, and Miss Ashdown has carried her commentary far beyond what is necessary for the understanding of even the relevant portions of the texts. Her confession that this part "has grown to unforeseen dimensions" is made necessary only by her desire to discourse too liberally, not merely on historical matters, but on questions of scaldic grammar, diction, and meter, which are out of place in this connection. There is nothing in the contents of Hallfred's *Ólafsdraþa* to justify printing it in full here, with a translation and notes extending to nearly 7 pages. A good deal of the saga prose could also have been omitted without loss, so far as its bearing on the reign of Ethelred is concerned. It is in the notes, however, that Miss Ashdown has allowed her enthusiasm to carry her farthest away from her proper theme, the historical element being subordinated to the philological in a way which would be appropriate only in an Old Icelandic Reader. The same remark applies to Appendix IV, entitled "A note on Skaldic verse, with analysis of the kennings of the Norse text," which extends to 18 closely printed pages, and even then fails to point out some of the most important features of *dróttkvætt* meter.

The two indexes, one of "personal names" and the other of "place-names and of peoples," are necessarily made more extensive by the inclusion of so much extraneous matter in the texts, but even then are unduly expanded by full accounts of persons who are only incidentally mentioned in these. The career of Hallfred cannot be said to have any connection with contemporary events in England which justifies devoting nearly a whole page of small type to it. So far as they are relevant, however, the indexes are good, and will be

useful to the student of the period. The bibliography is placed at the beginning of the volume under the "Table of Abbreviations"; this no doubt accounts for the absence from it of Professor Sedgefield's edition of the *Battle of Maldon*, although it is cited in the introduction and notes.—W. A. C.

Hans Galinsky's *Der Lucretia-Stoff in der Weltliteratur* ("Sprache und Kultur der Germanisch-romanischen Völker," B, Germanistische Reihe, Vol. III [Breslau, 1932]; pp. 234) is an interesting contribution to *Motivgeschichte*. The author is not so much concerned with the content of the story, the *Stoff* as such, as with the adaptations of the material to time, place, and taste. He therefore makes no attempt to collect and list all existing Lucretia parallels, but surveys instead the clearest and most conspicuous versions of every period, in order to analyze the part played by changing intellectual backgrounds in introducing modifications into the story. For this purpose he sets up a number of what he calls "*Komponenten*" or structural elements and uses them as touchstones by which to test the attitude and manner of approach of each of the main literary periods. He considers that these structural elements involve time (historical component) place (Roman component), content (erotic and social-political component), the interpretation of the characters (moral), the idea of fame (classical or anti-Christian), the theme of beauty and death (pessimistic-tragic), and the hour of Lucretia's seduction (romantic atmosphere). This classification, while serving the purpose of the author very well, could easily be reduced to general points applicable to other similar investigations: time, place, content (which would include the erotic and social-political component as well as the pessimistic-tragic), character (including motivation and interpretation), and setting. This investigation reveals many interesting facts and shows the author's intimate knowledge of the numerous versions of the story. In spite, however, of his methodical approach and his careful analysis of each period, one could perhaps wish that the different parts of the study had been more closely connected and that the more general tendencies had been more strongly emphasized. The headings of the various sections within the chapters and the final summary, it is true, remedy this defect to a certain extent. More stress might have been laid on the rise and fall in popularity of the story. In the Renaissance, for instance, the deepened interest is very striking; not until then, apparently, did Lucretia become a subject for art (see Furtwängler, *Die antiken Gemmen*, I, 66, No. 16; II, 308).—BARBARA SALDITT.

Maximilian Rudwin's *The Devil in Legend and Literature* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1931; pp. xvi+354) gives an idea of the many curious things that have been said and written about the Devil. As the title announces, legendary and literary matters are the chief objects of interest, while iconography and theology—notwithstanding chapter iv, "The Form of the Fiend"—are less to the fore. The treatment of literary motives brings

much that is new. Legendary and traditional matters are often passed over without full realization of the difficulties involved: Bilwis (p. 31), whose connection with Billie Blin seems highly doubtful, might well have been omitted; but if he was to appear at all, much more was needed. Erminsul (p. 82) should not be a Germanic god. The remarks (p. 98) on the Devil's dam, a figure quite unfamiliar to western tradition, are curious. Can they explain in any way the queer saying, "The Devil is beating his wife [or grandmother]," which is used of the sun shining through the clouds? For the traditions (p. 188) about Gerbert (Pope Sylvester II) reference should be made to Raphael Meyer, *Gerbertsagnet* (Copenhagen, 1902). That queer figure of Germanic tradition, the stupid Devil (*der dumme Teufel*), is overlooked entirely, although I should have been glad for a suggestion how the figure originated.

Perhaps I have illustrated sufficiently the complexity of the subjects touched on. It might have been wise for the author to have restricted himself to the literary aspects of his problem and to have used traditional materials only incidentally. Although additions of many kinds might be made, I must content myself with suggesting three reservoirs of information. On occasion the *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens* (Berlin, 1927—) supplies useful comment, although the article "Teufel" has not yet appeared. In H. F. Feilberg's *Bidrag til en ordbog over jyske almuesmål* (Copenhagen, 1886-1914) we find a little under the main entry "djævel" and much more in the supplement. Surely the abundant collectanea which are summarily indexed in H. Ellekilde, *Nachschlageregister zu Henning Fredrik Feilbergs ungedrucktem Wörterbuch über Volksglauben* ("FF Communications," No. 85 [Helsinki, 1929]), should have been consulted: more than 500 entries on the Devil are noted (pp. 170-71).—A. T.

To the *Obras completas de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra*, edited by Rudolph Schevill and Adolfo Bonilla, have recently been added Volumes I and II of *Don Quixote* (Madrid, 1928, 1931). With the publication of these two volumes, Mr. Schevill, unfortunately now deprived of the aid of his distinguished collaborator, is approaching the end of a long task. There remain to be published only two more volumes of the *Quijote* and a revision of the already published life of Cervantes. When this is accomplished, there will be available at moderate cost critical texts of all of Cervantes' writings—nineteen volumes in all.

Hitherto, our best text of Part I of the *Quijote* has been Wurtzbach's "Bibliotheca Hispanica" edition. Wurtzbach based his text on no single edition, synthesizing all editions which appeared in Cervantes' lifetime and giving important variants from all. Schevill prefers to take the princeps of 1605 as his norm, likewise giving variants from the other early editions. Schevill recognizes, where Wurtzbach did not, the existence of variants within a given edition. Printers of the time often made corrections in the course of publication. Consequently, available copies of the princeps have been carefully

collated. Schevill is undoubtedly correct in thinking that Cervantes intervened as a corrector in none of the subsequent editions. The variants are of interest chiefly as indicating what contemporaries regarded as error. The editor is less happy in his theory that the compositors set up copy from dictation. Forms cited like *tambien* for *tan bien*, *simpar* for *sin par*, etc., prove nothing. They may be found in the autograph manuscripts of most authors of the period. An author, quite as much as a compositor or copyist, may be under the influence of auditory suggestion.

As in other volumes of the series, Mr. Schevill is sparing in his comment. He neither attempts a digest of previous commentators nor offers an exhaustive commentary of his own. His plan seems to be to offer a note when he has a real contribution to make. The notes as a whole show far greater bibliographical competence and knowledge of historical grammar than has been the case with Spanish commentators. Mr. Schevill recognizes that a syntactical commentary to the *Quijote* is much to be desired but feels that to be a task in itself. Many notes are distinct contributions. One may single out for special mention the few lines in which the "difficulties" of "the most difficult passage of the *Quijote*" are brushed away (I, 454).—G. T. N.

Américo Castro's *Cervantes* ("Maîtres des littératures" [Paris: Rieder, 1931]), while addressed to the general reader, will also interest scholars desiring a succinct biography of Cervantes. There are only 73 pages of reading matter and hence there is little scope for literary criticism, but no essential biographical fact is omitted and the author is abreast of the latest discoveries. Señor Castro's one novel contribution is his discovery that Cervantes' teacher, López de Hoyos, was a member of the Erasmist group. He now can answer the question put by many critics as to how Cervantes came under the influence of Erasmus' teachings. This question, merely touched upon in the present book, has since been treated at length by Castro in an article, "Erasmus en tiempo de Cervantes" (*RFE*, XVIII, 329-89). Forty illustrative plates increase the value and charm of the book. They have been happily chosen, and transfer the reader at once to a delightful sixteenth-century setting.—G. T. N.

The attractive field of the relationship of eighteenth-century fiction to neo-classic theory has been entered by Ethel Margaret Thornbury in a study of *Henry Fielding's Theory of the Comic Prose Epic* ("University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature," No. 30 [Madison, 1931]). The author obligingly reprints the text of the catalogue of Fielding's library from the pamphlet in the British Museum, and devotes a chapter to the evidence therein of Fielding's knowledge and interests. Beyond this, it may be questioned whether she has contributed much more than a rearrangement of points already well enough understood. Her main thesis is that Fielding's *Tom Jones* is the one most nearly perfect answer to the great Renaissance literary problem of how to write the modern epic. This conclusion will not

surprise many students of Fielding; yet the author has seen fit to demonstrate it, not only by a study of Fielding's opinions and practices, but also by an elaborate exposition of Renaissance opinion on the composition of epics, including many things that have only a faint relevance to Fielding's thought. That she has added anything appreciable to what has been shown by Spingarn and others, this reviewer doubts. Perhaps none of her main contentions will be judged categorically false; the question is, rather, what need there was to elaborate matter already so accessible.

In her conclusion, moreover, the author argues a little beyond her evidence when she suggests that Fielding established for novels the principle that "in some way, their characters and their situations must be representative of at least a part of the modern world" (p. 165). In view of the widespread interest of the eighteenth century in the observation and examination of ordinary life—an interest expressed, for example, in biography, in the journalistic essay, in the bourgeois tragedy, not to mention fiction itself—the idea that Fielding won any single-handed victory for realism is preposterous.

Equally at fault is her low rating of *Robinson Crusoe*, *Gil Blas*, and *Le Roman comique* as having "largely a kind of news appeal" (p. 165), as well as her statement that Fielding's methods of story-making "made possible the great development of [the] modern novel as a literary form" (*ibid.*). In truth, Fielding's use of elaborate intrigue, coincidence, and neatly arranged ending is perhaps just what the realistic novel of today is farthest from. In respect to method, one may venture to say, the modern novel owes less to Fielding than to Richardson.

The author is on safer ground when she says, "Perhaps, we should think of Fielding, not as the first English novelist, but as the last of the Renaissance writers of epic" (p. 164). A concentrated discussion of the foregoing statement, with all it implies, would have been a more useful study than the present one.—H. W. TAYLOR.



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